169. Letter From Smith (S/P) to Herter1
Before your meeting with the President tomorrow on military policy, I hope that you will have a chance to read this letter.
I thought yesterday’s meeting with Secretary McElroy and Admiral Radford was discouraging. At Geneva, Secretary McElroy seemed sympathetic to the foreign policy considerations that you urged on him. However, Admiral Radford’s views seem to have changed Secretary McElroy’s mind.
Nothing that I heard at yesterday’s meeting led me to doubt the validity of the position that present American military posture and doctrine do not meet the imperative requirements of US foreign policy. It seemed clear to me from the discussion that we do not have a significant limited war capability unless it is assumed that we will automatically use nuclear weapons in almost any kind of military situation. As Admiral Radford made clear, the prospect is for rapidly [Facsimile Page 2] increasing dependence on nuclear weapons. This means that any limited engagement will likely result in total war. I think you put your finger on a striking fact in pointing out yesterday the anomaly of our planning for the use of weapons having a yield of over l megaton for tactical purposes.
Not only is the present military posture incompatible with American foreign policy requirements, but it is also deemed to be wrong by a majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—by those Services which would have to bear the brunt of fighting limited wars. This is not a new conclusion of the Army, the Navy, and the Marines. They argued strongly against the present military doctrine in the NSC last year. Our present military doctrine is also considered to be wrong by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Every officer in the State Department concerned with this problem has been briefed on the proposed State Department position and has endorsed it.
[Typeset Page 759] [Facsimile Page 3]The following excerpts from Bureau comments are pertinent:
EUR
“EUR strongly supports the Department of State proposal in the annex for revision of paragraph 16 (old paragraph 14), as well as the State-OCDM version of paragraph 12a.”
FE
“FE strongly urges NSC adoption of the State-OCDM proposal on paragraph 12a relating to the retention of both a US conventional and nuclear capability to fight limited wars. If our country were ever to lose the freedom to chose the weapons needed to do the job, it could be confronted with a local aggression where it would either have to use weapons so destructive and provocative of counteruse as to risk general war and, in any event, lose the war politically, or, where, knowing the disastrous consequences of thus opposing the aggression, we would be frozen into inaction.
“FE strongly endorses the State Department’s proposal for the revision of paragraph 16 as noted in the annex of the draft statement.”
AF
“Paragraph 12a: The State-OCDM proposal, stressing preparedness for limited war fought with or without nuclear weapons, is essential with reference to Africa.
NEA
“NEA feels strongly, however, that the State proposals in para 10 (definition of general war), para 12a (concerning US preparedness to fight limited war with or without nuclear weapons), and paras 15 and 16 (concerning the maintenance of ready forces with flexibility to fight limited wars of varying natures) are of critical importance for the carrying out of US foreign policy in the NEA area.
[Facsimile Page 4]ARA
“In particular, we welcome the greater clarity of the document, the somewhat more positive approach to economic questions, and the greater flexibility which adoption of the Department’s position on the military portions of the policy would give us with respect to limiting armed conflicts and avoiding having to rely principally on strategic nuclear capabilities to deter local wars.”
[Typeset Page 760]U/MSC
“U/MSC strongly supports the State position on these paragraphs and wishes to point out in addition that the decision taken on resolving the basic split on the development of a conventional capability by US forces also has definite repercussions in terms of US military assistance policy. If the US is not to develop a conventional capability of its own, we must either take major steps to develop a conventional capability among our allies and rely on them to do the job for us, or adopt the conclusion that any limited war will automatically lead to general nuclear war, in which case the development of foreign forces with a conventional capability is a waste of time and the taxpayer’s money, and our allies should be so advised.”
IO
“I attach the greatest importance to our proposed Paragraph 16, lest we end up under a nuclear umbrella that protects only bastion America, all other free-world positions having, in the meantime, eroded.”
[Facsimile Page 5]At yesterday’s meeting, Admiral Radford expressed some impatience that the State Department was raising the question of the use of nuclear weapons in limited war at this time. You will recall that during last year’s review of Basic National Security Policy, Secretary Dulles reluctantly concurred in the language of the existing military paragraphs only on the condition that they would be promptly reviewed by the Departments of State and Defense. The President directed that a review be undertaken.
I think that the issue of the political and military impact of present American military posture and doctrine is a central problem facing the US in its struggle with world communism. Our influence around the world is not as great as it should be. I think it will be less next year and in the years to come unless we get away from “massive retaliation” and the type of Military Establishment which this doctrine is developing. I hope you will stress the urgent need for this policy change on the President tomorrow.
[Facsimile Page 6]The decision will be a crucial one for American foreign policy in the period ahead.
Respectfully,
- Source: Bureau comments on NSC 5906 and use of nuclear weapons in limited war. Top Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.↩