Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

122. Memorandum of Conference with the President, and Department of Defense, NSC, and White House Officials¹

Washington, December 22, 1958, 10 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary McElroy
• Secretary Quarles
• General Taylor
• Admiral Burke
• General Pate
• General White
• General Lemay
• Mr. Gordon Gray
• Mr. Harlow
• General Goodpaster
• Major Eisenhower

Secretary Quarles, in speaking for the Department of Defense, summarized the questions for discussion as: (a) the revision of the Key West Directive in the light of the Defense Department reorganization, and (b) certain issues as to Service-DOD relationships in that directive.

Turning first to the revision of the Key West Directive as a whole (DOD Directive 5100), Mr. Quarles described it as a functional paper which sets forth the working relationship between unified and specified commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, channels of command requests, etc. As pertains to the military Services, and their relationship to each other (roles and missions), Mr. Quarles stated that this directive indicates nothing new. He assured the President, however, that the provisions of the new unified command plan have been brought into this directive without disagreement.

Mr. Quarles went on to say there were one or two points unresolved in this directive, however. In particular, he mentioned the manner in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are portrayed in the organization charts of the Department of Defense. In the two directives which are current, the Office of the Secretary of Defense proper is considered an extension of the person of the Secretary of Defense himself; whereas the Joint Chiefs of Staff are treated as a separate military staff, through whom the Secretary of Defense issues his instructions in exercising strategic direction of our armed services. Mr. Quarles said that this proposed revision of the directive has also placed the Joint Chiefs of Staff outside the Office of the Secretary of Defense; however, he feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could better be included within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In response to a question from the President, Mr. Quarles admitted that this problem is largely one of semantics, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense in either case would be components under the Secretary of Defense. Mr. McElroy pointed out that in the proposed directive the Assistant Secretaries are in one group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the other.

General Twining then spoke for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He pointed out that the Chiefs wish to avoid being under Assistant Secretaries of Defense. He supported this view by citing that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible by law to be advisers to the President and to the National Security Council, as well as to the Secretary of Defense. He feels that incorporation of the Joint Chiefs establishment into the Office of the Secretary of Defense would be downgrading to them, and this would be bad for morale. He finished by stating that the “reorganization group” had not recommended this change.

The President then stated a basic viewpoint with regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is that a staff should be organized as the boss wants it organized. Minute organizational details he described as “straining at a gnat.” Regardless of the wording of the law, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are direct subordinates of the Secretary Defense—they are his military staff. He recognized that the Joint Chiefs are probably concerned most about being placed under the Assistant Secretaries. General Twining assured the President that any arrangement will work and that this disagreement as to organization is largely a matter of prestige; the President then went on to summarize his conviction that in the defense of the United States the Joint Chiefs of Staff are far more important as a corporate body than as a collection of individual Service Chiefs; that if he were the Secretary of Defense he would not object to anything designed to maintain the dignity of the Joint Chiefs; and that the Joint Chiefs serve the Secretary of Defense primarily.

After Admiral Burke reinforced General Twining’s opinion as to the importance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vis-a-vis the Assistant Secretaries, General Taylor showed the President a diagram indicating an organization with the Joint Chiefs carried separately from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To this the President commented that military chiefs have always been technically considered advisers to the President (ever since 1903); but he is anxious that the Joint Chiefs be recognized as primarily a military staff for the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, he criticized drawing the line on the chart from the Joint Chiefs to the President equally as dark as that drawn from the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense. (The line to the Secretary of Defense should be solid, indicating direct line of responsibility.) He admitted that the Joint Chiefs do have an additional responsibility and stated that he will always see the Chief of a Service on matters of importance to that Service.

In summation, the President stated that he would solve the organization diagram by drawing two boxes, one for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These two boxes should be joined with a dotted line, indicating close coordination, and he did not object to another dotted line running from the Joint Chiefs to the President. He recognized that the problem that would exist if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were incorporated directly into the Department of Defense office in that Assistant Secretaries might be prone to oversupervise. He stated further that Assistant Secretaries are created in order to make the job of the Joint Chiefs easier; and are not designed to be their superiors.

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The President then proceeded to a problem corollary to that just discussed. He said that he did not see why we continue to use the term “joint.” Any strategic plan should be considered a “defense” plan (rather than a “joint” plan) which means that it is unified from its inception and is not the result of a welding of separate efforts. He stated that he would designate the senior military body the “Military Chiefs of Staff for Defense” rather than the “Joint Chiefs of Staff.” This he said he would do in spite of current legislation, in answer to Mr. Quarles’ statement that the name “Joint Chiefs of Staff” is statutory. (In this connection, the President pointed out that his residence is designated by law as the Executive Mansion, but he has never heard it referred to as anything but the White House. He voiced the opinion that many of these terms came about as a result of the school systems.)

The President then summarized the matters he would like to insure in his last two years in office. These he listed as follows:

(a) A realization of the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible to the Secretary of Defense.

(b) Recognition of the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff comprise a single group and not a collection of Service Chiefs. (The President recognizes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have some responsibilities to the President.)

(c) Amalgamation of the present “Joint Staff” into a truly single staff.

Mr. Quarles then stated that the only problem is to be sure that the Department of Defense is implementing the President’s desires. He invited comments from Mr. Harlow and General Goodpaster. Mr. Harlow summarized his view of the President’s desires on the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, emphasizing the statement of the President that excessive debate over organizational detail constitutes “straining at a gnat.” He considered these matters clear. He then questioned the matter of budgeting in this new directive.

To this Mr. Quarles stated that the unified commanders make military requirements known to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Provisioning as such is requested by the Services through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Harlow objected to this explanation, pointing out that a separate provisioning channel sets up two channels, in that the component commanders of the unified commands go directly to the Services for their “provisioning.”

When the President voiced objections, Admiral Burke attempted to explain the situation to some extent by assuring the President that the unified commander does know what is going on but does not concern himself with costs and finances. This appeared to alleviate the President’s concern. General Taylor attempted to bring the matter into focus by pointing out that the channel from the component commander to the chief of a service is a budgetary channel; but that the channel from a unified commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a strategic channel. The President stated that he would approve this arrangement, provided that decisions on strategic matters such as the strength of reserves, the numbers of carriers, etc., are reserved to the unified commanders.

Mr. Harlow expressed doubt that the paragraph places it in quite that perspective. Therefore, Mr. Quarles and the President checked the wording and agreed it should be substantially as follows: “. . . upon the basis of the agreed defense military requirements of that command.”

The President then brought up the question of intelligence services. He asked why there is not a solid military intelligence plan, pointing out that under existing arrangement three separate intelligence jobs must be done, and the material brought together. He stated he felt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be better served by an autonomous intelligence service at the Defense level.

Admiral Burke made a case for separate intelligence services based on his experience in CINCUNC, in which General Willoughby (G–2 of a unified command) had believed there were no Chinese in North Korea (November 1950). He expressed the opinion that in this circumstance Service disagreements were healthy. He further went on to mention a meeting on the subject of Laos conducted by the CIA. Here the CIA had been able to quote from many sources, including service intelligence. He felt the diversity had been helpful.

General Taylor reinforced the views of Admiral Burke to some extent by stating that the Joint Staff is providing autonomous intelligence service for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as such, will make a great contribution. He went further, however, to say that there are intelligence matters of unilateral Service concern that separate services should perform.

The President admitted that every military force needs its means of intelligence. He felt that the basic difficulty in this area was the intelligence services located in the Pentagon. They should produce unified intelligence and the intelligence which is used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should come through unified channels. He went on to comment on the fact that the War Colleges may contribute to the present insistence on separate intelligence services. He stated his opinion that War Colleges should lose their Service identification and should be designated as Defense Colleges No. 1, 2, 3 and 4. On all the matters of intelligence, the President stated that he is not specifically requesting a change, but that he is requesting that the Department of Defense ponder these matters seriously.

John S.D. Eisenhower

1. Source: Department of Defense reorganization and organization of military intelligence. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on December 23.