187. Letter From Furnas to Smith (S/P)1

Dear Gerry:
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The military paragraphs of Basic National Policy were disposed of by the NSC this morning in a way which I think should please you. There was practically nothing new or interesting in the discussion, and the Acting Secretary took the line set forth in the exchange of telegrams you’ve seen. Paragraph 12–a stood as written with McElroy’s note as a footnote. Twining commented that the language is all right with him so long as it is not a change of policy. He said he would have preferred the old but if the new one is agreed to he will not object. Paragraph 16 as agreed to in the Planning Board was amended only slightly and should cause us no serious trouble. Its main feature is that it leaves open the possibility of non-general war engagements between US and USSR forces so long as “sizeable” forces are not involved. Everyone agreed that the determination as to what is a sizeable force must be a question of judgement and needs to be looked at in individual circumstances. The “Radford Doctrine” is now out. Since paragraph 16 as now agreed to invalidates the present strategic concept and is satisfactory to the Department, Mr. Dillon withdrew our proposed definition of general war in paragraph 10.

The problem in the paragraph on enhancing the nuclear capability of selected allies is not yet fully resolved but will probably be settled before the end of the day. Only JCS is opposed to the version you last saw, and I believe they are coming around.

Attached are copies of paragraphs 12–a and 16 as they came out of this morning’s meeting.

Sincerely,

Howard Furnas

P.S. Sorry to miss you next week, but I’m off to Georgian Bay. Glad this ball-game didn’t go into extra innings. I feel that we just pushed over that winning run in the last of the ninth. Regards, HF.

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Enclosure

Approved Paragraphs

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12–a. [Par. 10–a of NSC 5810/1, amended]2 It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation’s war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. Designated commanders will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the Preseident.3

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16. [Par. 14 of NSC 5810/1, amended] Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use in cases authorized by the President. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, in conjunction with indigenous forces and with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat such aggression, or to hold it pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to defeat it quickly. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, forces should be promptly and resolutely applied in a degree necessary to defeat such local aggression. Force should be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities broadening into general war. Local aggression as the term is used in this paragraph refers to conflicts occurring outside the NATO area in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. The possibility of local aggression involving sizable forces of the United States and the USSR is ruled out; incidents in the NATO area such as incursions, infiltrations and hostile local actions, involving the United States and the USSR, are covered by the NATO political directive and strategic concept.

  1. Source: Transmits approved revised military paragraphs of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.
  2. All brackets, except those indicating footnotes in the original, are in the original.
  3. Paragraph 12–a of NSC 5906 was approved by the President with the understanding that it is not to be interpreted as a change in policy but rather as a clarification of existing policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons and the requirement for maintaining balanced forces. [Footnote is in the original.]