Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

185. Memorandum of Meeting Between Eisenhower and Gray¹

Washington, July 27, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

1. Robert Gray, Secretary to the Cabinet, joined us to discuss the Cabinet paper “Removal of Papers by Retiring Department and Agency Heads” (CP 59–58/4). I pointed out to the President that the paper which he had approved did not specifically advert to classified documents of the National Security Council and that it seemed well to have the covering memorandum make some reference to these papers. Thereupon Mr. Robert Gray presented to the President the draft document which is attached to Mr. Lay’s copy of this memorandum. The President approved the document and Mr. Robert Gray left the meeting.

2. I then asked the President whether he would be willing to see Mr. Charles A. Haskins for a few minutes at the conclusion of my business with the President to discuss the Jackson Committee study in view of the fact that Mr. Haskins was to be the President’s personal representative. I indicated that I felt that it would make Mr. Haskins a more useful representative from the point of view of morale and it seemed to me important for Mr. Haskins to hear from the President the limitations he wished put upon the scope of the study. The President said he would see Mr. Haskins and I added that Mr. Edward McCabe would come in at the same time.

3. I then discussed the draft Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of July 23 with the President and called his attention particularly to item 1c. I indicated that the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization had requested that it participate in any such study. I also pointed out to him that there was a difference of view between Defense and the Bureau of the Budget as to the second sentence in paragraph 1c. Defense wishing it deleted and Budget wishing it retained even though it might be modified in some respects.

The President said that he wanted no “ponderous studies” on this subject and that he wished an examination to be made by capable junior officers. He wasn’t even sure that he wished the study to be an NSC undertaking. However, he thought that such a study might be just for the benefit of the members of the National Security Council. He felt that he would like a picture of what the military believes to be the situation after a nuclear exchange. He would like to know what they felt to be the status of our resources, how we would have to use them, and in what way we would have to use them. For example, would our remaining resources be necessary for the purpose of winning the war or would the problem be one of survival.

He then recalled that the request that he had made in the July 23 meeting was that junior staff officers make the study and that the senior officers of the Services should not involve themselves except as they took an interest in what their subordinates were doing. The President felt that he would like to know what really would be the military problem under the conditions of a nuclear exchange and thought it was possible that such a study would show that rather than planning to increase and enlarge the military services in such a situation, quite a different approach might be indicated. He reiterated that perhaps our whole “mobilization base” thinking for such an emergency is obsolete, adding that a study might suggest an enlargement.

I indicated to the President that we would reflect that he had made a request for a study by junior staff officers with the participation of staff from OCDM. He approved this approach.

4. I then presented the attached draft memorandum to the President for his approval. I reminded him that he had directed that this procedure be followed some weeks ago, but that I had delayed taking action at Mr. Harr’s request until we were nearer the point of having a new Chairman of the OCB. Mr. Harr had felt and I had agreed with him that the letter of appointment to the new Chairman might be used as an occasion to indicate that the action concerning progress reports was not a downgrading of the OCB but rather put a heavier requirement upon the OCB.

I pointed out to the President that the State Department legislation had now been passed by the Congress and he would soon be in a position to appoint Mr. Murphy. The President approved the attached draft.

5. I reported to the President that in connection with current discussions about aid to Libya and certain possible covert actions in that country there had emerged for the first time to my knowledge the fact that the military perhaps did not consider the Wheelus base in Libya an essential base. I said this was not the final position of the JCS but that the Joint Staff had concluded that although the Wheelus base had very important peacetime functions, especially for training, there was no general war role for it. I told the President that I supposed that this was because of the comparative vulnerability of this base to Soviet IRBMs.

The President asked me whether the military wished to abandon it and have the Soviets take it over. I replied that I was sure that the military would not like such a result but that the reexamination was in part forced by an awareness that we probably cannot meet Libyan demands.

I repeated that this was not a final judgment but that I thought that the President ought to know that for the first time questions were being raised about the necessity for the base.

6. I reported to the President with respect to a 5412 activity, which is the subject of a specific memorandum.

7. I then discussed paragraphs 12 a and 16 of the Basic Policy paper. As to 12 a, I reported to the President that the Secretaries of State and Defense seem now to be in agreement on the version of 12 a which is attached, calling his attention to the footnote which would appear in the Record of Actions. I said to the President that we thus had an agreement between the principal department heads but that there was still some disagreement within the military establishment. I said that I feared, for example, that the Chief of Staff of the Army would not find the footnote compatible to his thinking and that he had tended to interpret the language in paragraph 12 a in a way quite different from the interpretation placed upon it by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and by the Secretary of Defense. Thus, I felt that the problem with respect to this paragraph as we would discuss it in the NSC meeting on July 30 would be whether he wished to allow those who found themselves in disagreement, to speak to it, recommending that he do so. The President agreed and said that he would welcome any further comments but he was in accord with my suggestion that this be the last meeting on the subject.

I then showed the President the draft of paragraph 16, which is attached. I pointed out to him that it defined local aggression as conflicts occurring outside of the NATO area.

This draft recognized that the engagement of sizeable US and USSR forces in NATO could not be considered local aggression and that short of such a situation we were reaffirming our commitment to NATO and NATO planning. The President agreed with this saying that in such a situation the decision could not be a unilateral US decision.

I also called the President’s attention to the world “balance” in the second line, pointing out that the Defense Department would probably object to it (it having been a State Department submission at the Planning Board) and that I personally would recommend against it in the light of the footnote to paragraph 12 a, and also because the reference here was to capability and not to forces. It seemed to me that what we really required was a flexible and selective capability. The President agreed and felt also that in the third line, the word “as” should be changed to “in cases” and the inter-lineation in the attached draft was in his own hand.

8. At this point Mr. McCabe and Mr. Haskins came into the meeting. I introduced Mr. Haskins to the President, pointing out to the President that the subject of the discussion was the Jackson Committee study.

The President began by stating that Mr. Haskins had been designated his representative in accordance with the guidelines agreed upon by the President and Senator Jackson. He then made the following points:

(1) There is a precedent for a Presidential representative to sit in at Congressional hearings in the case of the Immigration Committee, an arrangement which the President had established with General Swing. When that Committee has dealt with special cases (presumably the admission of defectors to this country under the exceptions procedure of the McCarran-Walter Act), the President’s representative has on occasion drawn the line with respect to the scope of Committee questioning, and the Committee has acceded.

(2) Of course, nobody is going to get into the substance of national security matters; that is out of bounds. That would open up the way for Senators to talk to their constituencies and to the press.

(3) The Jackson Committee at first went far afield, but has now decided to limit the inquiry. NSC discussion is advice given to the President and as such it is privileged.

Mr. Gray indicated that it seemed to him that problems with the Jackson Committee could arise in two ways: First would be the question of release of testimony taken in executive session. This matter could be dealt with by use of the Committee transcript, and Mr. Haskins would not be forced to take a position until after consultation with Mr. McCabe and others. The second and more difficult problem involves the issue of whether a question put to a witness involved substantive matter. At this point the President’s representative would find it necessary at least to raise a question with the Committee Chairman.

Mr. Haskins then raised with the President the need for a clear understanding of the exact scope of his responsibilities as the President’s representative, pointing out that questions might arise as to the interpretation of the agreed guidelines and particularly as to where the line between substance and procedure was to be drawn.

In response the President made the following points:

(1) That of course Mr. Haskins was not going to the Committee just to sit there as an observer; that it was up to Mr. Haskins to raise a warning light and, should the occasion arise, to say, “Now just a minute.”

(2) That Mr. Haskins was not to challenge the Chairman of the Committee, but that he was to point out where in his opinion he thought they were getting close to the dividing line.

(3) That it is far better to stop something in advance rather than to let it get into the record and then have to try to take it out of the record later.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

1. Source: Study of aftermath of nuclear war; Wheelus Air Force Base; basic national security policy; Senate consideration of NSC structure. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Staff Memos.