102. Memorandum of Discussion at the 382d NSC Meeting1
SUBJECT
- Discussion at the 382nd (Special) Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, October 13, 1958
Present at this special meeting (382nd) of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy; Mr. Richard Horner for the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Acting Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; and the Executive Secretary, NSC. The following members of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Department of Defense, also attended the meeting: Vice Admiral Sides, Director; Charles A. Boyd, Director of Research; Richard H. DuBois, Assistant; Lt. Col. Bolton Miller; M/Sgt. Ralph Pearson; Michael Picchioni.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
1. EVALUATION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS
(NSC Action No. 1733)
Mr. Gray explained the background of the subject report. (Copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.) Mr. Gray asked Secretary Quarles if he had anything to add before calling on Admiral Sides.
Secretary Quarles emphasized that this evaluation should be viewed as an abstraction of the problem, as are all such evaluations. It treats of the problem apart from some of the practical aspects which are normally cranked in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Quarles stressed that this was a report by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and not by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as such.
[Typeset Page 344]Admiral Sides presented the evaluation with the use of charts. (Copy of Admiral Sides’ notes for the presentation and of the charts used, filed in the minutes of the meeting.)
[Facsimile Page 2]The President remarked that he would like to say one positive thing about the presentation. He thought that it was as dispassionate, low-key and thorough an exposition as he had ever heard.
The President went on to say that this evaluation opens doors for additional investigation. It alerts us to what we must do if anyone studies the fiscal situation. There must be some substitution in these programs. Otherwise we will no longer be able to say that we are defending freedom. The President said he did not believe that we could keep these expenditures going up indefinitely without some kind of controls on the financial situation. He pointed out that interest on bonds is going up at a time when we are not yet out of the recession. The President concluded by congratulating the Group on its report, but expressing the view that it gives us more anxiety than he had imagined it would.
Mr. Gray said that he would like to point out one serious statement. This was that some of the interim systems examined were designed as defense against manned aircraft, but would not be completed and installed in time to deal with advanced types of weapons. Mr. Gray pointed out that Admiral Sides had raised a question for decision as to whether some of these systems should be completed.
The President said that he thought we should identify what systems are obsolete. Perhaps some of them should be “bought out” at an earlier date than now planned. He believed that more evaluation should be made of our present and future plans, to determine what the rule of reason requires. He thought that we should identify those, such as the second generation of BOMARCs, which by the time they were completed would be outmoded by other systems, such as the NIKE-ZEUS.
In answer to the President’s question, General Twining and General White indicated that the cost of a B–58 was about $20 million and the cost of a B–70 about $23 million.
The President said that he had the impression we were somewhat pessimistic about really developing a defense against ICBMs. He repeated that we should carefully review programs to see where they are antithetical or overlapping. General Twining assured the President that the Joint Chiefs were all taking a soul-searching look at this subject. Secretary Quarles said that such a review was beginning with the preparation of the FY 1960 budget.
The President commented that we were now seeing a new phenomenon in weapons development. It used to be that changes in weapons systems were made slowly and obsolescent models replaced gradually. Now, because of the urgent time element, we are trying to develop rapidly whole weapons systems to replace other systems. What [Facsimile Page 3] he was [Typeset Page 345] trying to say was that in this process we must make sure we are not substituting money for brains. He reiterated that in the long run he did not believe we could defend our freedom if we put too much money or resources into the machinery of war.
Mr. Allen Dulles commented that the report points up the vital need for improved intelligence on what the Soviets are doing. He noted that they had recently been cutting back production of heavy bombers. Also, they were not testing ICBMs to the extent expected. He wondered how effective the elaborate protective screen around Moscow would be.
Mr. Gray said that he thought one of the questions raised by the evaluation was the problem of dealing with limited wars, which had been before the NSC recently.
The President repeated that he expected the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group to lay out clearly for the Joint Chiefs of Staff the advantages versus the disadvantages of various weapons systems. Then, he felt, some very tough decisions would have to be made. Admiral Sides said that the WSEG had presented its report in full detail to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were now considering it.
Secretary Quarles expressed the belief that, just as we have gone back to the manned bomber as an effective weapon, he expected that the Soviets would too. He thought it was risky to assume that the Soviets would forgo manned bombers. He believed they would find it very much to their advantage to have the same kind of capability that we are trying to develop. He thought that the Soviets might end up producing a heavy bomber somewhere between our B–58 and B–70.
Mr. Allen Dulles estimated that the Soviets will keep up a substantial manned bomber force. He didn’t know yet whether they would be able to get high speed together with the necessary range.
The President noted that we expect to level out with about 600 B–52 s, while the Soviets will level off at about 200 heavy bombers. He questioned whether, as we convert to heavy bombers of 3-mach speed, we would still feel that we needed 600. He questioned whether we always needed to be three times better than the Soviets.
General White said that our problem was that we must assume that the Soviets will strike first. If they do, we cannot stop them by our Distant Early Warning lines. We must, therefore, find the number of bombers which it is logical for us to maintain in order to strike back after the initial Soviet attack.
Mr. Gray suggested, and it was agreed, that the Department of Defense be asked to review within the next year its report on relative advantages of ballistic missiles versus manned bombers.
[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]
[Facsimile Page 4]- Source: Agenda item 1: Evaluation of Offensive and Defensive Weapons Systems. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.↩