144. Notes by Killian for Presentation to the President1
In some respects, the analysis we present to you is a follow-up on the report that the Technological Capabilities Panel made in 1955—the report in which we recommended that our ballistic missile program be given top national priority.
The preparation of the analysis which Dr. McMillan is going to present to you was initially prompted by a technical appraisal which the Science Advisory Committee has been making of our anti-ballistic missile program, including the technical aspects of early warning. Among the conclusions reached by the Panel studying this complex technical problem are the following:
“1. The Nike-Zeus system cannot be a factor in protecting the retaliatory force before 1964 or 1965.
“2. In general the tactics of dispersal, hardening, concealment through mobility, and quick reaction upon early warning, all seem more certainly effective, and more inexpensively effective, than active defenses, for protecting the retaliatory force. Furthermore, these tactics are available and can be implemented to an effective degree relatively soon.
“3. The Panel believes that these ‘passive’ tactics should be considered as the basic anti-missile defenses for both the aircraft and the missiles of the U.S. retaliatory force. We urge in the strongest terms that they be exploited more fully, and more rapidly than present plans call for.”
The analysis also reflects our interest in techniques and principles for achieving a greater degree of stability in our deterrent position in a [Facsimile Page 2] period when possible uncertainty in intelligence and in estimates of relative strength, together with rapid technological change tend to augment the uncertainties in our deterrence. Of course, one of the [Typeset Page 669] major factors introducing a greater degree of instability is the possibility of impending achievement by the USSR of a substantial ICBM capability.
I would stress that the material which we present represents an analysis of one part of our military problem. It is the opinion of the Science Advisory Committee, however, that this analysis, limited as it is, presents certain principles and concepts which appropriately can be weighed anew along with the many other factors involved in formulating military policy. In making this analysis we have been concerned with measures which increase the sureness of our retaliatory power. It is not our purpose to suggest increases in our military budget, even though we recognize the large budgetary implications involved. It is our purpose to suggest that we need to give higher priority to certain kinds of military programs. This could be achieved by reducing the emphasis on certain other programs, or if that is not possible alternately by increased expenditure. I suggest further that any implications for our military budget or for our military policy which may be inherent in this presentation have to do mainly with the future, not necessarily with the present.
In the report of the Technological Capabilities Panel in 1955, we presented a time-table which identified a transitional period reflecting our military position relative to that of the Soviet Union when we might find our [Facsimile Page 3] position changing from one of very great offensive advantage to one in which our situation would be relatively less advantageous.
The report described the effects of this period as follows:
“Deterrent effect of U.S. power dangerously lessened if Soviet production of multimegaton weapons and an adequate… delivery capability is achieved prior to the development of an adequate U.S. warning and defense system and before we have achieved a reduction of the vulnerability of our strategic delivery systems. Under these conditions, Soviet possession of such weapons and delivery capabilities would place the U.S. in danger of surprise attack and possible defeat.
“The situation might develop as early as 1958. If we permit our military position to worsen to this extent, we will be in a poor position to ward off Russian political and diplomatic moves or to make such moves of our own.
“The intercontinental ballistic missile can profoundly affect the military posture of either country with respect to Period III… If the U.S. were to achieve an intercontinental ballistic missile capability first, it could maintain [a]2 position of advantage… so long as the Soviets did not have this missile capability. If the Russians achieve an intercontinental ballistic missile capability first, they might gain a comparable position of advantage.”
It was suggested that this period might be followed by another when both the U.S. and Russia would be in a position in which neither country could derive a winning advantage because each country will possess enough multimegaton weapons and adequate means of delivery, either by conventional or more sophisticated methods, through the defenses then existing.
While we do not suggest that either of these periods exactly fits our present situation, we do emphasize that the impending advent of substantial ballistic missiles capability raises again with greater urgency the question.
[Facsimile Page 4]In concluding this introduction, may I also note that the views on hardening and on dealing with the problem of instability and uncertainty reflected in this analysis have been consistently held by your Science Advisory Committee and emphasized in all of its reports beginning with the Technological Capabilities Panel in 1955. We would stress again the great importance of achieving a secure—and sure—retaliatory capability.