Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

166. Memorandum From the JCS to Secretary of Defense¹

JCSM–239–59

Washington, June 20, 1959

SUBJECT

• Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906) (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a draft statement of policy on the above subject prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on 25 June 1959.

2. The majority view submitted by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with specific regard to paragraphs 3, 10, 12, 15 and 16 is attached as Appendix “A”. The minority view on these same paragraphs submitted by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force is attached as Appendix “B”.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement that you should:

a. Support the Planning Board majority view on the following paragraphs: 5, 13, 17, 42b, 43c, 44, 57 and 62.

b. Support the Defense-JCS proposal in paragraph 23.

c. Support the Department of State proposal on page 29, paragraph 38 and the majority proposal on page 30, paragraph 38d.

d. Support the State-Defense-JCS proposal on paragraph 39.

e. Support State-Defense proposal in paragraph 43f.

f. Support the Defense-Treasury-Budget-CEA proposals in paragraph 55.

g. Note the understanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that paragraph 58 will be the subject of separate NSC action and that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject are in preparation and will be furnished to you by separate memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

Appendix A

Paper Prepared by the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps

Washington, undated

VIEW OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

on

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (NSC 5906) (C)

1. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have reviewed the draft statement of policy (NSC 5906) prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 25 June 1959.

2. In the past, the United States has assumed that possession of the nuclear deterrent would severely curb the scope of USSR military actions in conflict short of general war. This assumption was based on our possession of the sole capability to employ massive nuclear retaliation at a time of our choosing should a situation get out of hand. Even though there may have been questions in the minds of many as to what circumstances would be critical enough to evoke a nuclear reaction from the United States, the United States did have the known capability to employ a nuclear attack without receiving unacceptable damage in return. Possession of this capability gave confidence to our allies and inhibited the USSR. With the removal of this inhibition due to their achievement of a capability to launch a crippling attack against the United States, Soviet actions can be expected to become more aggressive and venturesome, including resort to limited wars of increased scope and severity. On the other hand, our allies have already shown signs of a decreasing confidence in our ability to provide a meaningful security to the Free World. Therefore, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps believe that present Basic National Security Policy is not responsive to the present or prospective world situation. They, therefore, hold that the military strategy outlined in NSC 5906 should be changed.

3. U.S. military strategy should be designed to cope with a condition of relative nuclear parity, in which it is recognized that general war will result in mutual devastation. To do so, it must provide not only for an evident, secure nuclear retaliatory capability and an acceptable doctrine for its use, but it must also provide an evident, adequate and flexible capability for military operations short of general war and an acceptable doctrine for the use of that capability against the full range of possible Communist aggressions. The former is a primary requirement, but its existence does not meet the total threat to our security. In a time of relative nuclear parity, the ability to conduct operations short of general war is of increasing importance. The deterrence of limited Communist aggression, and Free World confidence that such aggression will be deterred will depend more and more on the strengthening of U.S. limited war capabilities. The United States should possess a capability and a doctrine which are flexible enough to enable it to deter or to defeat limited Communist aggression with the degree of force necessary to achieve the objectives of the United States at the time. Three issues are fundamental to the necessary revision of our military strategy:

a. Relationship Between Strategy and Policy Objectives. U.S. strategy must serve our national policy objectives of maintaining the cohesion of the Free World and influencing the policies of the Communist Bloc in directions compatible with U.S. security interests. This strategy must also provide definitive terms of reference which will permit a measurement of adequacy of retaliatory and defensive forces, thus facilitating the allocation of resources among the various elements which make up the total U.S. military posture.

b. Nuclear Weapons Policy. Relative nuclear parity has already made the policy of massive retaliation unacceptable as anything but a deterrent to total nuclear warfare. Therefore, the United States can no longer place main reliance on nuclear weapons for other forms of conflict, and must maintain forces capable of reacting to limited aggression with nuclear and/or non-nuclear means, whichever is in the best interests of the U.S. in the situation then existing.

c. Limited War. With regard to limited war, it is necessary that no restriction be placed, by definition, on the locale, intensity, duration, or participants. In effect, limited war is recognized as any armed conflict short of general war.

4. The military elements of national strategy, as outlined in NSC 5906 (majority view), do not provide for the flexibility and range of response essential to U.S. security in a time of relative nuclear parity. Additionally, they do not fulfill the Foreign Policy Requirements considered by the Secretary of State to bear upon U.S. strategy. These elements permit an interpretation which places undue reliance on nuclear weapons to a degree incompatible with the Foreign Policy Requirements. Further, they define limited war in a manner which will prevent the U.S. developing the capabilities necessary to a broad range of response to limited communist aggressions. Modification of certain paragraphs will, however, correct these deficiencies and provide a military strategy which is realistic, and is responsive not only to foreign policy requirements, but also to the threat as discussed in the version of paragraph 3 which is supported by the majority of the NSC Planning Board.

5. In view of these considerations and the additional reasons noted in the Annex hereto, it is recommended that you concur with the changes to paragraphs 10, 12, and 16 of NSC 5906 which have been suggested by the Department of State. It is further recommended that you continue to support the majority proposal for revision of paragraph 3, NSC 5906, and support the version of paragraph 15, NSC 5906 proposed in subparagraph d of the Annex hereto.

Annex to Appendix A

It is recommended that with respect to the following portions of NSC 5906, the Department of Defense adopt the position indicated below:

a. Page 3, Paragraph 3—Continue support of the majority proposal.

REASON: The majority proposal is a clear and complete description of the basic threat. Further, it emphasizes flexibility of the threat posed by the hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes, and the dangers of gradual erosion of the Western position.

b. Page 10, Paragraph 10—Support the State-AEC proposal.

REASON: There is currently no definition of general war in the policy. The definition the Department of State proposes to incorporate in paragraph 10 is realistic in a time of relative nuclear parity and will provide the necessary flexibility.

c. Page 11, Paragraph 12—Support State OCDM proposal.

REASON: It is essential that U.S. policy in an era of relative nuclear sufficiency be flexible and provide for the application in each situation of whatever forces and weapons or mix of weapons best serve U.S. interests. The United States must not be programmed into a one weapon military posture which will allow it to respond to limited aggression—be that aggression large or small—only by initiating or threatening to initiate large scale nuclear warfare. The majority proposal with its “main” reliance upon nuclear weapons, regardless of the types of conflict, is inconsistent with the majority proposal on paragraph 3, which recognizes the possibility of serious differences in outlook and policy among Free World nations on the use of nuclear weapons. The present degree of U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, particularly for meeting or deterring limited aggression, disturbs large segments of the Free World and impedes the fulfillment of our national policy objective of maintaining the cohesion of the Free World. This condition further substantiates the need for a more flexible national policy concerning the employment of nuclear weapons.

d. Page 12, Paragraph 15—Delete and substitute:

“15. So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or to take actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby invite destruction. Therefore, in carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop maintain, and secure, as part of its military forces, sufficient nuclear retaliatory capability to reduce the Soviet power complex to impotency. Security of our nuclear retaliatory forces is essential to permit reasonable size and to lessen the need for their immediate or automatic release in order to avoid their destruction. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. The national effort devoted to continental defense should provide for early warning and defense of retaliatory forces. It should also provide a level of defense in vital areas sufficient to require a significant enemy effort to counter it, leaving no single threat totally unopposed.”

REASON: The above proposal provides specific terms of reference against which the adequacy of the retaliatory and defensive elements of the deterrent can be measured and will facilitate the difficult decisions concerning the allocation of resources among the various types of forces which make up the total U.S. military posture. Until some rational limit can be placed on the size of the retaliatory force the continued and unlimited expansion of such forces will absorb resources sorely needed to develop other forces designed to provide essential flexibility of response.

e. Page 13, Paragraph 16—Support the State proposal which is reproduced on pages 61 and 62 of the Annex to NSC 5906.

REASON: The State proposal properly emphasizes the increasing importance of further developing and maintaining the capability, including a nuclear capability, to oppose limited aggression. Further, it allows much needed political flexibility in that it does not require in advance that the United States, once committed to action in a limited war, must apply unlimited force to achieve military victory regardless of consequences, but leaves the United States free to fight for a limited objective if such is the best course under the conditions then existing.

Appendix B

Paper Prepared by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Washington, undated

VIEW OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

on

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (NSC 5906)

1. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force has reviewed the draft statement of policy (NSC 5906) which was prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 25 June 1959.

2. It is the view of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force that there has been no change in the international situation since the recent approval of the basic military strategy section contained in NSC 5810/1 which would necessitate any change in the military section of Basic National Security Policy. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force recommends, therefore, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative’s proposal for Paragraph 3, the majority view in Paragraphs 10 and 12, and Paragraphs 15 and 16 as they now appear in NSC 5906, are suitable as the basic statement of United States policy. It should be noted that except for minor changes in Paragraph 3, all of these paragraphs are identical with those in the currently approved NSC 5810/1.

3. In reaching this conclusion, the following areas have been especially considered:

a. The basic U.S. security objective should continue to be the maintenance of a position of military strength which will permit aggressive political action to achieve, by peaceful means, U.S. national objectives. The military forces and tasks, and their priorities, necessary to provide the position of strength to permit the exercise of U.S. initiative in world affairs are correctly and adequately described.

b. The over-riding military requirement continues to be the development and maintenance of adequate and safe-guarded strategic military power.

c. Primary reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, and for selective use in actual conflict, is the keystone of U.S. policy and posture. This concept is the only course of action open to the United States compatible with the economic well-being of the United States and the free world and hence with the preservation of our fundamental values and institutions.

d. With regard to Paragraph 16, it is the view of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force that within the total U.S. military forces there must be a capability of deterring or, if necessary, defeating, local aggression with forces able also to contribute in general war. In the opinion of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, the United States has in being and has, in fact, demonstrated that it has forces ready and capable of responding rapidly and flexibly to local aggression and to carry out initial general war tasks.

4. Notwithstanding the existing disagreements regarding military priorities and force structure, I am of the firm conviction that the military strategy as currently expressed in NSC 5810/1 provides suitably flexible, current, adequate and clear policy guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments. It in no way pre-judges military requirements to the detriment of any one Service’s ability to carry out its proper responsibilities for the national security. Further, it provides the very basis required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enable them to carry out their responsibilities to assure the security of the Nation under any and all conditions.

5. It is recommended that the foregoing constitute the basis of the Department of Defense position on NSC 5906 at the National Security Council meeting on 25 June 1959.

1. Source: Transmits views of JCS on NSC 5906; includes Appendix A and Appendix B. Top Secret. 12 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.