The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the reference report
(NSC 5904) are transmitted herewith for
the information of the National Security Council in connection with its
consideration of the subject at its meeting on Thursday, March 5, 1959.
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Enclosure
Memorandum From Burke to McElroy
Washington, March 2,
1959
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SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy in the Event of War (NSC 5904)(C)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft statement of policy,
subject as above, prepared by the NSC
Planning Board, for consideration by the NSC at its meeting on Thursday, 5 March 1959.
2. Subject to the comments contained in Appendix “A” hereto, it is
recommended that you concur in the draft of NSC 5904 to supersede NSC
5410/1.
3. Additional information considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be
suitable for your talking purpose, with regard to paragraph 15 on pages
4 and 5 of NSC 5904, is contained in
Appendix “B” hereto.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
/s/ Arleigh
Burke
Chief of Naval Operations
Appendix A
Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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COMMENTS ON NSC 5904
1. Reference Paragraph 2—Page 1. Support the view
of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
REASON: U.S. policy is based upon the assumption
that any war with the USSR would be
general war. It must be presumed that the Chinese Communists will be in
any general war as an active ally of the USSR, or will be a power center capable of assuming world
leadership when the U.S. and the USSR
have so weakened themselves that they cannot maintain their power
positions. It is improbable that any of the
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other Bloc nations could maintain a
non-belligerent status in a general war. Therefore, the qualifying
phrases as applied to subparagraphs 2 b, c and d are misleading.
Furthermore, these phrases are inconsistent with the Heading of Section
A of the paper.
2. Reference Paragraph 6—Page 2. Support Defense,
Treasury and Joint Chiefs of Staff views.
REASON: The phrases recommended for deletion are
unnecessary and in the context of the paragraph weaken the guidance the
paper is developed to provide. It is almost a certainty that the USSR and Communist China will be in a war
together; therefore, the phrase is unnecessary in 6 b. In c and d
the phrase is redundant in view of the limiting words “requisite”,
“selected” and “as necessary” already in the paragraph.
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3. Reference Paragraph 7—Page 2. Support Defense,
Treasury and Joint Chiefs of Staff views, and delete.
REASON: The paragraph is inappropriate in the
present paper. It might be proper and desirable in a paper dealing with
pre-war preparations. The subject paper (NSC 5904) deals with war situations. Under war conditions,
an attempt by Government departments and agencies to carry out the
policy stated in this paragraph would divert effort and resources from
the vital active military role. While the United States must be able to
absorb and recover from a nuclear onslaught, to adopt this paragraph as
a wartime philosophy would in effect channel U.S. resources and efforts
to activities that cannot win the war. The first two words of the first
U.S. general war objectives are “to prevail.” This is defined as “to win
mastery,” “to triumph,” “to succeed,” and “to predominate.” This
objective cannot be attained by the policy stated in paragraph 7.
4. Reference subject, Section “B”—Page 4. Suport
the JCS view.
REASON: The majority view would restrict limited
war policy to Soviet satellite states. Neither the recent U.S. action in
Lebanon nor the British, French, Israeli venture into Egypt involved a
satellite state. Therefore, it would appear that if the United States is
to have a policy for limited war, it should permit policy guidance for
any limited war situation and not be restricted to Soviet
satellites.
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5. Reference paragraph 13, page 4. Delete.
REASON: While this is a valid statement, it does
not materially contribute to the policy statement. Moreover, it does not
properly belong under “Objectives.”
6. Reference paragraph 15, pages 4 and 5.
a. Delete the JCS
proposed wording in lines 1 and 2 of paragraph 15.
b. Support the position of the JCS Alternative.
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REASON: The phrase recommended for deletion is
redundant. At the same time it can be interpreted to mean that political
and military factors are not all examined and weighed in every decision
to commit United States forces to war.
The proposed JCS Alternative is the only
one of the three proposals that is consistent with the remainder of the
paragraph.
The danger of general war being initiated by the USSR is present in any conflict in which
the United States or its Free World allies are involved. Therefore, this
risk must have been assessed and accepted before any U.S. forces are
committed to war in support of U.S. national objectives. It is
impossible to know what U.S. action would cause the USSR to enter the conflict and thus
broaden it into general war. Since a policy to provide guidance to the
departments and agencies of the Government of the United States must
have a reasonably finite foundation, it cannot be based upon an
unknown.
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Further, including in a policy statement the thought that the United
States, to avoid a general war with the USSR, would revise downward or would abandon part or all of
the political and/or military objectives for which it was then engaged
in a war with a country other than the USSR could lead to fatal consequences in terms of the U.S.
national existence, since it would:
- a.
- Foster indecision in the planning of political and military
actions and in the utilization of the U.S. armed forces in war
in support of these plans;
- b.
- Place the decision of war or peace completely in the hands of
the USSR regardless of the
importance of that decision to the United States;
- c.
- Open the way to a series of political-military defeats like
Korea and Vietnam;
- d.
- Seriously, if not fatally, weaken the U.S. position as leader
of the Free World; and, as a consequence,
- e.
- Destroy the world-wide systems of military alliances so
painfully erected by the United States.
