Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

105. Memorandum Prepared by the Office of the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology¹

Washington, undated

SELECTED ISSUES IN THE FY ’60 DEFENSE BUDGET

(As of November 1, 1958)

Limitations and Approach of this Memorandum

1. It collects and classifies current questions about specific budgetary items; it does not seek to answer these questions. The questions selected deal primarily with the development and procurement of weapons systems. It does not, for example, cover military construction.

2. It reflects the methods and approach of scientists and engineers; it does not express or assume military judgment and experience. It does not attempt to evaluate the military risks entailed in making changes in the military program. It does not deal with factors arising from national domestic policy.

3. It does not assume that the total defense budget is too large, too small, or just right. The objective is to suggest those detailed questions which can help in answering this general question:

“How much military capability do we need and how much more or less will it cost?”

4. It does not exclude the possibility that our military capability may be substantially increased by a small increase in the total military budget. It is based on the conviction that expenditures for some weapons systems need to be increased, while expenditures for others can be cut back. It has not sought to determine whether the net effect of increases and reductions will be a reduction or an increase.

5. It reflects the strong conviction that questions about the effectiveness of weapon systems require a combination of technical evaluation and military value judgments, and that this combined evaluation is so complex that it warrants continuous effort by highly skilled analysts. It reflects the belief that increasing benefit can be derived from increasing the input of technical analyses. It recognizes that evaluation of the effectiveness of a particular military budget depends upon interaction between weapons systems, the nature of the threat, the strategic concept and consideration of relative costs.

6. It is not intended to imply that the questions raised have not already been considered by the services. Rather its purpose is to examine the basis for decisions on specific budgetary items and the extent to which relationships have been considered among alternate weapons systems designed to perform similar military missions.

7. The memorandum has organized the questions listed in the following four categories:

a) the strategic striking force

b) the defense of the striking force and home base

c) ground and sea forces

d) general military support

Determination of the balance of expenditure between the four categories presents many difficult issues. One class of issues is basically scientific, dealing with the estimation of probable consequences of allocation of military resources in the face of an assumed threat. The other class of issues involves value judgments as to what consequences, and hence what resource allocation are to be preferred. Military policy must be based upon decisions of both kinds.

Examples of technical questions relating to probable consequences are:

1. What is the most economical division of funds between the striking force and the defense of it, with the object of achieving a given strike force capability? Elements of the striking force are so expensive that a small expenditure on hardening, active defense, or quick reaction capability may significantly increase effectiveness per dollar of the striking force system.

2. What kind and what size of overseas war capability is needed to deal with the expected threat and what would be the costs of alternative assumed levels of capability?

Examples of questions requiring value judgment are:

1. What should be the proportion of the striking force directed to enemy attack bases as opposed to industrial or population targets?

2. What fraction of the military budget should be devoted to population defense against air attack?

Other questions of balance within each category are discussed below where relevant.

OUTLINE

I. Strategic Striking Force

A. General Discussion

B. Strategic Missiles

• Atlas
• Titan
• Minuteman
• Polaris Force
• Thor-Jupiter

C. Manned Bomber Striking Force

• B–52 with Hound Dog
• B–58
• KC–135 Jet Tanker
• B–70
• Goose

II. Defense of the Striking Force and Home Base

A. General Discussion

B. Active Defense

• Nike-Zeus
• Nike-Hercules
• Super Hawk
• Bomarc
• F–108 and GAR–9
• ASW Expenditure
• ASW Seaplane

C. Passive Defense

• SAC Alert
• Hardening

D. Ground Environment

• SAGE
• AEW and C
• Badge-Alaska
• Dewline
• BMEWS
• IREW

III. Ground and Sea Forces

A. General Discussion

B. Ground Forces

• Davy Crockett
• Vigilante-Mauler
• Redstone
• Hawk
• Short-range Missiles

C. Sea Forces

• Fleet Missiles
• Nuclear Powered Fleet
• Eagle Missile
• Bullpup v. White Lance

IV. General Military Support

A. General Discussion

B. Research and Development

C. Communications

• High altitude nuclear weapons effects
• Global communications systems

D. Navy Radio Telescope

E. Pacific Missile Range

F. Aircraft, nuclear propelled

G. Dyna-Soar

H. ARPA Space Program

I. BW–CW

I. STRATEGIC STRIKING FORCE

A. General Discussion

The mission of the strategic striking force determines, of course, related questions such as the size of the force, composition of the force, and the number of nuclear weapons it requires. In turn, the quantity of nuclear weapons assigned to the striking force will influence the number available for defense of the home base and for ground and sea forces and will affect substantially the budget of both the DOD and the AEC.

Is the size of the strategic striking force, therefore, to be determined principally in terms of its expected effectiveness against bases of the enemy striking force, or by its effectiveness for retaliatory purposes, or both? If intended targets consist of population centers and enemy war mobilization potential, would a smaller force be possible? Alternatively, if intended targets consist of enemy striking force bases alone, or such bases together with population centers, will a larger force be necessary?

With regard to the composition of the striking force, what is an appropriate balance between bombers and missiles? Is it desirable to have a mixed force of missiles, as, for example, a combination in the future of Titan, Polaris and Minuteman? Would such combinations reduce the vulnerability of the striking force and complicate the enemy’s problems of countering it?

Decisions to proceed with research and development of new delivery systems should clearly be distinguished from decisions to develop operational capabilities. The parallel development of competing delivery systems must take into consideration questions of relative technical certainty, costs, performance, time phasing and vulnerability to countermeasures.

It is within the framework of such considerations as these that the individual items listed below need to be evaluated when weighing their value to the striking force and in seeking alternative approaches.

B. Strategic Missiles

What is the most economical, fully adequate program for achieving a dependable strategic missile capability?

The strategic missiles, Atlas and Titan, are possibly redundant. Is this redundancy necessary to the reliable attainment of an ICBM capability?

Concerning Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman, the following comments are applicable.

1. Atlas

This missile provides the earliest possible ICBM capability.

If the Titan program is continued, should Atlas program be terminated as soon as adequate production of operational Titans is assured?

2. Titan

Do the improved characteristics of this missile justify its continued development in parallel with Minuteman?

Should there be a program for converting Titan to storable propellants?

Titan has much greater payload capability (or range) than Minuteman and promises an earlier availability. It is an improvement over Atlas and in the presently-planned sites is less vulnerable than Atlas.

3. Minuteman

Does this missile have a technical certainty and an expected operational performance and availability that would warrant exclusive reliance on it for an ICBM capability?

The most important feature of Minuteman is its large solid propellant booster. This feature may also be the most critical aspect of its development. Although there appears to be adequate back-up for the large-scale development of solid propellant grains required by Minuteman, the early stage of the development makes it difficult to predict the date of operational availability.

Is the level of development effort for Minuteman adequate to solve its problems and meet reasonable IOC dates?

4. Polaris Force

What constitutes an effective force level for this system, seen as an integral part of the strategic missile force of USA?

The cost and a great part of the complexity of this program arise from the nuclear submarine, not the missile. This makes an evaluation of force level an important consideration in assessing its effectiveness. Could the cost of this program be reduced and its effectiveness extended by installing Polaris missiles on other types of ships and by stretching out submarine procurement?

5. Thor, Jupiter

Are the problems of vulnerability as well as political acceptability of IRBM’s sufficiently great to warrant limiting these weapons systems to a very small number of squadrons?

Should one of these programs be terminated at an early date since the missiles operationally are so similar?

Difficulties of obtaining foreign bases may considerably limit the use of these weapons.

Both of these missiles depend on cryogenics and lack mobility.

C. Manned Bomber Striking Force

1. B–52

Can the B–52, equipped with Hound Dog, compete with possible new developments? What is the potential of the B–52 system for growth in the future?

2. B–58

Does the B–58 represent a sufficient improvement over the B–52 delivery system to warrant its further development? What would be its requirement for increased KC–135 support?

3. KC–135 Jet Tanker

What is the proper relation of the size of the jet tanker force to the manned bomber force? What is the vulnerability of the jet tanker refueling system?

4. B–70

Are the speed and altitude advantages of the B–70 over the B–52 great enough to warrant the substantial investment such a force will require?

What will be the capability of the B–70 for penetrating enemy defenses at the time it is operationally available?

What capability would the B–70 have for maintaining a force on airborne alert?

5. Goose

Assuming the availability of Quail, what is the requirement of Goose, considering its inflexibility?

II. DEFENSE OF THE STRIKING FORCE AND HOME BASE

A. General Discussion

It is perhaps in this area that the interrelations of weapons systems with each other is most complex and the evaluation of the technical facts is most dependent upon policy judgments. Important among the issues involving policy judgments are:

a. The size of the striking force to be defended;

b. The missions assigned to that force and for which it must then be defended—this influences the composition of the striking force and the fraction of each component which must, in extremis, be preserved;

c. The relative needs for defense of other targets on the home base, e.g. cities; determination of these needs involves judgment directly; it also involves judgment indirectly because decisions made under “a”, and “b”, above influence the amount of the enemy’s force available to attack targets other than the striking force.

In principle, once policies have been set which establish a yard-stick for effectiveness, many technical issues can be settled by adequate analyses of systems and their costs. Interpreted in this light, the broader technical questions relate to:

a. The choice of means for best defending the striking force—e.g., by warning and alert, by dispersal and hardening, and by active measures;

b. The extent to which defense against aircraft must be prosecuted in a missile age;

c. The choice of means for air defense;

d. The extent to which the threat from missiles launched at sea should be countered by warfare at sea.

Once the policies mentioned above are set and the technical analyses just listed are done, it is possible in principle to consider the broadest issues: the extent to which a given budget should be apportioned between striking force and its defense, and finally, the budget for the two which best meets the country’s needs as set by policy.

Another issue of a somewhat different sort seems important in connection with defense. The complexity of the defensive mission places great demands upon the organization which conducts this mission. The present organization, NORAD, is unified in the somewhat narrow sense that it can deploy and command the forces made available to it. But the technical composition of these forces and the nature of their equipment and of their supporting elements, (e.g., SAGE), are determined by separate actions of the three services (and also the services of Canada). On these matters NORAD can advise and request but not control.

Nor, outside of NORAD, is there any other mechanism of authority by which policy decisions, such as those mentioned above, can be brought directly to bear upon procurement, or upon research and development as these relate specifically to defensive efforts.

For these reasons, the most complex of the military tasks facing this country, and the task most needing careful balancing and interrelating of many components, is without an adequate structure for its management. Is an effort to improve the effectiveness of defense as a whole likely to fail without more centralized management?

The subsequent paragraphs of this section examine some specific technical issues.

B. Active Defense

1. Nike-Zeus

Is this system effective enough as planned at present to permit procurement plans to proceed, or should hardening of a fraction of SAC be undertaken instead, while R & D on the Zeus system is carried on at the highest practical rate?

A large ICBM can carry more than a dozen appropriately designed warheads which reenter separately and must be countered individually. The cost of an effective defense by Nike-Zeus then depends critically upon the cost of furnishing the necessary fire power. Does this fact, together with the fact that the radars of the Zeus system are necessarily soft targets, suggest that hardening may be both a cheaper and a more dependable alternative?

2. Nike-Hercules

Should this defense system, now becoming available, be installed to defend population centers or be used principally for the defense of SAC bases?

Would economy result from concentrating on the use of this weapon for SAC base air defense during the early time period when the manned bomber threat to SAC is predominant, and would this be militarily wise?

3. Super Hawk

What effectiveness will this weapon offer over other ground-to-air missile systems? Could this added effectiveness be bought more cheaply by increasing the use of Nike-Hercules or other existing weapons systems?

These questions seem particularly relevant in view of the similarities between Super Hawk and other air defense weapons, and in view of the fact that development costs are always high.

4. Bomarc

Since this system is controlled by the ground environment, is it so vulnerable to ICBM attack as to represent a questionable air defense?

Alternatively, should greater reliance be placed on more nearly autonomous weapons systems (including manned interceptors) with appropriate armament, designed for this mode of operation?

5. F–108 and GAP–9

What effectiveness will this interception system add to air defense of the home base? Is this development the best means to get this added effectiveness?

An interceptor system which does not depend too heavily on the ground environment is desirable during the ICBM era. But is the F–108 system too complex and the vehicle too small fully to exploit the concept? Can an effective radar for this plane be developed without degrading the performance of the plane?

6. ASW Expenditure

Is the large fraction of the Nary budget expended on ASW in need of redirection? Should there be more emphasis on development of better methods, including sea surveillance, as distinguished from marginal improvement and test of existing methods? Is the Navy recommending funds large enough to deal adequately with the solution of this complex problem?

7. ASW Seaplane Development

The prospect of success should be critically examined here on technical grounds. The use of the open ocean as a landing platform poses an extremely difficult problem under most conditions. Can this be considered a high-priority item if the questions in “6” above are answered affirmatively?

C. Passive Defense

1. SAC Alert

Is the planned SAC alert adequate to meet the enemy missile threat? Has there been a realistic forecast of the operating costs entailed by the continuous alert over the next several years?

How would these costs, as well as the operating capability of SAC, be affected by hardening a portion of each base?

2. Hardening

In addition to earlier questions which have related hardening of SAC bases to other defensive alternatives, the following questions appear:

To what level of pressure should bases be hardened? How is this level related to the number of aircraft to be protected by hardening? What levels of hardening are best for missile bases, and how many bases should be protected at this level?

In all cases, the protection obtained by greatly hardening a few bases needs to be compared in its cost with more widespread hardening to a lower pressure level.

D. Ground Environment

1. SAGE

Is this system so vulnerable to bomb damage that some of the scheduled improvements are of marginal value? Alternatively, should additional funds be allocated to hardening SAGE installations? What will be the traffic handling capacity of SAGE in the face of electronic countermeasures? Is this adequate to support the air defense mission of the interceptor and Bomarc force?

2. AEW and C

Are the Air Force and Navy programs in this area adequate to support the air defense of our coastal areas? Would augmenting these programs be an economical way to increase the effectiveness of air defense? Do these two programs lead to equipment which is mutually compatible, compatible with SAGE, and compatible with existing and programmed interceptor forces?

3. Badge—Alaska (extending air defense ground control into Alaska)

Would enough defense of the striking force be provided by this proposal to warrant the expenditure?

4. Dewline

Is the system likely to fail to give warning unless the contemplated radar replacements are made, or do the changes make only a marginal difference in performance? Should the programmed extensions to Dewline be accelerated?

5. BMEWS

Should the proposed additional site in Scotland be authorized?

What is the relation of the BMEWS system to the possible use of infra-red airborne devices for early warning (IREW, see 6 below)?

6. IREW

Should aircraft, devices, and communications for this warning system be developed? How, and how effectively, can this system supplement BMEWS or substitute for extensions of BMEWS?

III. GROUND AND SEA FORCES

A. General Discussion

New technological developments impinge directly on such questions as the size and make-up of conventional forces, logistic support, mobility, and increased firepower in relation to manpower.

The use of nuclear weapons by the fleet and by ground forces raises questions, furthermore, as to the extent to which these weapons will contribute increased effectiveness for a given investment. What should be the relative emphasis given to increasing the use of nuclear weapons, as opposed to conventional weapons for tactical systems?

Other technical advances as, for example, nuclear engines for ships, will require examination. To what extent do they simplify the logistic support of ground and sea forces and increase the effective mobility of such forces?

At a more general level, the question arises, whether, on the whole, present funds for the Navy give adequate support to its several missions. The Navy contributes to the strategic striking force; the extent of this contribution, and the cost thereof, will increase as the Polaris program advances. At the same time, the Navy assists in defending the home base, contributes a mobile tactical force, is a stabilizing and deterrent element in peace time, and is a major troop carrier in the case of general war.

B. Ground Forces

1. Davy Crockett

Is there a clear understanding of the nuclear warhead requirements for this weapon system based on approved operational concepts for its employment?

This system provides great explosive power in a weapon of light weight. It is effective against armor, troops, and installations; nevertheless, its effects are restricted enough that it can be used safely in the vicinity of friendly forces, and discriminately against ground targets.

2. Vigilante-Mauler (new AA gun and missile)

Are both of these projects necessary for battlefield defense?

3. Redstone

Does this weapon have sufficient mobility and invulnerability to make it dependable under combat conditions and useful under present Army organization and requirements for mobility?

4. Hawk

Should the procurement of Hawk missiles be limited to the number required for use overseas?

This air defense weapon for general tactical use should be considered in relation to other tactical air defense weapons. It may be that Hawk is the only available air defense weapon under the direct control of Army field forces.

5. Short-range Missiles (Little John, LaCrosse, Missile A, Missile B)

Is there need for all of these tactical weapons?

C. Sea Forces

1. Fleet Missiles

Will the increased use of missiles in the fleet permit reductions in numbers and types of aircraft and carriers?

With cruisers and other vessels having a missile capability in the fleet, does the number of carriers needed for air defense, air attack of land installations and other carrier attack missions diminish?

2. Nuclear Powered Fleet

Does a second nuclear carrier commit the Navy to planning for an all nuclear task force? How much improvement in effectiveness and economy results from the use of an all-nuclear task force?

Since carriers are organized as units of a task force and cannot operate alone, do nuclear carriers of high speeds and long endurance require other ships in the force to have the same performance?

3. Eagle Missile

In view of the Navy’s growing AA missile capability in ships of the fleet is the Eagle missile and associated aircraft development necessary? Is this program redundant?

4. Bullpup v. White Lance

Can one of these tactical air missiles be developed for use by both the Navy and Air Force?

IV. GENERAL MILITARY SUPPORT

A. General Discussion

This section does not include any items of general military support except those which clearly involve technical issues. For example, the possible economy that might result from a reduction of mobilization reserve procurement is not discussed.

B. Research and Development

Should an adjustment be made in the direction of more research and less development? Only a very small part of the total research and development budget goes into research, especially basic research.

There are several kinds of military research:

1. Basic fact-finding concerning natural phenomena. Examples are meteorology, solid state physics, and radio astronomy.

2. Inventions of components and devices of obvious utility to existing or foreseeable weapon systems. Examples are transistors, infra-red detectors and new rocket fuels.

3. Analytical studies of possible weapon system developments, utilizing all available scientific facts and guidance as to the objective to be achieved. The studies of the Nike-Hercules and Bomarc, in advance of their actual development, are typical of this type of research.

It is by no means true that all, or even a large fraction, of the research studies of the kind mentioned in (3) should lead to weapon system developments. The practical question is whether expensive delays and mistakes could be prevented by reducing the number of developments and using the money thereby saved to assure, by research studies, that the developments actually undertaken embody the best approaches to their military objectives.

Is the ratio of research to development expenditure too small for most economical operation and for the furtherance of our military technology? Any proposed reduction in research needs to be examined carefully in terms of its effect on the future national science effort and current policy for strengthening this effort.

C. Communications

1. High altitude nuclear weapons effects

Do any of the planned communication systems that are expected to operate during an all-out war depend upon the ionosphere?

Any such systems are expected to be undependable if high altitude nuclear explosions take place anywhere within hundreds of miles of the propagation path. A single shot of this kind produced strong effects, not yet fully understood, during recent tests in the Pacific.

Such communication systems, if they exist in present plans, may require substitution of other types, such as cable, which would not be affected. Are the budget implications of these findings reflected in the FY–60 budget?

2. Global Communications Systems

Should the expansion and improvement of a military global communications system be developed as a unified communications system for all three services?

All services require communication to many points on the globe. The increased vulnerability of overseas communications to enemy countermeasures and the corresponding need for greater reliability through use of alternate compatible routes raises the basic question of whether there is not need for a properly designed unified communications system. Has this possibility been examined for the armed services? The individual services will, in addition to any common global net, continue to need specialized communications to their mobile elements and for command purposes.

D. Navy Radio Telescope

The intelligence application of the system has been seriously questioned as well as the desirability of making so large a jump in size at one step. In the light of these technical questions, is the continuation of this project warranted under conditions of a tight budget?

E. Pacific Missile Range

Is all the presently planned instrumentation for this range necessary?

F. Aircraft, nuclear propelled

Has a major technical advance occurred since the recent technical review to warrant programs of the size put forth for FY–60 by the Air Force and the Navy?

G. Dyna-Soar

Does it have sufficient military usefulness to justify its inclusion in the Air Force budget?

H. ARPA Space Program

Has the proposed program been coordinated with that of NASA?

Presumably the National Aeronautics and Space Council will review the combined budget of the two agencies. Information is still incomplete about this combined budget, but enough information is available to indicate that a top policy decision must be made about the size of the national space program and the allocation of items between NASA and DOD.

I. BW–CW

Should research be expanded to uncover potential capabilities? Most of the funds for BW–CW are currently in procurement.

1. Source: Selected issues in the FY ’60 Defense budget (As of November 1, 1958). Top Secret. 21 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Offensive and Defensive Weapons.