Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

168. Memorandum for the Record¹

S/P–59146

Washington, June 30, 1959, 2:30–5 p.m.

State-Defense Meeting on Military Paragraphs of NSC 5906

PARTICIPANTS

• State
  • Secretary Herter
  • Under Secretary Dillon
  • Assistant Secretary Smith
  • Mr. Mathews
• Defense
  • Secretary McElroy
  • Deputy Secretary Gates
  • Admiral Radford
  • Mr. Williams
• NSC
  • Mr. Gray

(Note: The first 45 minutes of this meeting were taken up by a Defense briefing on nuclear weapons.)

Secretary McELROY opened the discussion and made the following major points in the course of the meeting:

1. The policy set forth in the current key military paragraphs of Basic National Security Policy is flexible enough to take care of the military situations facing us around the globe. The language might be improved (although any change now would have an unsettling effect on our allies and within State and Defense) but the policy is right. Some of the language changes proposed in the Planning Board seem to have dangerous policy implications.

2. If there really is any question as to our determination to use nuclear weapons in limited war as required, State is fully justified in raising the questions it has and in being worried about our military posture. The President should affirm in the NSC his willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons in limited war when necessary.

3. The military cannot support State in the range of commitments it has assumed around the world unless nuclear weapons can be used as needed.

4. Defense is going just as far as it can to adapt nuclear weapons to meet all military needs.

5. The longer a limited war lasts, the greater the danger of general war. We should, therefore, not hesitate to use nuclear weapons promptly to discourage the enemy.

6. The Defense position is determined by McElroy, Gates, Twining and Radford, who have the responsibility. The Chiefs who favor a different position will be given an opportunity to present their views in the NSC.

Secretary HERTER made the following major points:

1. There are increasing indications that our allies and the uncommitted countries are not sure that they want our protection if this means nuclear war. One symptom is the trend among some NATO members to seek joint control over the decision to use nuclear weapons in the NATO area; France wants to extend joint (tripartite) control to the whole world.

2. In a situation of US and USSR nuclear sufficiency, we should not automatically use nuclear weapons in limited war. If it proved necessary to use them, we would, of course, do so.

Under Secretary DILLON made the following major points:

1. State’s “Summary Statement of Foreign Policy Requirements Bearing upon US Strategy” calls for forces with a dual capability, the non-nuclear component of which should be strengthened.

2. He understood the Defense position to be that we must use nuclear weapons to deter and fight limited war or put many more men and resources into our limited war capability. If our present planes can’t operate efficiently with iron bombs, we would need a new air force. Our Navy would have to be enlarged to fight without nuclear weapons.

Admiral RADFORD made the following major points:

1. In consequence of a Presidential decision in 1953, our whole military establishment is built on the use of nuclear weapons in any kind of military situation. Our present planes cannot operate efficiently with iron bombs and we have far too few planes to conduct non-nuclear air warfare. Nuclear weapons are essential for anti-aircraft and anti-submarine defense.

2. There are, however, practical restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons. There would be no casual use; use would be in accordance with careful prior planning.

3. It would take five years to reconstruct our military establishment to fight limited war without nuclear weapons.

4. The US could not keep its present forces in the West Pacific unless they were armed with and could use nuclear weapons. If we found it necessary to put ground forces in Viet Nam, they would have to have nuclear weapons to keep from being overrun.

5. There is no reason why nuclear weapons can’t be used against us in the less developed areas. The Chinese Communists can handle planes that can deliver nuclear weapons.

6. Basic National Security Policy should state that nuclear weapons will be used whenever such use is to our military advantage.

7. The definition of general war in the current strategic concept gives us the opportunity to take advantage of overt Soviet participation in military action against us to launch our strategic power against the USSR (the Admiral attributed this view to the President). If the USSR is willing to fight us openly, it must be ready for general war.

Assistant Secretary SMITH made the following major points:

1. The US–USSR strategic balance has changed since 1953, and decisions made then as to our military posture are not necessarily valid in 1959. It was this consideration which led the President at the conclusion of the 1958 review of Basic National Security Policy to direct that the military paragraphs of that document be kept under continuing review.

2. The definition of general war in the current strategic concept is too restrictive. When rigidly applied as in the State-Defense limited war study of 1958 it results in unrealistic assumptions about the non-use of nuclear weapons by the Communists in limited war. The military have, moreover, found it necessary to disregard the definition in some of their planning for certain contingencies.

3. State is trying to prevent our becoming dependent upon nuclear weapons in almost all kinds of military situations.

Mr. GRAY made the following major points:

1. The basic issues are

a. to what extent should nuclear weapons be used in limited war,

b. what is general war,

c. does local aggression occur only in less developed areas and

d. is the prompt defeat of local aggression by application of the degree of force necessary the best way to avoid general war or are there cases in which a lesser response to restore the status quo ante would be the best way to avoid general war.

2. We muddled through the 1958 Quemoy crisis without any clear understanding as to whether and in what circumstances we would use nuclear weapons.

1. Source: State–Defense meeting on military paragraphs of NSC 5906, use of nuclear weapons in limited war. Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy. Prepared on July 1.