Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

119. Memorandum of Discussion at the 391st NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 18, 1958

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 391st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 18, 1958

Present at the 391st Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also attending the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were Mr. Laurence Robbins for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the meeting were the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Howard Furnas, Department of State; from the Department of Defense: Assistant Secretary Perkins McGuire, Donald F. Bradford, and Harrell B. Altizer; the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the Director of the NSC Secretariat.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. STATUS OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION BASE PROGRAM

(NSC Actions Nos. 1680, 1698, and 1918; NSC 5810/1, para. 47)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council² and called upon Mr. Quarles for a presentation by the Department of Defense.

Mr. Quarles said the presentation which would be given by Defense would show the basis for mobilization planning, i.e., for the procurement of materials and the establishment of reserves. This basis as it now exists has some weaknesses. However, the test of a mobilization base should be, what is procured and what reserves are set up? The Department of Defense has attempted to establish a pattern of mobilization and is seeking to improve the pattern. Mr. Quarles then called upon Assistant Secretary McGuire to make the presentation.

A copy of Mr. McGuire’s presentation is filed in the Minutes of the meeting and another is attached to this memorandum.

At the conclusion of the presentation, Mr. Quarles remarked that fundamentally the report just made represented a transition from World War II mobilization concepts to concepts consistent with the atomic age. From this point of view, the base has some inconsistencies, e.g., the National Guard and reserve programs. Defense can set up a logistics plan for the reserves, but Congress can upset that plan by its reserve legislation.

The President said he was intrigued by the assumption of a six months’ period between M-Day and D-Day. He would repeat an old saw: plans are worthless but planning is absolutely invaluable. Plans would probably be inapplicable to the actual war situation, but their value lay in the study and thinking required to produce them. The mobilization base presented represents a doubt that war will necessarily begin with an atomic exchange; if it did, 42 divisions would not be very useful. It was wise to try to provide a base which would fit various contingencies. The President applauded the effort had been expended on this difficult problem. Mr. McGuire said he was glad someone applauded.

Mr. Gray said the Planning Board, when it heard the presentation, had been impressed by the progress made in Defense. The six-months’ concept we still being examined. Defense had been frank in saying that its plans might be subject to great changes in case a satisfactory answer were found to the bomb damage problem. Mr. Gray hoped a later presentation would shed some light on this latter problem.

Mr. McCone recalled that 30 days ago the Council had heard a presentation indicating the war would be over in 30 hours.

The President said mobilization plans were affected by the amount of warning of attack received. If the 30-hour war occurred, little could be done unless strategic warning were received during the six-months period. Only in the pre-World-War-II period had any preplanning whatever been accomplished, and even this had been on a very austere basis. In 1941 many units drilled with dummy guns. Before the Korean War, the Chiefs of Staff warned of our weakness; despite these warnings we were unprepared when war broke out in Korea. The President believed the need for mobilization planning was absolute.

Mr. Dulles cautioned that six-months warning of attack would probably not come from intelligence sources. An intermediate possibility was that our mobilization activities during a period of increasing international crisis would serve as a deterrent.

Mr. McGuire hoped an assessment of probable bomb damage would eliminate the assumption that nothing useful could be done in the mobilization field. The President observed that he had asserted many times that if we assumed too much damage there would be little point in planning, since everything would be ashes. An earlier presentation had estimated that some areas would not be useable for 30 years after an attack; of course planning on that basis is impossible. While we won’t get off scot free in case of attack, we should make assumptions which describe a realm in which humans can operate.

Mr. McCone felt a distinction between limited and general war was necessary. In general war maximum emphasis would be on readiness to respond on D-Day. Mobilization activities preparatory to a small war, however, would be possible.

Mr. Quarles said the concept was that the mobilization base could handle a limited war without unacceptably impairing the general war base.

Mr. Quarles then raised the question of “packaged plants”. He said Defense had analyzed about half of these plants and considered that about two-thirds of those analyzed might be liquidated. The tremendous stock of material involved might be of great significance for underdeveloped nations. The President said he had earlier opposed the “packaged plant” idea. He had been told by business that the material involved in this concept could not be suddenly thrown on the market but would have to continue to be held by the Government.

Governor Hoegh wondered whether the machine tools in the “packaged plants” could be used in the recovery period after a nuclear attack on the U.S. when the industrial capacity of the country would be impaired. He felt this matter should be examined before the plants were “unloaded.” The President pointed out that, while machine tools were very hard to destroy, the labor force which would use them and the buildings in which they would be used were easier to destroy. Governor Hoegh, while admitting the importance of manpower, felt the problem should be studied. The President agreed; and added that the potential value of the plants to Latin America should also be studied.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the subject in the light of an oral report by the Department of Defense, presented by Assistant Secretary of Defense McGuire.

b. Noted the President’s statement that he concurred in the general direction being taken by the Department of Defense in its Mobilization Base planning, and that it should:

(1) Keep under study whether its Mobilization Base planning should continue to assume a mobilization period of six months prior to D-day.

(2) Continue its efforts to find a means of taking bomb damage into account in its Mobilization Base Planning, while keeping the assumptions as to the extent of damage within limits which provide a basis for feasible planning.

c. Noted the President’s directive that the Department of Defense should, in its study of the disposition of Defense package plants:

(1) Consult with the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization as to the possible need for such plants or equipment during the recovery and rehabilitation phase if there were nuclear attack upon the United States.

(2) Consult with the Department of State as to the possible use of such plants or equipment in assisting the economic development of under-developed Free World nations.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation, and report back to the NSC on developments within the next three months.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation, in consultation with the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, as to c (1) above, and with the Secretary of State as to c (2) above.

2. FALLOUT SHELTER IN EXISTING FEDERAL BUILDINGS

(NSC 5807; NSC 5807/1; NSC Actions No. 1882, 1948–b, and 2015; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter”, dated November 5 and 18, and December 4, 1958)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on this subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the meeting and another is attached to this memorandum.) A draft Record of Action and copies of a letter from Mr. Hoegh and Mr. Stans to Mr. Gray (attached) were distributed.

Mr. Stans explained that a program of building shelters would not be started at this time, but it was proposed to make $2 million available for research and the building of prototype shelters. The President wondered whether a strong ground floor in a building such as a public garage could be used as a fallout shelter.

In reply to a question from Mr. Dulles, Governor Hoegh indicated that under our policy the use of funds was authorized for installing fallout shelters in new Government buildings under construction.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed a joint memorandum on the subject (circulated at the meeting) by the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2015–b.

b. Agreed that, as an additional measure to provide some Federal example in the area of fallout shelter, the present program of shelter research and prototype construction should be broadened to provide specific emphasis on such research and prototype construction in existing Federal buildings.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget for appropriate implementation; and incorporated in a revision of NSC 5807/1, circulated as NSC 5807/2.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

Marion W. Boggs

1. Source: Agenda item 1: Status of Military Mobilization Base; Agenda item 2: Fallout Shelters in Existing Federal Buildings. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
2. A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the meeting and another is attached to this memorandum. [Footnote is in the original.]