Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

120. Presentation by McGuire Before the NSC¹

Washington, December 18, 1958

STATUS OF THE MOBILIZATION BASE 1 JULY 1961

PRESENTATION BY PERKINS MCGUIRE BEFORE THE NSC DECEMBER 18, 1958

INTRODUCTION

Mr. President, Gentlemen:

I will report on the projected status of our mobilization base as of July 1, 1961 with particular reference to the adequacy of our materiel to meet the requirements of basic national security policy objectives.

Basic policy states “The mobilization base should be designed to meet the requirements of:

(a) General war, initiated by the enemy with a nuclear onslaught or as a result of hostilities which were not intended to lead to general war

(b) Cold war, and

(c) Military conflict short of general war.

Emphasis should be given to those elements that will increase U.S. D-Day readiness and capability. Within the military, first emphasis should be placed on achieving readiness for the forces in being. The base should meet the objectives which I have summarized as follows:

(1) Maintenance of the active forces in a condition of optimum readiness to execute initial wartime missions.

(2) Maintenance and support of certain selected reserve forces in a high state of readiness.

(3) Maintenance and support of phased expansion to M/6 months force levels.

(4) The capacity to meet the combat requirements of all forces which would be mobilized by M┼6 months.

(5) Pre-M-Day positioning of selected supplies within the continental United States.

(6) Pre-M-Day positioning of selected supplies reasonably protected outside the United States.

(7) Maintenance and support of industrial capability to replenish stocks used in local war.

The presentation consists of four parts:

The force basis used in determining requirements.

Materiel readiness against the mobilization base objectives in quantitative and qualitative terms.

Selected problems.

Summary.

FORCE BASIS FOR DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS

The force basis used in determining requirements is shown on the next three charts. All data are expressed as a percent of the active forces in being on M-Day. For logistic planning purposes we place D-Day at M┼6 months. The first chart shows the Post M-Day mobilization of forces authorized in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan with an M-Day of July 1, 1961 which is our authorized planning base. The Post M-Day mobilization build up by Military Service is shown on the right. Army enters M-Day with 14 divisions, and proceeds to build up its forces to 21 divisions at M┼1; then continues as indicated to 42 divisions by M┼6 or D-Day. Navy begins with 684 combat ships, increases its forces to 1,044 ships by the end of the first month and, as indicated, to 1,630 combat ships by M┼6. Air Force increases its 101 wings to 140 wings by M┼1 and maintains that 140 wing structure constant throughout the build-up period. In like manner, the Marine Corps’ strength at M-Day is 3 divisions and air wings. These are increased immediately to 4 division/air wings and maintained constant thereafter. The forces are portrayed on the left as a percentage increase to the active forces on M-day, during the M to D-Day build-up period. The Army mobilizes its forces throughout the six months, increasing to 150% of the M-Day forces by M┼1 month; 229% by M┼3; and 300% by M┼6 months. Comparable positions for the Navy are 153% of its beginning forces by M┼1; 225% by M┼3; and 238% by M┼6. Both the Air Force and the Marines complete their build up by M┼1 month with the former increasing to 139% of its M-Day force and the latter 133%

The deployment of these forces during the M to M┼6 and D to D┼6 planning period is pictured here. JSOP–61 stops at D-Day. Post D-Day force projections, therefore, represent Service plans. For logistic planning purposes only, the deployment depicted here provides a basis for determining combat requirements for the forces engaged. Accordingly, they should not be interpreted as how deployment of the forces would actually take place under a variety of possible conditions. The effects of nuclear attack are not reflected in these force levels. For the Army and Marine Corps, the deployment figures represent total forces outside the U.S. For the Navy, deployment figures represent ships on station, and exclude ships in port in the U.S., or enroute. For the Air Force all combat units are shown as deployed, including those in the U.S., since all are in a position to perform their mission from their home bases. Of the 14 Army Divisions in being on M-Day, 8 are deployed; these rise to a level of 21 divisions by D-Day and continue upward, as indicated, until all 42 are assumed to be deployed at D┼6 months. Of the Navy’s 684 combat ships on M-Day, 610 are deployed. These rise to a level of 1,141 ships by D-Day, which remain on station throughout the D to D┼6 period. The Air Force increases the deployment of its total forces to 140 wings by M┼1. It remains constant through D┼1, after which attrition reduce the force by 52 wings, leaving 88 wing equivalents at D┼6. The Marine Corps starts on M-Day with one of its three divisions deployed and increases that deployment to the point where the D-Day force of 4 division/air wings is assumed to be fully deployed. This level of force remains constant during the Post D-Day period.

The third chart shows the relationship of U.S. forces engaged in limited war, to the active force structure and the Post M-Day mobilization of forces. An actual unified command contingency plan for resumption of hostilities in Korea is used for logistic planning purposes. 2 Army divisions or 13% of its active forces are assumed in this plan to be committed on M-Day to limited war. These rise to 6 divisions or 40% of the active forces by M┼3 months. 114 combatant ships or 16.6% of those in the active forces will be committed on M-Day, increasing to 245 ships or 36% of the active forces by M┼3. The Marine Corps with 1 division or 1/3 of its M-Day force, will increase its commitment of forces to 2 divisions or 2/3 of its active forces by M┼2 months. It is not planned for the Air Force to commit forces over and above the 6 wings planned for commitment on M-Day. This amounts to 6% of its active forces on that day. Not shown here, are those indigenous forces which may require support in limited war. The degree of support could be substantial, particularly for Army materiel.

This chart shows the overall status of our quantitative readiness, in percent to total dollar figures. The requirement to support the total force objectives under the plan is shown as the 100% line. Assets on 1 July 1961 to meet this requirement will be 77% of this need, of which 48.5% will be comprised of aircraft, ships and strategic missiles. If we look at the active and selected reserve forces portion of the total, our estimate of assets will bring us to a readiness position of 84% of the requirement for these forces. For such capital items as aircraft, ships and strategic missiles, the requirement is based on the estimated availability of the items involved. For other hard goods, the requirement is derived from the force objective, just discussed.

An evaluation of our readiness status, by Military Service, for these other hard goods which are calculated against the force objective, shows that materiel to support the active and selected reserve forces is as follows:

66% for Army

65% for Navy

81% for Air Force

40% for the Marine Corps

We are faced with a qualitative as well as quantitative problem which reduces the effectiveness of our inventories, and accordingly, attainment of 100% readiness on a quantitative basis will still leave us with a substantial modernization problem.

Illustrative of our qualitative situation is the following chart which shows the problem of modernization cycles. The 90 millimeter and 120 millimeter anti-aircraft guns have served their purpose for over 15 years. They now have a very limited defense capability and are being phased out for modern weapons capable of destroying today’s supersonic aircraft. The Nike-Ajax has been operational for only five years but is being modernized to the Nike-Hercules. Within the next five years, it is anticipated that the Nike-Zeus will be in the engineer-user test phase. The next chart shows the projected M-Day composition of the fighter-interceptor forces in the Air Defense Command and the Air National Guard. Nearly all the aircraft in the regular forces will be supersonic and most will have an atomic capability. The National Guard forces are equipped primarily with subsonic aircraft, with 69% of the forces equipped with aircraft having no atomic or Falcon capability. This is explained by the fact that generally new aircraft are not purchased for the Air National Guard. Both the Air Reserve and Air National Guard units are equipped with aircraft which are transferred from the Regular Air Force as it receives more modern aircraft equipment. Some of these aircraft, even though subsonic, are nevertheless effective operational aircraft.

In other areas, our rate of modernization is not keeping pace with the obsolescence of existing equipment. Our deferral of ship replacement has reached a point where the Navy foresees the loss of one half its force within the next ten years. To varying degrees, elements of the other Services are faced with like situations in either their force or equipment needs. In several instances our technology complicates the problem by out-distancing previously accepted modernization cycles.

Basic policy refers to two other aspects of our material readiness and I will address myself to these very briefly. One of these requires provisions of reasonably protected prepositioned stocks outside the United States. The next chart shows the current status of such stocks. The bars show the percentage of the requirement for prepositioned stocks which is located with forces or in depots overseas. All Services have met more than two thirds of their requirement, with Marine Corps and Navy in the best position. Most of the Air Force prepositioned stocks are with or immediately accessible to the using units as shown on the green portion of the bar, while most of the Army and Marine Corps stocks are in depots as shown in the yellow portion of the bars. Navy ammunition and petroleum products are likewise in storage sites. Additional pre-positioned stocks of all types of Navy supplies, are afloat with their mobile logistic support forces.

Limited protection of these prepositioned reserve stocks has been provided for ammunition and part of the petroleum products. This protection is of substantial value where coupled with dispersion, but is of doubtful value against direct attack with nuclear weapons. Protection of other supplies depends almost wholly on dispersal. The Navy’s mobile logistic support forces represent one type of dispersal. The Army gains protection by dispersing its reserve stocks into numerous small general depots, instead of concentrating them in a few large specialized depots. The growth of the Soviet tactical missile capability, which is forecast in current National Intelligence Estimates, makes it unlikely that substantial protection could be provided against direct attack. It now appears vital that greater emphasis be placed on the protection of critical supplies and facilities in the United States. I will discuss this problem further in connection with the problem of incorporating attack damage assumptions into our planning for general war.

Our industrial base to support the plan is generally adequate. This base consists of our current producers, which are a combination of private enterprise and the active portion of our DOD owned industrial facilities. This chart shows the progress being made in readjusting our packaged plants to the changes in strategic concepts. Packaged plants are, for the most part, groups of machine tools and production equipment held at a manufacturing facility or in storage to produce specific military end items for mobilization. As a result of our continuing review, considerable progress has been made in making these tools available for general re-distribution and utilization or disposal. Since April of this year, we have cancelled 210 such packages or 35% of the total that had been established. 105 or 17% have been re-approved while the remainder amounting to 294 or 48% are under review.

CONCLUSION

The status against the NSC objectives may be summarized as follows—necessarily these represent overall situations and do not reflect the Service variations associated with each of the objectives.

Readiness against the first objective exists in terms of quantities but not in terms of modernized materiel.

Readiness against the second objective exists in part but deficiencies in quantities as well as quality preclude a status equal to the high standards contained in this objective.

Readiness against the third objective is extremely limited.

Readiness against the fourth objective exists in terms of industrial capacity to meet the rate of combat consumption, provided there is no damage to our production resources.

Pre M-Day positioning of selected supplies within the continental United States is reasonable for limited war but relocation may be required under attack damage assumptions.

Pre M-Day positioning of selected supplies, reasonably protected, outside the United States has been accomplished in part.

Maintenance and support of industrial capability to replenish stocks for use in local war exists.

SELECTED PROBLEMS

I come now to the planning problem areas which I cited last Spring: namely, the M to M┼6 months build up, individual Service interpretations of Post D-Day planning and the question of reflecting attack damage assumptions in our planning for general war.

In my May briefing, I listed as a major problem area in planning guidance, the assumption that “six months of full scale mobilization and deployment might precede the outbreak of general war” and stated that a reevaluation of this assumption would be undertaken. A revaluation of these assumptions has been undertaken, but as yet we have not come to a satisfactory conclusion.

As noted earlier, we have not attempted to reflect the effects of attack damage in planning force levels for general war. The JCS have felt it infeasible to base planning on the results of any single war-game analysis, because of the many possible variations in the design of enemy attacks and in the effectiveness of our active defenses against attack. Further, it would not be necessary to reflect attack damage in force levels in order to insure balanced support, if we could reasonably assume that the effects of attack damage on forces would be proportional to the effects on support.

Studies have now made clear that we can not reasonably assume that attack damage to forces will be even roughly proportional to damage to support, but may be either much higher or much lower, depending on the type of forces, and on the policies for the geographical distribution of logistic support. Thus it is clearly essential to consider in some detail the probable effect of attack on both forces and supporting resources, if we are to have any prospect of providing effective post-attack support for surviving forces.

A study of hazard probabilities consistent with forecast Soviet capabilities in 1962 is now nearing completion. This new study, being made in collaboration with OCDM, considers: (a) A range of possible attack designs; (b) chance variations in aborts, attrition, and aiming error; (c) random variations in the direction and speed of the winds carrying fall-out. The results of this analysis will provide a basis for calculating the chance of loss of personnel or materiel at particular locations; for finding the places where the hazard is least; and for appraising the effectiveness of alternative kinds of protective measures in relation to their cost.

Preliminary results of this study show that about one-third of the depot warehouse space in the U.S., would likely survive a pre-meditated surprise attack in 1962. Despite the substantial amounts of materiel surviving attack, war-game studies have shown that under present distribution patterns very little continuing military capability would survive. This is because most of our depots are specialized in a particular class of products, and the surviving stocks would be so badly unbalanced that no surviving weapon system would be supportable. It seems clear that study must be given to the desirability of relocating a limited portion of selected assets so as to provide greater assurance of balanced post-attack support for a few weapon systems. To do this, however, we must decide what our post-attack national and military objectives will be. If we plan to try to support everything, we will not likely be able to support anything.

SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

To summarize, Mr. President, we have reviewed the status of our material readiness on a quantitative and qualitative basis, related to Basic National Security Policy Objectives. We have also reported on the progress being made on the planning problems outlined last Spring. We believe the answers to some of the problems outlined may evolve from the studies we are undertaking in refining the mobilization base support concept and the application of attack damage to our logistics planning. Solutions are essential for the improved material posture required by Basic National Security Policy Objectives.

1. Source: Status of the mobilization base, July 1, 1961. Top Secret. 18 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.