79. Memorandum of Discussion at the 425th Meeting of the National Security Council0

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Status of National Security Programs as of June 30, 1959: The Military Program (NSC 5912)1

Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council (a copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).2 After reading the first page of his briefing note, Mr. Gray called on General Twining.

General Twining said the presentation which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been asked to make on this subject would be a review of our military [Page 340]capabilities to support the objectives of national policy. He cautioned that the presentation would indicate where we have been, not where we are going, and would therefore not be a part of the second item on the agenda, “U.S. Military Programs for FY 1961.” General Twining then called on Colonel Goodwin who displayed a chart entitled “Basic Objectives of Military Programs” and read a briefing memorandum, a copy of which is attached to this Memorandum.3

At the conclusion of Colonel Goodwin’s briefing, the President referred to Objective Number Three on the chart which read as follows: “Highly Mobile and Suitably Deployed Ready Forces with a Capability of Responding Selectively and Flexibly to Local Aggression Using All Weapons (Including Nuclear Weapons) as Required to Achieve National Objectives and to Carry Out General War Tasks.” Referring to the words “and to Carry Out General War Tasks”, the President asked whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisaged the use of our nuclear stockpile in the event of general war. General Twining replied in the affirmative. The President inquired what, then, would be the other general war tasks of the ready forces? As he saw it, general war had become restricted almost entirely to a nuclear battle. General Twining said it was necessary for our military forces to be ready for local aggression or for general war. The President said the important capability of our military forces in general war was their nuclear retaliatory power. He wondered what mobile ready forces would be required to do in general war. Some six years ago the U.S. was committed to reinforce NATO forces in the event of general war to the extent of about twelve divisions; and a great deal of effort had been required to terminate this commitment. He did not wish to discuss the matter further in the Council, but requested that the Department of Defense submit a listing of the missions of the “highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces” in carrying out general war tasks.

Mr. Gray then read the remainder of his briefing note. In connection with the point made in the Military Status Report that modernization of non-nuclear fire support has not kept pace with the improvement in the overall nuclear posture of the services, Mr. Gray asked whether this evaluation had been made in the light of the statement contained in Paragraph 12–a of the new Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1). General Twining answered in the affirmative, and added that at first it was necessary to concentrate on acquiring a nuclear capability throughout the armed forces, with the result that conventional capabilities had lagged behind nuclear capabilities. However, the non-nuclear capabilities would now “pick up”.

Secretary McElroy said this point could be developed further in connection with the discussion of the second item on the agenda. In the FY [Page 341]1959 and FY 1960 budgets provision had been made for fitting the ground forces with nuclear weapons, so that a certain imbalance between nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities had occurred.

Secretary Herter said it had been his intention also to raise the point mentioned by Mr. Gray. In addition, he wished to call attention to the conclusion in the Military Status Report and in the presentation that those who take the initiative in general war would have a decisive advantage. The President said this proposition had been almost self-evident from the beginning of warfare, but was tending to assume more and more importance in modern times. Secretary Herter observed that it would become increasingly difficult to employ U.S. forces to resist local aggression if the side which takes the initiative thereby secures a decisive advantage. In the event of an aggression in Southeast Asia, for example, the U.S. would be faced with the judgment as to whether or not the employment of nuclear weapons to resist local aggression would unleash a completely nuclear war. Accordingly, the matters which General Twining said were under study, namely, a relative increase in our non-nuclear capabilities, were very important.4

Secretary McElroy said the matters mentioned by General Twining were not only under study, but were being acted upon. The Army, after its release from responsibilities for space and for IRBMs, would put its research and development capabilities to work on the problem of local war. Dr. York has a group working with the Army. The Army, as well as the Marine Corps, realizes that improvement of local war weaponry is necessary.

Secretary Herter referred to Objective Number Five on the chart which read as follows: “A Cold War Contribution of U.S. Military Power to Reinforce and Support in Appropriate Ways Overt and Covert Political, Economic, Psychological, Technological, and Cultural Measures.” He did not understand this Objective when read in conjunction with the following statement on Page 14 of the Military Status Report: “U.S. Military Forces overseas represent the largest single group of U.S. personnel located in foreign countries and in daily contact with the citizens of those countries. This group by reason of its background and training, and the variety of skills represented, is particularly well fitted to pursue the objectives of the President’s People-to-People Program and otherwise contribute to the cold war effort.” Secretary Herter was not clear about [Page 342]the relation of the People-to-People Program and Objective Number Five.

The President remarked that the Air Force had been handling certain problems which had arisen in connection with Moroccan bases and the local population with extraordinary beneficial results. He was pleased to see that the armed forces were thinking of their presence abroad as a cold war capability. He believed this was a capability of which notice should be taken. Secretary Herter agreed, but added that the man in uniform on foreign soil is under definite disadvantages, since the local population will be automatically inclined to dislike him. He wondered whether the military services had initiated any programs designed to offset this feeling of antipathy on the part of local populations in countries where U.S. forces are stationed. Secretary McElroy said that every service had a program of the type referred to by Mr. Herter.

Secretary Herter said he hoped the statement on Page 14 of the Military Status Report was not intended as an argument for deploying additional U.S. forces overseas. Secretary McElroy said no arguments were being made in favor of deploying additional U.S. forces overseas. He hoped he had made his position on this matter clear during the NATO discussion at the Council meeting of November 11.

The National Security Council:5

Noted and discussed an oral presentation of the status of the military program as of June 30, 1959, by the Department of Defense, based on Part 1 of NSC 5912.
Noted the President’s request that the Department of Defense submit a description or listing of the missions of the “highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces” in carrying out general war tasks, as referred to in the above-mentioned presentation.6

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

2. U.S. Military Programs for FY 1961 (NSC Actions Nos. 1994, 2000 and 2013)7

Mr. Gray called on Secretary McElroy to make the presentation on this subject.

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Secretary McElroy said that all items in the Defense Budget for FY 61 had been discussed thoroughly, but some items had been considered more intensively than others. He wished to make a few remarks about the significant items which had been discussed intensively. Following his remarks, General Twining and Mr. Sprague, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), would continue the presentation.

Secretary McElroy noted that the Defense Budget for FY 61 was based on the assumption that the threat to U.S. security had not appreciably changed since preparation of the FY 60 budget. Some softening was evident in Soviet public attitudes, but Soviet positions on matters in dispute with the U.S. were as firm as ever. Moreover, the Chinese Communists were at least as aggressive as they were when the FY 60 budget was prepared.

Secretary McElroy then gave the following tabular comparison between the FY 60 and FY 61 budget, in millions of dollars:

FY 1960 (Estimated) FY 1961
Expenditures $41,075 $41,187
New Obligational Authority $40,622 $40,747

Secretary McElroy said we were in a period of level military expenditure, this being the third year in a row that the military budget had been stabilized at about $41 billion. It was necessary to point out, however, that $41 billion would not buy as much defense in FY 61 as it had bought in FY 60, for a number of reasons. In 1959 Congress had enacted new health benefits for the armed services which would cost $53 million a year. Retirement consumes an increasing amount of money each year and in a few years would require the expenditure of a billion dollars a year. The Department of Defense now had to spend $73 million plus $22 million for special additional retirement benefits for general officers who had not previously been given proportionate treatment relative to other ranks in the new pay bill. Even though the number of persons covered by the Defense Budget was reduced by 31,000, the cost of personnel was increased by $227 million. This increase was due to the Cordiner Report8 and to the fact people were staying in the services longer, acquiring more dependents, receiving higher pay as their skills increased and receiving other benefits incidental to the longer term of service. Secretary McElroy felt that some of these factors would lead to improved capabilities, although the cost per capita was increasing.

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Secretary McElroy noted that the combined personnel, operating and maintenance cost in the Defense Budget was 55 per cent of the total, leaving 45 per cent for capital improvement, research and development (which was costing $5 billion a year) and military construction. At the present level of expenditure, the upper limit on retaining personnel in the services had probably been reached. In the future, Defense would have to face a reduction in personnel or an increase in its budget estimates. Turning to personnel levels, Secretary McElroy reported that Army personnel was remaining level at 870,000 and he was hopeful of reducing overseas deployments. The Navy was reducing personnel from 630,000 to 619,000, while the Air Force was reducing from 845,000 to 825,000. The Marine Corps was holding the line at 175,000. The personnel strength of the Army Reserve was fixed at 270,000 and the personnel of the National Guard at 360,000, as in the past. These figures were 10,000 less than the figures authorized by Congress.

Secretary McElroy then called attention to a series of other significant budgetary items:

SAC Airborne Alert

Ninety million dollars was included in the FY 61 budget for long lead time items of maintenance, principally aircraft engines, and for additional crew training in preparation for a possible SAC airborne alert with B–52’s in mid-1961, or after 1962, if the JCS recommended such an airborne alert. If we are to be in position to initiate an airborne alert by mid-1961, we must begin to prepare the crews and equipment now. Even if we begin preparations now, we would not be able to put every aircraft in the air at all times, but we could put up a significant force of planes at any one time.


Even before the final budget discussion, it had been decided to discontinue the F–108, a Mach-3 fighter. Indeed, this program had been cancelled two months ago.


There had been a great deal of discussion of the rate of advance on the B–70, a Mach–3 bomber. The final decision had been to carry on the B–70 program only as a follow-on development program on a strictly research basis leading to one or two prototypes. Only flying machines, that is, air frames and engines flyable by Calendar Year 1960, would be built, rather than a complete weapons system. This decision would bring the expenditure rate down by $200 million, to $74 million a year. Secretary McElroy thought that the B–70 program now makes sense. This program will not now drive hard toward a military capability, but will not cancel out all prospect for future development of the aircraft. A decision can be made later whether to build a weapons system around the B–70.

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Consideration of the Defense Budget had also provoked considerable discussion of the B–58, a Mach-2 bomber, the development of which to date had cost a great deal of money. It had been decided to retain the B–58 on a reduced basis of three wings, some of which would fly operationally as combat units in 1961. This program would cost $625 million in FY 1961.


Secretary McElroy then turned to a discussion of the ICBM. He said that the Atlas had proven to be a very satisfactory missile. The FY 61 budget increased the number of Atlas squadrons from nine to thirteen, each squadron disposing of ten missiles. Titan squadrons were increased from eleven to fourteen. A major decision had been made to shift to storable liquid propellants for the Titan. This decision should give the Titan simplicity, readiness and reliability. Storable liquid fuel, incidentally, was an important missile development, since it enabled the missile to be stored underground in hardened sites. Any future strategic delivery system would have to be either concealed, or mobile, or both. Needless to say, concealment and mobility were both very expensive. Secretary McElroy indicated his strong belief in the value of the solid-propellant Minuteman, which was being continued as a top priority item and which was expected to have substantial capabilities by FY 1963. The FY 1961 budget contained some $2 billion for ICBM’s.


The Nike–Zeus was the only “near time” active defense possibility against missiles. After careful examination of the Nike–Zeus program by Dr. York and Dr. Kistiakowsky, who had, incidentally, been very helpful in this matter, Secretary McElroy had decided that there were too many uncertainties to proceed to the manufacture of Nike–Zeus. The missile, however, would be retained in a research and development category which would cost $237 million in FY 61. The probability was that the missile could be created and would operate successfully, but there was nothing to prevent an incoming missile from emitting twenty decoys in such a way as to make it impossible for the Nike–Zeus to discriminate between the decoy and the warhead missile. The Nike–Zeus weapons system, to be successful against a decoy system, would require an enormous number of missiles.


Secretary McElroy said that it had been decided to provide for three Polaris submarines in the FY 61 budget and to start building reactors for three more. While the Polaris was still in a research status, Secretary McElroy was optimistic about its future capabilities.

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Aircraft Carrier

Secretary McElroy said the budget included $300 million for a conventional-powered aircraft carrier. Last year Congress had authorized the advance components of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, which would cost $100 million more than a conventional-powered carrier. The nuclear-powered carrier had some advantages but not enough to justify its additional cost; it also had some disadvantages. The decision this year was to put funds for a conventional-powered carrier in the budget in the hope that Congress could be convinced that a conventional-powered carrier was more desirable than a nuclear-powered one.


The Budget contained $140 million NOA and $60 million of expenditure for Saturn. At some point these figures might come out of the budget after Congress made a decision as to the facilities at Huntsville.

The President said he did not understand the figure of $22 million for general and flag officers who had not received the same treatment as other officers. He asked whether the presentation just made covered all officers.

Mr. Stans said that it would require $24 million to cover all officers. Secretary McElroy said he had not explained the matter very well. The budget covered all officers, but substantial amounts were required for general and flag officers due to their higher pay.

The President referred to the statement that the Cordiner Report had made us spend more for the same people. However, he recalled that the Cordiner Report had been supported by the Services as a means of reducing recruitment and turn-over and obtaining more on-the-job training. This presentation appeared to be different from the arguments used by the Services in connection with the Cordiner Report. The President wondered where efficiency took over from numbers.

Secretary McElroy said that some improvement in efficiency in utilizing personnel had enabled the Army to take on additional missions such as atomic storage overseas.

The President asked whether any Service had abolished a special training school. Admiral Burke said that in the Navy training had been reduced, but because of complex equipment this reduction had not been as great as anticipated. General White reported that a number of training centers had been abolished in the Air Force. General Lemnitzer said the Army had retained its schools because it was required to give six months training for the Reserves. The quality of training had improved.

The President felt it would be desirable to take a look at specialist schools, military training programs, and related facilities. He was often told that a program would cost only $25 million in a given year. He was rarely told what the follow-on cost would be, that is, that a program [Page 347]might cost $380 million three years from now. He was worried about the tendency of expenditure curves to go up. He thought now that there was a reduced turn-over in military personnel, the possibility of combining or closing some training schools should be considered. He felt it might be possible to combine the War Colleges, for example.

The President then referred to the ICBM program (which was costing $2 billion), the B–52, the B–58 and the B–70 programs. He asked whether the Air Force would not have at some time to reach the hard decision as to whether it wished to concentrate on planes or missiles. He wondered whether we really had any confidence in missiles since we continued to demand planes to back them up. He also wondered whether the B–70 program would not become more expensive in 1962.

Secretary McElroy said the B–70 program would cost more if two prototypes instead of one were built.

The President then inquired about the number of B–58’s to be built. Secretary Douglas said the Air Force had accepted deliveries of fifty-one B–58’s, five of which had been lost. Two of the planes had been lost on the ground and three in rigorous tests. This was a normal experience. In his opinion the B–58 program was on schedule and was doing well. Forty-nine B–58’s would be built by next August. The President asked when three squadrons of B–58s would be operational. Secretary Douglas said the first squadron would be operational next August. One hundred sixteen planes would be produced, ninety-eight of which would be in tactical units. The production line would be continued to 1963, at which time the B–58 program would be completed.

The President felt that the U.S. was paying a lot for insurance against the possibility that the ICBM would not work well. Secretary McElroy said the B–52 was in a somewhat different category from some other planes since it was a missile launcher. As a missile launcher, a capability which it would have by mid-60, it was a more attractive weapon than planes which did not have this capability. The President asked whether Secretary McElroy was speaking of the Hound Dog. Secretary McElroy replied in the affirmative. He added that the B–52 carrying Hound Dog could be recalled from a mission if need be, whereas a decision to launch a missile such as the Atlas was irrevocable. The President then inquired about the capabilities of the B–58. Secretary McElroy said the B–58 was attractive as a low-level, high-speed bomber. He added that we were now in a period between weapons, that is, between the bomber and the missile. During this transition period there would undoubtedly be a high-cost overlap. To date we do not have the necessary capabilities with a weapon successor to the bomber. The ICBM is in a soft configuration and hardening is yet to come. Secretary McElroy felt that the time for substantial reliance on missile capabilities was five years away. General Twining [Page 348]said bombers were superior weapons against the targets we had in view because of their accuracy and the weight of load they could carry.

The President asked what size bomb the B–58 could carry. General Twining said it could carry a ten-megaton nuclear weapon. Secretary Douglas said the B–58 and the B–52 programs were both extended to deliveries in the highly critical period of 1963 but for budgetary (NOA) purposes both programs ended in 1961. Secretary McElroy said that money would be spent beyond FY 1961 on these programs.

Secretary Anderson asked whether the B–58 could be made a missile carrier. Secretary McElroy believed not, and General White added that the B–58 could not carry missiles without great modifications in its structure. Secretary Anderson asked how much built-in, automatic increase there was in the budget over the next two or three years. Secretary McElroy said the budget was intended to be a level budget. It would not be pushed up in the future. This estimate was brought out by the fact that NOA was slightly below spending. Except for the decreasing value of the dollar and increases in retirement, etc., he believed an increased budget for military purposes would not be forced upon us. Mr. Stans agreed with Secretary McElroy with one reservation, that is, that decisions as to Minuteman and Nike–Zeus might compel an increase in the Defense Budget. Secretary McElroy said that when large expenditures for Minuteman and Nike–Zeus became necessary, some aircraft would be dropped out of the budget.

The Vice President asked how much the budget included for space activities. Dr. York said that by stretching the definition of space a bit, the FY 1961 budget included $400 million for space activities. The Vice President remarked that “space” was almost indefinitely expansible and that the cost of space activities was high. Secretary McElroy thought this was a good point and remarked that the cost of the reconnaissance satellite, for example, would be very high.

Secretary McElroy then called on General Twining to continue the presentation on the Defense Budget.

General Twining read a presentation, a copy of which is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting.9 He also displayed four charts as follows: (1) “Summary of Major Forces—Army” (2) “Summary of Major Forces— Navy” (3) “Summary of Major Forces—Air Force” (4) “Summary of Major Force Deployments as of November 1, 1960.”

The President asked for some clarification about the BOMARC figures mentioned in General Twining’s presentation. General Twining said sixteen BOMARC squadrons will be deployed, each squadron to [Page 349]have thirty missiles. Four squadrons would be operational in FY 1960, with four additional squadrons operational in FY 1961. The President asked what were the characteristics of the weapon. General White said the BOMARC–A had a range of 200 miles and a speed of Mach-2 plus. The BOMARC–B would have a range of 400 miles with a nuclear warhead and solid propellant. The President asked whether the BOMARC was a completely defensive weapon and General White replied in the affirmative.

Secretary McElroy then called on Mr. Sprague to complete the presentation. Mr. Sprague read a briefing memorandum, a copy of which is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting, and displayed charts showing “The Defense Program for FY 1961”, “The Aircraft Procurement Program,” “Selected Missile Programs”, and “The Defense Program for FY 1961 per Service.”

The President inquired about increased per diem for Government employees. Had this resulted from legislation?

Mr. Stans said that the bill to increase the per diem of Government employees had almost passed the last session of Congress and was almost certain to pass the next session. The Bureau of the Budget had testified before Congressional Committees that the per diem should be $14 a day instead of the present $12. However, it had been raised to $15 a day in committee. Budget had also testified that the mileage allowance for Government employees was adequate at the present time, but it had also been raised by the committee.

The President said this was the first time he had heard of Congress raising per diem or mileage allowances for anyone but Congressmen. He thought the Bureau of the Budget ought to repeat its testimony of last year in the new session of Congress. Moreover, he believed current provisions regarding the retirement age of military personnel should be reviewed. The doctors were keeping people alive longer and in better physical shape. There should be room at the top in the military services, but if a military career could last longer, the individual officer would have a longer time in which to reach the top. Perhaps the services should do more toward eliminating the less-fit officers after their first seven years of service. Many officers had been forced to retire at age 60 when they were still very capable officers. The President asked that the Department of Defense prepare a study on the provisions regarding retirement age of military personnel. He also asked Mr. Stans to submit a memorandum on the status of legislative proposals for per diem and mileage allowances for Federal employees.

Secretary Anderson then brought up the subject of cargo airlift. He said he had heard of a plan to subsidize private carriers to develop a cargo plane. He wondered whether the Quesada plan had been coordinated with the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). Mr. Gray said that [Page 350]this matter was currently under consideration by the Planning Board, which had hoped to submit recommendations to the Council before the President’s departure on December 3.10 The Planning Board had been unable to complete the project, however, because of General Quesada’s absence from the country. Secretary Anderson asked whether the FY 1961 budget provided for the subsidization of the development of the cargo plane. Mr. Gray said he understood that the Bureau of the Budget was ready to proceed with a guaranteed loan for the development of a cargo airplane. Mr. Stans said a guaranteed loan was not a budgetary item for the first year. The Budget would include some money for modernization of MATS with the understanding, however, that there would be no apportionment for MATS modernization unless the issues revolving around MATS and the cargo airplane were settled.

Secretary McElroy said that Defense had a study on this subject which would be submitted soon. He felt the Quesada plan needed some review in the light of the proposition advanced by some of the major airlines to develop a cargo airplane without a guarantee, as long as there was some assurance that some of the traffic now carried by MATS would be diverted to these private lines. Secretary McElroy said he was inclined to give these assurances. The President said this sounded like an attractive proposition. Mr. Stans said the basic questions now were: how much business should MATS give to the private airlines, and is there a need for a guarantee?

Secretary Anderson pointed out that while we need not worry about a guaranteed loan for a year, such a guarantee is a contingent liability. Mr. Stans agreed that the guaranteed loan could “come home to roost”. For example, the FY 1961 budget might have to include $50 million for payment of shipbuilding guarantees. The President thought another kind of guarantee would be to guarantee that a certain percentage of military traffic would be given to the private carriers.

Mr. Stans said the Defense Budget had had intensive consideration. Difficult decisions had been faced and made, and the Bureau of the Budget had worked closely with Defense. He was completely satisfied as to some decisions, but not as to others. However, on balance, he felt the proposed Defense Budget for FY 1961 was a very creditable result. He admitted that he had hoped for a smaller budget, but felt that the time had now passed for individual suggestions. However, he hoped the normal budgetary process would be retained.

The President agreed that before he took final action, the military budget estimates for FY 1961 should follow the normal budgetary process. The President then said he wished to make some observations from [Page 351]instinct, not from logic. In 1957 Sputnik went up and induced a Sputnik psychology in this country. One had only to say “moon” or “missile” and everyone went berserk. Sputnik was followed by a recession resulting in tremendous pressure to spend additional money. The peak of our anxiety is now past and the people are taking things in their stride. He did not wish to inculcate complacency, but he did hope that Defense would be able to find a way to save $200 million more. He realized that certain factors mentioned by Secretary McElroy had pushed the Defense Budget up and possibly he was too optimistic in hoping for savings. However, if the Defense Budget could be $200 million below the present figure, he would have a big lever in compelling a reduction in the budgets of other departments and agencies. Indeed he wished to use a reduction in the Defense Budget as a club, not only against other departments and agencies, but against Congress.

Mr. Gray asked whether the record might show that, subject to normal budgetary process and final action by the President, the U.S. military programs for FY 1961 as recommended by Secretary McElroy were generally consistent with national security policy objectives. The President answered in the affirmative.

The National Security Council:11

Noted and discussed an oral presentation of the recommendations by the Secretary of Defense as to the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1961, as presented at the meeting by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. John M. Sprague, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Noted the President’s request that the Department of Defense study and report to him on the following subjects:
The possibility, in view of the reduced turn-over in military personnel resulting from the Cordiner report, of further reducing or consolidating military training programs, specialist schools, and related facilities.
A review of the structure and functions of the various war colleges.
A review of the current provisions regarding retirement age of military personnel in view of the increased longevity and fitness of the population resulting from medical advances. In this connection, the President also suggested consideration of instituting the selection process at an earlier period of military service.
Noted the statement by the Secretary of Defense that the Defense Department’s Office of Research and Engineering has a special group working on advancing the art of weaponry for limited war, and the statement [Page 352]by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the procurement of non-nuclear weapons systems would now be given increased attention.
Agreed that, subject to the normal budgetary process and final action by the President, the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1961, as recommended by the Secretary of Defense at this meeting, were generally consistent with national security policy objectives.
Noted the President’s statement that, before he took final action on the military budget estimates for Fiscal Year 1961, the regular budgetary process should be completed to make sure that all practicable economies were effected.
Noted that the NSC Planning Board was:
Undertaking a review of current policy on Continental Defense (NSC 5802/1).12
Preparing a report for Council consideration on Cargo Airlift.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

The actions in d and e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for appropriate action.

Marion W. Boggs
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.
  2. Complete copies of NSC 5912 are ibid., White House Office Files, Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers Series. A copy without the sections on “The Military Program” and “The Atomic Energy Program” is in Department of State, S/SNSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5912 Series. The section on “The Military Program” is also ibid., S/S Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 5912. Part of that section, attached to an October 30 covering memorandum from Lay to the Council, is in the Supplement. On October 29, the Council had considered the section on “The USIA Program.” (Memorandum of discussion by R. H. Johnson, October 29; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Not found attached. A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.
  5. In memoranda to Herter, dated October 29 and November 18, Smith set forth his opinion that furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives required the United States to move far more vigorously in augmentation of conventional forces. (November 18 memorandum attached to memorandum dated December 11 from Max V. Krebs, Special Assistant to Herter, to Smith; all in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Planning 1958–1959) See the Supplement.
  6. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2150, approved by the President on November 30. (Department of State, S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
  7. See footnote 6, Document 106.
  8. Regarding NSC Actions No. 1994 and 2000, see footnotes 2 and 6, Document 36. Regarding NSC Action No. 2013, see footnote 6, Document 41.
  9. In January 1957, the Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, chaired by Ralph J. Cordiner, offered a plan to base enlisted men’s pay on skill rather than length of service. A later version of the report was made public after the Bureau of the Budget in late April 1957 adopted some, but rejected most, of the Committee’s recommendations.
  10. The minutes of the meeting are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.
  11. See Document 86.
  12. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2151, approved by the President on November 30. (Department of State, S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
  13. See footnote 10, Document 8.