36. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher)1
Dear Eric: I refer to our Telegram No. 640 of October 3d2 regarding the Ladejinsky visit, to our Despatch 125 of September 30th,3 “Conversation with President Diem”, particularly the remarks [Page 88] and comments regarding the Can Lao party, and to the several remarks I have made about that party in my letters to you regarding the Cassia trade. (Your letter of September 29 on Cassia4 has just come in.)
When I dictated the message on Ladejinsky I hoped that we could get to you at least a fairly full preliminary report on Can Lao activities prior to Ladejinsky’s arrival. However, after reading the first draft of that report prepared by Ben Wood,5 it is obvious that because of the complexities and covert nature of the Can Lao, it will be impossible to get it out prior to October 20th. Furthermore, I have been thinking the matter over and talking to Howard Elting. I now question whether it would be advisable for you or anyone else in the Department to discuss the alleged activities of the party with Wolf because I have decided that I can and should take it up direct with Diem myself without any preliminary laying of wires through Wolf.
Since the activities of the party are a purely internal matter, I have felt since the beginning that the logical and least offensive way to bring up this subject would be in connection with a direct U.S. interest, for example by using concrete evidence available to the U.S. Government that Nguyen Van Buu has been breaking American laws by under-invoicing Cassia shipments. As soon as we get concrete official information from the Commissioner of Customs indicating under-invoicing, I now plan to take up the Cassia case with Diem. I could quite logically say that there are many persistent rumors circulating in diplomatic and business circles that Buu has monopoly of the Cassia trade and the proceeds derived from this trade, particularly the large profits accruing from under-invoicing, are going into the coffers of the Can Lao or perhaps into the pockets of Buu and others connected with him. Having raised the subject, I would then refer to “more rumors” known to private as well as official foreigners here and in some cases to newspaper men, indicating that the Can Lao may be involved in many other fairly important business transactions in the country. I would mention for instance that reports keep coming to us alleging that many businessmen in order to obtain import licenses must pay a considerable sum to the Can Lao party. I would point out in this connection that whether these reports are true or not it would be detrimental to the best interests of Viet-Nam vis-à-vis the American Congress and public if any reports should reach the press alleging that licenses for the importation of American financed goods are obtainable in some cases only after payment of a substantial fee to the covert Can Lao party. Except for the Cassia and duck feather cases, we do not have too solid proof, but the many reports [Page 89] we have received on Can Lao business transactions and squeezes convinces me that many of them may be true.
Some people believe, and it may be true, that Diem is not fully aware of all the financial machinations of the Can Lao members. I feel, however, that he must know of some of them or have given his blessing to some operations of this kind and it would certainly do no harm to let him know in connection with a solidly based Cassia complaint that we have considerable information on some of these machinations. If Diem does not know about all of them, he should. Moreover, I believe it is in U.S. interest to let him know that we have much information on this subject and in the process point out to him that if our data is correct it would be very detrimental to Viet-Nam’s interests if a scandal should break in the press over such matters.
Despite the fact that I do not believe that you or anybody else should at this time discuss the Can Lao with Wolf, you may find it helpful if I give you the following preliminary data.
Since the Can Lao is a covert organization, it has proved quite difficult for … ourselves using all sources available to obtain too much concrete information regarding its organization and activities. Nevertheless, it obviously plays an important part in running the country and in anti-communist operations. The party has for its ideology a Vietnamese philosophy known as “Personalism”. Roughly, Personalism is a philosophy that tries to walk the tightrope between communist collectivism and democratic individualism. It recognizes individuals have certain inalienable rights but these are rather circumscribed by discipline which must be administered by those who “know”, i.e., the members of the Can Lao party. The party has as one of its goals to distribute a small piece of land to each family which the head of family has the right to hold against all comers, and where if necessary he can eke out an existence whether the government or anyone else gives him a job or not. In general, however, the individual is expected to work for the government or non-government organizations, and contribute part of his time for community works, etc. In the meantime, the party through its covert cells, which incidentally are similar in many ways to communist party cells, tries to educate the individual in his duties and rights. Eventually, once the people have learned discipline and their responsibilities, more democratic freedoms may be introduced. In a country like Viet-Nam where the French did nothing to train the people for public service or try to instill in them an appreciation of their responsibilities vis-à-vis the community and nation, it is understandable why in theory at least full democratic freedoms can not be introduced at once. This is particularly true in a country where about eighty percent of the people are illiterate. In other words, “Personalism” [Page 90] is sort of a guided democracy on the non-communist side of the fence run by leaders who apparently sincerely believe in rights for the individual and do not believe that the masses should be forced to work for the state in the totalitarian way practiced by communists.
As mentioned in my referenced telegrams and Despatch, if such a party does not act in a too arbitrary, dictatorial manner, it could do a great deal of good for the country. However, we have heard many reports of discontent and grumbling particularly among intellectuals to the effect that the party is playing too many favorites. We have many unconfirmed reports, some of them fairly substantial, that the party has started to take a hand in military promotions not necessarily based on merit. In Central Viet-Nam where the party is under the tight discipline of brother Ngo Dinh Can it has done a fair job in organizing and governing and has been quite effective against communist subversion. Nevertheless, some of its rigid operations have reportedly caused resentment. In the South, where the much looser party organization is run by brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, the party has not been as effective although resentment is perhaps greater over the alleged machinations of Nhu and his wife as well as others.
Be that as it may, we can not ignore the increasing number of reports that the party both in Central Viet-Nam and in the South is horning in on all business, industrial, commercial and agricultural activities of any substantial nature whatsoever. If the money gained from these operations is actually used by the party to benefit the masses, build up the economy and strengthen the regime, it might be possible to justify its operations. If on the other hand, as appears possible, individuals are reaping considerable personal financial benefit from these transactions and indulging in corrupt practices, it is a matter of much concern to us. It is for this reason that I asked … Ben Wood of the Political Section to work up as full a report as possible on party activities. We will turn it out as soon as we feel it is in proper, objective form.6
- Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 65 F 98, 350.1 Vietnam 1956–58. Secret; Official–Informal.↩
- Supra.↩
- Document 33.↩
- Not found.↩
- Apparent reference to a partial draft, not found, of Document 56.↩
- Durbrow sent a
separate letter to Kocher on
October 10, adding the following postscript:
“With reference to my letter of even [same?] date concerning the Can Lao, I believe another reason why it would be inadvisable for you to discuss the Can Lao with Ladejinsky arises from his somewhat anomalous position here as an American working for the head of a foreign state. As far as I know, Wolf, who is an old friend of mine of some fifteen years standing, has acted in every way as a loyal American but in a matter of this kind he might feel justified in tipping off his boss that ‘the Department is gunning for the Can Lao’. Furthermore, while we all talk to Wolf fairly freely and he is helpful in many ways he is in no way a ‘controlled agent’ and therefore it is better for all of us to listen but divulge as little as possible.” (Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 65 F 98, 350.1 Vietnam 1956–58)
↩ - Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.↩