101. Memorandum From Briber to Killian1
SUBJECT
- Dr. Kistiakowsky’s Views on the N.I.E., “Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles”
Dr. Kistiakowsky is “not completely happy” with this intelligence estimate, although in total it fits pretty well with the Gaither Panel estimate of the 1960–62 critical period.
His modest dissatisfaction stems mainly from the conservative impression left by the report. The Soviets are first credited (para. 75) with an I.O.C. of ten missiles sometime in 1959, and only later in the report is the qualification added, in speaking of the end of 1959, of “ten or more, but less than 100” missiles. Kisty was responsible for the qualifying phrase, but feels the report still gives the impression that 10 missiles are the only concern for 1959. He feels they will quite certainly have closer to 100 by the end of the year. He concurs with the final estimate of 500 Soviet missiles in 1961–62. This will be a critical period and so, in general, corresponds to the Gaither Report. We will then have 100 missiles but then bases will not be hardened, nor will BMEWS be operational.
He also criticizes this N.I.E. in that it speaks (para. 75) of an initial 50 per cent Soviet missile reliability and a 5 n.m. CEP; he feels both of these estimates are somewhat harsh toward real Soviet capabilities.
- Source: Kistiakowsky’s views on NIE entitled “Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles.” Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.↩