Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

100. Memorandum From Lay to All Holders of NSC 5819¹

Washington, October 6, 1958

The enclosed Part 1 of NSC 5819 (Military Program) and Annex A thereto, are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council. The enclosures are being given a special limited distribution, and access to them should be on a strict need-to-know basis.

In view of the fact that Part 1 contains “RESTRICTED DATA”, if it is inserted in the covers previously circulated for NSC 5819, such covers should be stamped “RESTRICTED DATA”.

Annex A provides the special annex pursuant to NSC Action No. 1862 and the supplement required by NSC Action No. 1842–g–(10), –(11) and –(12).

This distribution completes NSC 5819.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure

National Security Council Memorandum 5819, Part 1

Washington, September 22, 1958

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT TO NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON STATUS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY PROGRAMS AS OF 30 JUNE 1958

THE MILITARY PROGRAM

CONTENTS

BASIC REPORT

MILITARY FORCES

I Objectives of the Military Program

II JCS Evaluation of our Actual and Potential Capabilities

A. Nuclear Retaliatory Capability Continental Defense System (Covered in Section III)

B. Ready Forces

C. Maintaining Essential Sea Areas and Air Communications

D. Cold War Contribution

E. Summary Comparisons of Major Forces

III JCS Evaluation of the Continental Defense System

SELECTED MILITARY PROGRAMS

IV Mobilization Base

V Manpower

VI Military Research and Development

VII Areas of Special Interest

VIII Installations

IX Cost of the Military Program

ANNEX “A” — Continental Defense Supplement (NSC 5408 Program Review, Status of NSC 5802/1 Implementation, and Certain NSC 5724 Items)	Special Distribution
ANNEX “B” — Statistical Data Supplement (Detailed data on Status and Progress of DoD Programs)	Special Distribution

NSC 5819, Part 1, THE MILITARY PROGRAM

I. OBJECTIVES OF THE MILITARY PROGRAM.

The basic national objective of the United States is to preserve and enhance the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions. The primary threat to fulfillment of this objective is that posed by an aggressive and deeply hostile International Communism. All elements of U.S. national power must be resolutely directed toward meeting this Communist challenge.

The objectives of the U.S. military programs, in support of the basic national objective and in light of the primary threat, are to provide:

An effective nuclear retaliatory capability, adequately safeguarded and ready for immediate action.

An adequate continental defense system.

Highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces, with the capability to respond selectively and flexibly to local aggression, using all weapons (including nuclear weapons) as required, and to carry out general war tasks.

A capability of maintaining control of essential sea areas and air communications.

A cold war contribution of U.S. military power to reinforce and support, in appropriate ways, overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological and cultural measures.

II. SUMMARY EVALUATION BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OF OUR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO FULFILL CURRENT MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND BASIC OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED IN NSC 5810/1.

The nuclear retaliatory forces continue to provide the United States with a capability to inflict such loss and damage upon the enemy as to achieve a margin of advantage which, if exploited effectively in conjunction with other military operations, would permit the United States and its allies to prevail in general war. “However, despite continued improvement in the quality and posture of these forces during FY 1958, and notwithstanding the promise of continued improvement in the future, recent Soviet technological advances and the concurrent quantitative reductions in U.S. forces have combined to diminish that margin of U.S. military superiority. If these trends continue, it is estimated that this superiority will be lost in the foreseeable future.”

Improvements have been made in Continental Defense during FY 1958; but concurrent Soviet offensive improvements have made any relative U.S. gain questionable. The Continental Defense system is not capable of preventing an attack which could seriously damage the United States.

The ready forces of the United States are capable of responding selectively and flexibly to local aggression in most parts of the world. These forces have been quantitatively decreased but qualitatively improved during FY 1958. This qualitative improvement has been attained by the further equipping of forces with advanced weapon systems, including more nuclear weapons, and by improved organization, planning, and techniques. The scope and timing of response to local aggression would be limited primarily by the degree to which maldeployment for initial tasks of general war could be accepted. The capabilities of our Allies to assist in coping with local aggression, with few exceptions, are very limited.

The United States and its Allies are capable of controlling essential air communications. The Soviet threat to the control of essential sea areas at the onset of a general war is so great that U.S. and allied forces, because of quantitative deficiencies and technological difficulties, are only marginally adequate to deal with it. As attacks at the source, offensive ASW operations and coastal and shipping defense operations take effect, U.S. capabilities to control essential sea areas will improve. The capabilities of allied forces to assist in the control of essential air communications and sea areas generally are limited to their homelands and coastal waters and are steadily diminishing.

The contributions of U.S. military forces to cold war activities have been significant, but potential capabilities have not been exploited fully. The increased emphasis recently given to this field should produce dividends.

A. AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR-RETALIATORY CAPABILITY, ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARDED AND READY FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION. The U.S. forces with a nuclear retaliatory capability include strategic bomber forces, carrier striking forces, tactical air forces, and other forces employing weapons armed with nuclear warheads which are ready to strike immediately and effectively against targets within the Sino-Soviet Bloc area.

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) has primary capability for nuclear retaliation and is charged with exploiting U.S. current superiority in nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems against selected targets and target systems immediately after outbreak of hostilities. Over-all effectiveness of SAC has increased during FY 1958 with introduction of new equipment and procedures. Total SAC force has been reduced from 50 wings of bomber, reconnaissance, and fighter aircraft at end FY 1957 to 44 wings at end FY 1958. This reduction was effected through inactivation of 5 strategic fighter type wings (2 were redesignated fighter bomber and 2 fighter day) and one medium reconnaissance wing. Total of 39 bomber (11 heavy and 28 medium) wings remain unchanged; all but 5 of SAC’s 39 bomber wings have a high degree of readiness. Inactivation of one more medium reconnaissance wing in FY 1959 will reduce the total to 43 wings, 39 bomber and 4 (3 medium and one light) reconnaissance.

Combat capability of SAC heavy bomber wings increased during FY 1953 as B–36 units were converted to B–52’s and as the number of heavy bombers per wing was increased from 30 (B–36) to 45 (B–52). As of 30 June 1958, 7 wings have been converted and equipped with B–52 aircraft (compared to 3 on 30 June 1957), and one more wing is undergoing conversion. Of the 7 B–52 equipped wings, 4 are considered fully capable and 3 have limited capabilities due to combat crew training and recent conversion status. Remainder of 3 B–36 wings are fully operational. By end FY 1959, 9 wings will be fully converted to B–52’s, and 2 more wings will be in process of conversion.

As the Soviet delivery capability increases, the vulnerability of SAC bases within and outside the United States becomes a matter of greater concern. To reduce vulnerability, SAC dispersal and alert programs are being implemented. The status of these programs is:

a. Heavy Bomber Dispersal. Although there is a goal to have no more than one heavy bomber squadron on any one base, 33 squadrons are presently (30 June 1958) located on 11 bases. By end FY 1959, these squadrons are programmed to be dispersed on 18 bases; i.e., 5 bases each with 3 squadrons, 5 bases each with 2 squadrons, and 8 bases each with one squadron.

b. Medium Bomber Dispersal. At present there are 28 wings on 18 bases. Two heavy bomber bases are presently accommodating one medium wing each. At end FY 1959, medium bomber wings are programmed to be located on 17 bases; 11 bases each with 2 wings, and 6 bases each with one wing. Dispersal for heavy bomber squadrons, plus a required location of medium bombers on optimum strike bases, causes this temporarily reduced dispersal of medium bomber wings during FY 1959. (See SAC Base Dispersal Map, Section VIII, Installations).

c. Alert. As of 30 June 1958, 156 bombers with associated tankers are on continuous 15-minute alert. In December 1957, 20 bombers were on 15-minute alert. By end FY 1959, about 350 SAC bombers with associated tankers are expected to be on continuous 15-minute alert. Under emergency conditions, the present alert force can be readily increased by curtailing training operations, but the increased alert capability can only be sustained for short periods, possibly 30 days.

In addition to the increase in the status of alert forces, new concepts for meeting the threat were implemented in the Strategic Air Command. Two of the most significant are as follows:

“Positive Control”. This allows CINCSAC to launch his alert force under conditions of little or no warning and buy “precious time” for a national decision. This concept, it is hoped, will save the force while the threat is being evaluated.

“Reflex Action”. This concept replaced the old plan for rotation of bomber units to overseas bases. It gives SAC an improved overseas alert posture with reduced vulnerability, i.e., the only strategic bomber aircraft in the forward area are “cocked” and ready to go on emergency war plan missions.

In addition to the above, SAC is presently testing a plan for airborne alert in which a significant portion of the alert force remains airborne continuously.

Supplementing SAC retaliatory capabilities are the USAF tactical nuclear strike forces. In the Pacific, tactical forces consist of 3-2/3 wings (2-1/3 nuclear capable) of fighter bombers and day fighters, decreasing to 3 wings (all nuclear capable) of tactical fighters by end FY 1959; one wing of tactical bombers which remains through FY 1959; and one detachment of MATADOR tactical missiles, increasing to 2 groups by end FY 1959. Based in the United Kingdom and Europe, tactical strike forces consist of 6-2/3 fighter bomber and fighter day wings (in addition, one fighter day and 3 fighter bomber squadrons are maintained on rotation to Europe from continental U.S. based wings). Of these wings, 6-3/4 are nuclear capable. These tactical fighters remain through FY 1959. There is also one wing of tactical bombers on 30 June 1958, which remains through FY 1959; and 3 groups of MATADOR tactical missiles. One of the 3 MATADOR groups will be converted to the more advanced TM–76 A (MACE) tactical missile by end FY 1959. MATADOR missiles released by this conversion are expected to be transferred to a selected Ally. Tactical air forces in United States, capable of augmenting forces overseas, consist of 12–3/4 fighter day and fighter bomber wings (less 4 squadrons on rotation) of which 7 wings are nuclear capable, to be reduced to 7-1/4 tactical fighter wings (less 4 squadrons on rotation) all of which are nuclear capable, by end FY 1959; and one tactical bomber wing to be inactivated during FY 1959. By end FY 1959, all tactical fighter wings are planned to be totally equipped with modern “century series” fighters.

Continuing progress is being made in providing the above delivery systems with smaller diameter and lighter weight weapons and warheads of various yields. The continuing dispersal of nuclear weapons to combat units in the field has improved greatly the operational readiness of our offensive forces. This action, coupled with the streamlining of our release procedures, has reduced substantially the reaction time of these forces to counter enemy aggression. However, due to political denial of storage rights in certain countries, weapons allocated to some combat units are not immediately available to those units. Action is continuing to obtain greater latitude in the dispersal of nuclear weapons.

Certain major U.S. Navy forces, with the primary mission of maintaining control of essential sea areas and air communications, possess a significant nuclear retaliatory strike capability. This capability exists primarily in attack carrier striking forces with a secondary capability in missile delivery from surface ship and submarine. There are 15 attack carriers and 17 associated carrier air groups. Since the previous report (30 June 1957), deliveries of new jet aircraft and modernization and new construction of attack aircraft carriers have materially increased Navy’s nuclear weapon delivery capability. Three CVA 59 (FORRESTAL) class carriers have replaced ESSEX class carriers for fleet operations. Included in Naval forces are Marine Corps forces which contribute to the over-all nuclear retaliatory capability. These include 3 Marine Aircraft Wings, 2 in continental U.S. and one deployed in the Pacific area, maintained in a state of readiness to operate from land or sea bases, and to deploy rapidly to a theater of operations from present locations.

Present Naval capability for guided missile delivery of large nuclear warheads from surface ships and submarines is represented by the REGULUS system, for which nuclear warheads are stockpiled. REGULUS I system is now installed in 3 submarines and 4 heavy cruisers. There are 8 submarines equipped with REGULUS radar guidance system (TROUNCE). One of the 3 missile submarines in the fleet possesses both a REGULUS I and a REGULUS II capability.

Currently, U.S. Army forces contribute to the nuclear retaliatory capability with REDSTONE, CORPORAL, HONEST JOHN, 280mm gun, 8-inch howitzer units, and atomic demolition munitions now deployed in Europe; and with HONEST JOHN, 280mm gun, 8-inch howitzer units, and atomic demolition munitions in the Pacific.

The following air defense capabilities opposing U.S. retaliatory forces apply in general to the Soviet Bloc’s air defense system:

a. Against penetrations conducted during daylight and in clear weather, at altitudes between about 5,000 and about 35,000 feet, capabilities of the system are greatest. At about 35,000 feet they would begin to diminish, and above 45,000 feet would fall off markedly; at altitudes below 5,000 feet, they would also be progressively reduced.

b. Against penetrations conducted at night and under poor visibility conditions, the capabilities of the system would be considerably reduced.

c. Against varied penetration tactics utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary maneuvers decoys, and electronic countermeasures, capabilities of the air defense system would be diminished through disruption and saturation.

The advantage accruing to the United States and its Allies as a result of a retaliatory offensive would be dependent on the amount of warning of Soviet attack and the degree of protection afforded military installations, particularly those installations from which our retaliatory effort would be launched. It is estimated that enemy losses sustained as a result of a U.S. offensive retaliatory attack would provide a margin of advantage to the United States and its Allies which, if exploited effectively in conjunction with other military operations, would assure eventual victory.

B. HIGHLY MOBILE AND SUITABLY DEPLOYED READY FORCES WITH THE CAPACITY TO RESPOND SELECTIVELY AND FLEXIBLY TO LOCAL AGGRESSION, USING ALL WEAPONS (INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS) AS REQUIRED, AND TO CARRY OUT GENERAL WAR TASKS.

1. OVERALL CAPABILITIES.

a. Army. U.S. Army forces are capable of reacting flexibly to local aggression or general war utilizing selective fire power of the appropriate magnitude. Development of new infantry, armored, and airborne divisions, with organic nuclear capability, has greatly increased the operational capability of Army to meet the threat of a nuclear war. All active Army divisions are organized in the new Pentomic structure and are capable of integrating nuclear fire support with that of conventional weapons and with maneuver. A nuclear projectile for the 8-inch howitzer is now in the stockpile. Additionally, Army has developed Army Missile Commands capable of rendering nuclear fire support to allied ground forces by various ground delivery systems. Addition of a limited number of helicopter units has provided Army with increased battle mobility. Principal limitations on effectiveness of Army forces are related to lack of modernization of non-nuclear fire support and an insufficiency of combat and logistic support because of manpower and budgetary limitations.

b. Naval. Increased nuclear capabilities of U.S. naval forces add materially to their effectiveness as a part of the ready forces. Included in naval forces are Fleet Marine Force divisions and air wings, with an organic surface and aircraft launched nuclear capability, capable of reacting to local aggression or general war. The new vertical helicopter assault doctrine provides a high degree of mobility for landing forces in assault and subsequent operations.

c. Air Force. USAF forces include units of Tactical Air Command, tactical air units of overseas theater air forces, and SAC bombardment forces described in previous paragraphs. USAF tactical air forces world-wide have been reduced from a total of 55 (including 15 airlift) wings on 30 June 1957 to 45 (including 13 airlift) on 30 June 1958, further to be reduced to 35 (including 11 airlift) by 30 June 1959. The effectiveness, however, of both strategic and tactical air units to respond to local aggression or general war has not decreased since the 30 June 1957 status report as a result of the growing nuclear delivery capabilities of tactical air weapons and the improving reaction time and mobility of strategic bombardment units.

d. In the succeeding paragraphs the ready forces capable of responding selectively and flexibly to local aggression and general war are treated by geographical areas.

[Omitted here is the remainder of Section II, JCS Evaluation of Actual and Potential Capabilities.]

III. EVALUATION BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OF OUR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE CONTINENTAL DEFENSE SYSTEM.

A. OBJECTIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTINENTAL U.S. DEFENSE PROGRAMS (Based on NSC 5802/1). To be prepared at all times to counter an attack on the North American Continent in such a way as to deter Soviet attack, or, if an attack occurs, to insure our survival as a free nation. Such preparation requires that the United States achieve and maintain, in collaboration with Canada and other Free World nations, a continental defense readiness and capability which will protect and permit the launching of our nuclear retaliatory forces, even in the event of surprise attack. Such preparation should: (1) Provide warning to alert the nation to impending attack; (2) counter enemy subversive and clandestine efforts; (3) prevent the threat of nuclear destruction from unduly restricting U.S. freedom of action or weakening national morale; (4) maintain adaptability to make timely changes as technology permits and as the nature of the threat changes; (5) provide appropriate measures of protection for the civil population; and (6) include appropriately organizing, protecting, and placing in a condition of readiness the resources of the country essential to national survival.

B. ESTIMATED SOVIET THREAT AND CAPABILITIES.

1. Soviet capabilities for full-scale air attack or the continental United States, while still subject to limitations, have been improved by phasing-in of additional jet bombers, by continued improvement in forward and staging air base capacities, by availability of greater nuembers of megaton yield weapons end emergence of a limited capability for in-flight refueling. The numbers of aircraft launched against the United States in an initial attack, even under conditions where surprise was a major Soviet consideration, could range in the several hundreds.

2. In light of recent tests, it is estimated that USSR is developing and stockpiling a versatile group of nuclear weapons ranging from very low yield warheads to high yield thermonuclear weapons.

3. It is estimated that Soviets will achieve an initial limited capability for ICBM attack in 1959.

4. USSR could now have subsonic cruise-type guided missiles with nuclear warheads suitable for launching from submarines against targets in U.S. coastal areas, and have several guided missile submarines equipped to carry and launch these missiles.

5. Clandestine attack on the United States itself by sabotage, biological warfare, and placement of nuclear weapons, could occur against specifically selected targets.

C. SUMMARY EVALUATION OF U.S. AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND PROBLEMS. The absolute capability of our forces to defend the United States against air attack has progressively increased since last report, as of 30 June 1957. This over-all increase is the result of establishment of North American Air Defense Command (NORAD); installation of additional early warning radar coverage, including seaward extensions of DEW Line, and contiguous seaward coverage; provision of more effective control of the air defense system through automation; increased coverage of the sea surveillance system; and availability of improved weapons systems, to include nuclear warheads. Although U.S. defense capabilities have improved during FY 1958, Soviet nuclear weapons development and improved delivery capabilities during same period, e.g., as demonstrated by Soviet launchings of space satellites, have made any relative U.S. gain questionable. Soviets are probably now capable of exploiting weaknesses in our defense system at very high and very low altitudes and of utilizing electronic countermeasures, sabotage, and deception to reduce the effectiveness of our defense system and contribute to success of their mission. During 1959, the estimated Soviet initial limited ICBM capability will provide an additional means of exploiting weaknesses in our defense system. The continental air defense system cannot be expected to counter completely an all-out attack of the magnitude which Soviets are capable of launching against the North American Continent. Solutions to following problems are being pursued on a high priority basis:

1. Procurement, training, and retention of highly skilled personnel required by modern and increasingly complex defense systems.

2. Detection of airborne vehicles at very high and very low altitudes, and development and availability of weapons which can be effectively used at these altitudes.

3. Development and implementation of measures to overcome or counteract enemy electronic countermeasures.

4. Development of a system which can be used in defense against enemy ballistic missiles.

5. Development of an effective and integrated sea surveillance system which will provide for detection, identification, and tracking of surface ships and submarines operating within missile launching range of the North American Continent, toward goal of development of capability to establish control over the submarine or surface ship prior to launching of its missile.

6. Identification and engagement of hostile aircraft as far from our borders as possible.

7. Means to mitigate or shorten the long lead time involved in completion of programmed improvements to systems.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the report.]

1. Source: Transmits Part 1 of NSC 5819 and Annex A. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Special Limited Distribution; Noforn. Extracts—11 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 5819.