Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

121. Memorandum of Conference with the President, and Department of State, Department of Defense, and NSC Officials¹

Washington, December 19, 1958, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Herter
• Asst. Secretary Murphy
• General Twining
• Secretary Quarles
• Mr. McCone
• General Loper
• Mr. Gordon Gray
• Admiral Parker
• Colonel Schinz
• General Goodpaster
• Major Eisenhower

The purpose of this meeting was to present for the President’s approval the joint Defense/AEC proposal for dispersal of atomic weapons. (State had concurred.) Various items of discussion came out during the presentation. Essentially, these were:

a. Custody of atomic weapons, specifically that the military commanders be authorized to act as the agent of the AEC in maintaining custody of atomic weapons.

b. The precarious nature of our base agreements in such countries as [text not declassified] from a political standpoint.

c. Means of safeguarding dispersed atomic weapons in the event of limited or general war.

d. Relationship of the AEC with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy in operational matters.

In further discussion, the President stressed certain points of particular interest. He queried how well protected our weapons are overseas, and Mr. Quarles said they have the same protective arrangements as here. The President added that he had the feeling there was increasing lack of control on these weapons, and emphasized that there must be no carelessness in their custody. General Twining pointed out the need to balance conflicting considerations: while dispersal undoubtedly lessons control, if the weapons are not locally available to commanders in an emergency they may not arrive in time. The President commented that, as to anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons, he did not have too much reservation; when it comes to increasing the number of large weapons that are dispersed, he wanted very careful review of protective arrangements.

The President then asked how many weapons could be carried [text not declassified] on the first sortie; no one was able to give him a definite answer. He said his thinking was that the United States may not be able to carry out more than one sortie from this area, because fields could well be immediately destroyed. He asked as to the Defense thinking on this matter, indicating that while enough weapons to arm the planes that are stationed there could logically be kept on hand one must ask why we could not send the other B–47s planned for straight from the United States with weapons aboard. The Defense members said they would study this matter further.

The President approved the dispersal plan as presented by Admiral Parker. However, he desired that he be briefed at a later date on the planning by which this dispersion scheme has been calculated in order to afford optimum economy and usefulness of our national stockpile. (Scheduled for January 5, 1959.)

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At this point Admiral Parker and Colonel Schinz departed and Mr. Lay joined the group.

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The group then presented a letter for the President’s approval entitled “Instructions for the Expenditure for Nuclear Weapons in Accordance with the Presidential Authorization dated May 22, 1957.” Mr. Gray brought the President up to date on this subject by reminding him that the matter had been discussed this last September in Newport, at which time Mr. Gray had presented a version of these instructions agreed between Department of State and Department of Defense. At that time the President had raised certain questions. Mr. Gray stated that the language had been agreed but had at that time been too broad in that it allowed [text not declassified] attack any element of Sino-Soviet forces, without restriction. He pointed out the revised language in this letter states with relation to retaliatory missions: [text not declassified].

In regard to this language, the President questioned the status of China pointing out that only the Soviet Union has been mentioned.

(At this time word was received that the ATLAS satellite was transmitting the President’s voice over the radio.)

Mr. Quarles, in answer to the President’s question, stated that this limitation does not preclude an attack on China.

The President then asked whether these instructions were confined to a situation in which the enemy used nuclear weapons. Mr. Gray responded to this by pointing out that they apply to any attack, nuclear or non-nuclear, which threatens to destroy U.S. forces overseas. He pointed out, however, that it requires a clear situation [text not declassified]. Mr. Quarles affirmed this statement adding that pursuit into any territory as necessary is permitted except into the USSR, unless [text not declassified] there has been an attack on the U.S.—in which case pursuit into the USSR is authorized.

The President expressed his concern by citing the example in which an enemy submarine shoots two torpedoes into a carrier. In this case, does the commander suddenly decide that he must destroy targets on land in order to assure the safety of the rest of the force? In other words, he points out there is an infinite variety of conditions possible. To this Mr. Quarles answered that this letter sets forth principles only and that each commander will receive separate instructions, each set to be specifically approved by the President.

The President continued to stress the point of degree of retaliation. He cited the case of China. There he felt that we might hit bases which threaten U.S. forces and would not go so far as to hit Chungking with big weapons. Mr. Gray said that retaliation would be only sufficient to eliminate the local threat of Sino-Soviet Bloc forces.

The President continued to express doubt on the degree of response, citing the USS PANAY incident of 1937 as a case of attack on a portion of a U.S. force. This type of incident is exactly what he does not want parlayed into a major attack on our fleet. (Mr. Murphy gave as an example the necessity to strike [text not declassified] in the event of action in Korea.) The President let this subject pass, however, with Mr. Quarles’ assurance that this letter sets forth principles only and that the implementing instructions will deal with these contingencies specifically.

The discussion then turned to [text not declassified] permission must be granted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Presidential approval in each case. Such instructions will go to the unified commanders sealed.

[text not declassified]

Mr. Gray pointed out that if this letter is approved, it should be typed in three copies, one of which should be addressed to the Defense Department, one to the State Department, and one retained in the President’s files. To this the President did not respond, but stated that he would like to retain this letter for further examination.

Mr. Quarles pointed out that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be seeing the President on Monday, December 22, and it could be discussed further at that time. This the President approved.

(It was later decided to hold off this discussion in order to give the President time to study the paper.)

John S.D. Eisenhower

1. Source: Discussion of Presidential approval of Defense/AEC proposal for dispersal of atomic weapons. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on December 31.