Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

167. Briefing Note for the June 25 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, June 23, 1959

Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906)

We are now to begin the annual Council review of basic national security policy. In preparing the draft which is before you, the Planning Board first studied and discussed two pertinent National Intelligence Estimates (“Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958–1963”, NIE 11–4–58; and “Estimate of the World Situation”, NIE 100–59), which have already been discussed by the Council (at its meeting on March 5, 1959, NSC Action No. 2055.)

The Planning Board then had the benefit of comments on the existing basic policy paper (NSC 5810/1) from 22 outside consultants, who met in small groups with the Planning Board in five different meetings. Subsequently, in the light of changes suggested by all the agencies concerned and taking into account the consultants’ comments, the Planning Board has rewritten the paper. During the past ten days, 15 of the consultants have come back and gone over the revised draft. I shall summarize their principal comments, where pertinent, as I go through the paper.

I wish to make clear at the outset that there are four paragraphs of existing policy which the Planning Board did not consider: Paragraphs 13 and 14 (reprinted as 15 and 16), which deal with general and limited war; Paragraph 47 (now 58) on the mobilization base; and Paragraph 48 (now 59), which deals with the strategic stockpile. With those four exceptions, the Planning Board has considered every paragraph word by word, having devoted all or the major part of 11 meetings to substantive discussion.²

With respect to the language of 13 of the paragraphs as printed in the new draft (Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 11, 14, 21, 22, 24, 50, 53, 56, 60, and 64), the Planning Board recommends no change. Other paragraphs were revised in one respect or another and agreed to at the Planning Board. There are 9 wholly new paragraphs. In 15 of the paragraphs there are splits, in some cases more than one.

I now propose to go through the paper, not dwelling on the unchanged paragraphs, or on the less important agreed revisions, unless someone wishes to raise a question about any one of them.

Paragraph 3 (p. 3), which is split, gives an evaluation of the basic threat to the U.S. from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The majority proposal stresses that the “danger to U.S. security from the Communist threat lies not only in general war or local aggression but [also]³ in the possibility of a future shift in the East-West balance of power” which “could be caused by a gradual erosion of Western positions via means short of force, and over time by a continued growth of over-all Communist strength at a rate significantly greater than that of the West.”⁴

The JCS Planning Board Advisor preferred the language of the old paper, with the slight amendments indicated by the underscoring in the left-hand column.

(Call on: SECRETRY HERTER ALLEN DULLES ADMIRAL BURKE)

Paragraph 5 (p. 6) describes the basic task for the U.S. in general terms, pointing out the need, among other things, for adequate military strength and civilian preparedness. Treasury and Budget in their split wish to emphasize “while preserving fundamental American values and institutions”. Other Planning Board members felt that this thought was repetitious, being covered generally in Paragraph 1 and specifically in Paragraph 2.

(Call on: SECRETARY SCRIBNER MR. STANS)

Paragraph 6 (p. 7) summarizes the objectives toward the achievement of which detailed guidance comes later in the paper. The paragraph is virtually unchanged from existing policy save for the addition of subparagraph b. However, I should point out that a number of the consultants felt that the U.S. should not take the initiative in promoting sound economic growth and acceptable political development in the Free World.

Paragraph 7 (p. 8) is a revision of earlier language which called for presenting the true image of the United States, a concept which had puzzled the consultants.

Paragraph 10 (p. 10) is the general paragraph on deterrence and, as the majority would have it, is unchanged. State and AEC, however, wish to define the term “general war” by adding the words “a war in which the survival of the United States is at stake.” Adoption of such a definition would mark a change in present policy which “is based upon the assumption that any war with the USSR would be general war.” (NSC 5904/1, p. 2, footnote)

(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER Mr. McCONE)

Paragraph 12–a (p. 11), which deals with the use of nuclear weapons, presents one of the most important splits in the paper. However, in view of its relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, which are the subject of separate treatment, I propose that we do not this morning seek to deal with 12–a.

Paragraph 13 (p. 12) sets forth our policy on chemical and biological weapons. The majority would leave the language of the existing paper unchanged, but Budget and Treasury propose that the President decide on the stockpiling of such weapons, as well as their use.

(Call on: MR. STANS SECRETARY SCRIBNER)

Paragraphs 15 and 16 (pp. 12–14), as I explained at the beginning, were not considered by the Planning Board and are not up for Council consideration today.

Paragraph 17 (p. 14) deals with the “cold war” contribution which the capabilities of U.S. military forces can make. Existing policy is continued, but there is a split in that USIA proposes deleting the clause which uses the term “cold war.” It may be noted that Paragraph 9, as agreed to by the Planning Board, would sanction the use of the term “cold war.”

(Call on: MR. GEORGE ALLEN)

Paragraph 18 (p. 14) deals with U.S. bases overseas. It omits the reference to the possibility of “a small net expansion” of the base system, which was written into basic policy last year. The revised language reads:

“The entire overseas base system should continue to be reviewed periodically in order to assure that base requirements are adequately met and are related realistically to developments in weapons technology and other factors.”

The last sentence of Paragraph 18 (which is unchanged) deals with the positioning of IRBM’s around the Soviet periphery. While I have not yet discussed this in the Planning Board, I believe that IRBM’s should be the subject of a separate paragraph and not included in the paragraph on U.S. overseas bases. I am therefore going to propose to the Council, on my own motion, the following new paragraph:

“18–A. IRBM’s will be positioned only in those NATO and other Free World nations which demonstrate a desire to have them, and pressure will not be exerted by the U.S. to persuade reluctant nations to accept them. The determination as to the positioning of additional IRBM’s will be made by the President.”

Paragraph 19 (p. 15) treats generally of strengthening the collective defense system. As revised, it contains the new guidance that the U.S. should, as practicable, “induce Western European and other allies with well-developed economies to increase their share in collective defense.”

Paragraph 23 (p. 16) proposes a major change in policy and is split. Present policy provides in essence that the U.S. should seek to prevent the development by additional nations of nuclear weapons capabilities (NSC 5810/1, Paragraph 18, p. 7). Some of the consultants felt that such a policy is impractical because, as one of them put it, “the black art is too well known.” The new majority proposal is that the U.S. should seek to prevent or retard the development by additional nations of nuclear weapons capabilities; but, failing that, should (1) exchange with, or provide to, selected allies (additional to the U.K.) information on nuclear weapons and (2) even be prepared to make available nuclear weapons themselves to such allies. The Defense-JCS version would sanction exchanging with, or providing to, additional selected allies information on nuclear weapons, but it would not go so far as to be prepared to make nuclear weapons available to selected allies. Both proposals would, of course, be subject to obtaining the necessary legislative authority.

(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER MR. McCONE SECRETARY McELROY ADMIRAL BURKE)

Paragraph 24 (p. 16), which is unchanged from present policy, says that the U.S. should consider the long-term development of a NATO nuclear weapons authority.

The consultants were generally of the opinion that our policy should combine the first part of the majority proposal in paragraph 23 with paragraph 24. That is, our attitude toward providing nuclear weapons or weapons information to additional allies should be negative; but if pressed by an ally, such as France, for example, we should consider the matter not on a bilateral basis, but in a NATO context. The Planning Board seemed receptive to such an approach.

(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER MR. McCONE SECRETARY McELROY ADMIRAL BURKE)

Paragraph 25–a (p. 18) is a revised general guidance paragraph on providing military assistance to nations “whose increased ability to defend themselves and to make their appropriate contributions to collective military power is important to the security of the United States.”

Paragraph 25–b (p. 19) is new and deals with military aid to other nations, including uncommitted nations. It reads:

(Read Paragraph 25–b, p. 19)

Paragraph 25–c (p. 20) is also new and grows out of the OCB conclusions on the overseas internal security program.

Paragraph 26 (p. 20) is a new item of guidance and would encourage, in less developed nations, the participation of indigenous military forces in economic, social, and psychological programs.

Paragraph 28 (p. 21) is the general paragraph on military research and development which is in existing policy, with two new sentences added on nuclear weapons R & D. They read:

(Read Paragraph 28–a, p. 21, last two sentences)

Par 29 [p. 23] is a new paragraph which amplifies and strengthens a similar statement in the old policy [last sentence of old 22]. It takes the position that, given an adequate Free World deterrent posture, the Bloc will place chief reliance on non-military means and that the U.S. should accordingly give increased attention to non-military aspects of the contest. As a result of its discussion with the consultants, the PB decided it would be wise to recognize here that the Soviets also use military assistance, and to include language to reflect this.

Par 30 [p. 23] is a revision of old 22 and 23 which stresses that:

“The ability of the Free World to deal successfully with the competition of the Sino-Soviet Bloc will depend in large measure on demonstrated progress in meeting the political, economic and ideological aspirations of Free World peoples. In the long run, it is in the interest of the United States and of the Free World that this progress be accompanied by the spread of individual freedoms and the growth of democratic institutions and practices.”

I believe that this is consistent with the discussion last week on military takeovers.

Par 31 [p. 24] involves revisions the most significant of which is the addition of subparagraph e. (read subparagraph e)

Par 32 [p. 25] represents a somewhat more qualified U.S. attitude toward the use of the UN. [At the beginning of the second sentence, what is now “make effective use” was “make maximum effective use”. In the second sentence, at the bottom of page 25, the parenthetical language has been inserted as a qualification. Finally, the last sentence, a new one, reflects the new voting patterns caused by the entry of many new nations.]

Par 33 [p. 26] has been revised to reflect the improved economic situation in Western Europe. While still strongly supporting European integration, U.S. financial assistance to that end is drastically curtailed. [The FY 1960 Budget called for $3.5 million for the three continuing programs mentioned in the footnote.]

Par 35 [p. 27] is old 30, considerably revised. Old 30 said that independence of neutral less developed nations from Sino-Soviet control serves U.S. interests; the new language says that such independence “meets the minimum U.S. objective”. There is new language which says to avoid insofar as possible courses of action which appear to reflect more consideration by the United States for neutrals than for friendly nations. Further, there is new language which calls for providing incentives where feasible for the eventual incorporation of less developed nations in effective regional collective defense systems, for encouraging a maximum identification of interests and attitudes between these neutral nations and the U.S. and its allies, and for promoting practical forms of cooperation in non-military fields. A minority of the consultants advocated a still harder line toward neutralist nations.

To here June 2.⁵

Par 36 [p. 28], a new paragraph which would apply world-wide a policy contained in the current Latin America paper (NSC 5902/1), deals with maintaining contact with selected non-Communist opposition elements. I believe that we should add “through appropriate channels”.

1. Source: Basic national security policy. Top Secret. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
2. Includes June 22 meeting with consultants; excludes 5 earlier meetings with consultants and 2 meetings on the NIE’s. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. All brackets are in the original, except for those identifying footnotes in the original.
4. The majority proposal also points out such factors as the rapidly growing Soviet nuclear capabilities, which have made their leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas; the Soviet regime’s ability and willingness to identify itself with political and social discontent, and to exploit instability; and the ability of Communist leadership to act ruthlessly and rapidly and to repudiate agreements without being subject to moral restraints.
5. The Council reached this point in its discussion of Basic Policy (Through Para. 35). Discussion on remaining sections of the Basic Policy and Briefing Note will be contained in the subsequent Memorandum. [Footnote is in the original.]