Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

106. Memorandum From Gleason to the NSC Planning Board¹

Washington, November 5, 1958

SUBJECT

• Review of NSC 5410/1

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5410/1
• B. NSC 5810/1
• C. Memos for Planning Board, May 16 and October 17, 1958
• D. Record of Meeting of Planning Board, October 17, 1958

As a result of discussion by the drafting committee constituted by the Planning Board on October 17 (Reference D), the enclosed alternative policy statements on the subject are transmitted herewith for consideration by the Planning Board at its meeting on Friday, November 7, 1958.

Alternative A is a draft revision of NSC 5410/1 submitted by the Defense and JCS members of the drafting committee. Other members of the drafting committee feel that it might be preferable to deal with the substance of NSC 5410/1 along the lines of Alternative B, which is in the form of a draft Annex to NSC 5810/1.

Marion W. Boggs
Director
Policy Coordinating Secretariat

Enclosure

Paper Prepared by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, undated

Alternative A

Defense-JCS Revision of NSC 5410/1

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL WAR WITH THE SINO SOVIET BLOC

(Assumes that general war has been forced upon the United States, directly or indirectly. Reference to territory of the Soviet Union means the area included within the August, 1939, borders.)

1. To achieve a victory which will insure the survival of the United States.

2. To preserve and retain as many of its effective allies as possible.

3. To reduce by military and other measures the capabilities of the USSR Sino Soviet Bloc to the point where it has lost its will or ability to wage war against the United States and its allies.

4. Delete old par. 4 and renumber subsequent paragraphs.

5. 4. To render ineffective the control structure by which the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes have been able to exert ideological and disciplinary authority over individual citizens or groups of citizens in other countries and over their own peoples.

6. 5. To prevent, so far as practicable, the formation or retention, after the war, of military power in potentially hostile states sufficient to threaten the security of the United States.

6. While avoiding premature decisions or commitments, commence now formulation of, and keep under continual review, plans with respect to such issues as terms of enemy surrender, border and territorial rearrangements, the forms or administration of government in enemy territory, independence for national minorities, and the degree of postwar responsibility to be assumed by the United States in readjusting the inevitable political, economic and social dislocations resulting from the war.

7. In pursuing the above objectives, the United States should from the outset of general war:

a. Mobilize fully its moral, human and material resources.

b. Obtain the full participation of its principal allies in the collective war effort.

c. Seek the participation in or contribution to the collective war effort by other nations, as consistent in each case with attainment of the above objectives.

d. Divide, as practicable, the peoples and armed forces of the Soviet Union and Communist China from their communist regimes, and the peoples of the satellites from their Soviet-dominated regimes; and so far as possible enlist the active support of these peoples on the side of the United States and its allies in prosecuting the war against the Soviet regime.

e. Make clear that this war is not an attempt by the United States to impose by force of arms a particular political or economic system upon the world, but rather a defense against efforts by the Soviet regime to do so.

f. Exert U.S. influence at every opportunity during the war to shape political and other developments in ways favorable to U.S. post-war objectives.

8. The United States should maintain after the cessation of hostilities, U.S. and allied military strength adequate to achieve post-war objectives.

Enclosure

Alternative B

DRAFT ANNEX A TO 5810/1

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ARMED HOSTILITIES

1. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1) calls for sufficient U.S. military strength to deter the Communists from use of their military power. The initiation by the U.S. of preventive war to reduce Soviet or Chinese Communist military power is rejected as an unacceptable course of action.

2. If a general nuclear attack is launched against the U.S. directly or indirectly by the USSR, the U.S. plans to insure the survival of the United States by using all available means to destroy the will or ability of the USSR to wage war against the U.S. The only additional factor to be taken into account in such planning is the increase or decrease in the amount of anticipated damage to the United States resulting from different kinds of U.S. retaliatory attacks on the USSR.

3. It is not now feasible to state U.S. policy for the period following a nuclear exchange between the USSR and the U.S. Decisions will have to be made at the time as to the post attack missions of U.S. military forces then existing. Consequently, the U.S. must refrain from public discussion of political actions it might take during the second phase of a general nuclear war with the USSR but must make clear its determination to prevail if general nuclear war is forced upon it.

4. If Communist China joins the USSR in a general nuclear war, the U.S. will seek to reduce by military and other measures the capability of Communist China to the point where it has lost its will or ability to wage war against the United States. The active participation of Communist China on the USSR side should be prevented by all means consistent with other U.S. objectives.

5. In the event that Communist China initiates all-out war against the United States or its allies, the U.S. will carry out its treaty commitments and seek to destroy the will and ability of the Chinese Communists to wage war against the U.S. or its allies. In conducting the war against Communist China, the U.S. will make a major effort to keep the USSR from actively engaging in the conflict.

6. Basic national security policy calls for U.S. military strength adequate to present a deterrent to limited aggression. In the event the deterrent fails, and if U.S. forces are to be employed, a decision will be made at the time (a) whether vital U.S. interests require the defeat of the limited aggression by using whatever degree of force is necessary, or (b) whether U.S. interests would be served by using force to achieve the objectives of restoring the status quo ante and of limiting the area and scope of hostilities.

a. The United States should take the necessary steps to convince its allies that it is committed to carry out its treaty obligations, including the UN Charter, and possesses the capability to fulfill its commitments, using nuclear weapons as necessary to defend Free World interests.

b. The U.S. should make clear that it will not use force to impose a particular political or economic system upon the world, but will take all actions necessary to defend against Communist use of force to impose its system upon the non-Communist world.

1. Source: Encloses alternative policy statements on NSC 5410/1. Top Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.