The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the reference report
(NSC 5904) are transmitted herewith
for the information of the National Security Council in connection with
its consideration of the subject at its meeting on Thursday, March 5,
1959.
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Enclosure
Memorandum From Burke to McElroy
Washington,
March 2,
1959
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SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy in the Event of War (NSC 5904)(C)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft statement of
policy, subject as above, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, for consideration by the NSC at its meeting on Thursday, 5
March 1959.
2. Subject to the comments contained in Appendix “A” hereto, it is
recommended that you concur in the draft of NSC 5904 to supersede NSC 5410/1.
3. Additional information considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
be suitable for your talking purpose, with regard to paragraph 15 on
pages 4 and 5 of NSC 5904, is
contained in Appendix “B” hereto.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
/s/ Arleigh
Burke
Chief of Naval Operations
Appendix A
Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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COMMENTS ON NSC 5904
1. Reference Paragraph 2—Page 1. Support the
view of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
REASON: U.S. policy is based upon the
assumption that any war with the USSR would be general war. It must be presumed that the
Chinese Communists will be in any general war as an active ally of
the USSR, or will be a power
center capable of assuming world leadership when the U.S. and the
USSR have so weakened
themselves that they cannot maintain their power positions. It is
improbable that any of the
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other Bloc nations could maintain a
non-belligerent status in a general war. Therefore, the qualifying
phrases as applied to subparagraphs 2 b, c and d are
misleading. Furthermore, these phrases are inconsistent with the
Heading of Section A of the paper.
2. Reference Paragraph 6—Page 2. Support
Defense, Treasury and Joint Chiefs of Staff views.
REASON: The phrases recommended for deletion
are unnecessary and in the context of the paragraph weaken the
guidance the paper is developed to provide. It is almost a certainty
that the USSR and Communist China
will be in a war together; therefore, the phrase is unnecessary in 6
b. In c and d the phrase is redundant in view of the
limiting words “requisite”, “selected” and “as necessary” already in
the paragraph.
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3. Reference Paragraph 7—Page 2. Support
Defense, Treasury and Joint Chiefs of Staff views, and delete.
REASON: The paragraph is inappropriate in the
present paper. It might be proper and desirable in a paper dealing
with pre-war preparations. The subject paper (NSC 5904) deals with war situations.
Under war conditions, an attempt by Government departments and
agencies to carry out the policy stated in this paragraph would
divert effort and resources from the vital active military role.
While the United States must be able to absorb and recover from a
nuclear onslaught, to adopt this paragraph as a wartime philosophy
would in effect channel U.S. resources and efforts to activities
that cannot win the war. The first two words of the first U.S.
general war objectives are “to prevail.” This is defined as “to win
mastery,” “to triumph,” “to succeed,” and “to predominate.” This
objective cannot be attained by the policy stated in paragraph
7.
4. Reference subject, Section “B”—Page 4.
Suport the JCS view.
REASON: The majority view would restrict
limited war policy to Soviet satellite states. Neither the recent
U.S. action in Lebanon nor the British, French, Israeli venture into
Egypt involved a satellite state. Therefore, it would appear that if
the United States is to have a policy for limited war, it should
permit policy guidance for any limited war situation and not be
restricted to Soviet satellites.
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5. Reference paragraph 13, page 4. Delete.
REASON: While this is a valid statement, it
does not materially contribute to the policy statement. Moreover, it
does not properly belong under “Objectives.”
6. Reference paragraph 15, pages 4 and 5.
a. Delete the JCS proposed wording in lines 1 and 2 of paragraph
15.
b. Support the position of the JCS Alternative.
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REASON: The phrase recommended for deletion is
redundant. At the same time it can be interpreted to mean that
political and military factors are not all examined and weighed in
every decision to commit United States forces to war.
The proposed JCS Alternative is the
only one of the three proposals that is consistent with the
remainder of the paragraph.
The danger of general war being initiated by the USSR is present in any conflict in
which the United States or its Free World allies are involved.
Therefore, this risk must have been assessed and accepted before any
U.S. forces are committed to war in support of U.S. national
objectives. It is impossible to know what U.S. action would cause
the USSR to enter the conflict and
thus broaden it into general war. Since a policy to provide guidance
to the departments and agencies of the Government of the United
States must have a reasonably finite foundation, it cannot be based
upon an unknown.
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Further, including in a policy statement the thought that the United
States, to avoid a general war with the USSR, would revise downward or would abandon part or
all of the political and/or military objectives for which it was
then engaged in a war with a country other than the USSR could lead to fatal consequences
in terms of the U.S. national existence, since it would:
- a.
- Foster indecision in the planning of political and
military actions and in the utilization of the U.S. armed
forces in war in support of these plans;
- b.
- Place the decision of war or peace completely in the hands
of the USSR regardless of
the importance of that decision to the United States;
- c.
- Open the way to a series of political-military defeats
like Korea and Vietnam;
- d.
- Seriously, if not fatally, weaken the U.S. position as
leader of the Free World; and, as a consequence,
- e.
- Destroy the world-wide systems of military alliances so
painfully erected by the United States.
