Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

33. Despatch From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

No. 125

Saigon, September 30, 1958.

REF

• Embtels 576,² 577,³ 578,⁴ dated 9/24/58, and Embtel 586,⁵ dated 9/25/58

SUBJECT

• September 24 Conversation Between President Ngo Dinh Diem and the Ambassador Regarding VN Security Problems.

There is enclosed a memorandum of the conversation which occurred September 24 between President Ngo dinh Diem and the Ambassador.⁶ A brief resume of the conversation, together with the Ambassador’s comments, follows:

1. SDC and Civil Guard

During the conversation the President pointed out the need to tighten up the organization and training of the Self Defense Corps and Civil Guard. He referred to communist plans to step up guerrilla activities and pointed out that the SDC must be trained as an anti-communist guerrilla and intelligence gathering organization.

The President believes that SDC effectiveness can be greatly enhanced if he trains, in addition to those on active SDC duty, a considerable number of villagers in intelligence and anti-guerrilla activities, through shorter periods of active SDC service.

He explained that SDC members on active service would theoretically be on duty at all times. This means that while engaged in their normal occupations they would still be mingling with the people and picking up intelligence. These men would also be in a position to take the first brunt of an attack and hold the enemy until Civil Guard or army units arrive.

The President stated that there are many very small villages in the deep forest west and northwest of Saigon which have been infiltrated by communists. The villagers, lacking in means of defense, have been forced to work with and assist communists in various ways.

2. Organizing Activities in NRM (National Revolutionary Movement)

Diem said that the NRM is to train the SDC in civic action type work and certain anti-communist intelligence operations. NRM training along these lines has been very effective in central Viet-Nam and it is now concentrating on the Southern part of the country.

3. Communist Activities Among Montagnards

The President stated that communist infiltration and subversive activities among the Montagnards have been stepped up in recent months and that they are trying to induce villagers in Laos and Viet-Nam to sign petitions requesting that an autonomous, semi-independent Montagnard Federation be established. Although many Montagnards have seen through this communist propaganda, the communist problem among these people is still quite serious. According to Diem, it is imperative that GVN security forces set up posts in the rugged mountain areas west of Faifo, Tourane and Hué to control communist activities and win over the Montagnards. He reiterated the need for at least a jeep trail from Kontum north through the mountains to Faifo or Hué in order to support these posts.

Diem said that the school set up at Dalat to train Montagnards is progressing quite well though some difficulties remain.

4. Dissident Surrenders in 5th Military (Delta) Region

Diem said he is very pleased that more and more dissidents are rallying to the government in the 5th Military Region (Delta Area). Many of these people have become disillusioned by communist failures and are ripe for surrender if approached in the right manner. He indicated that several “deals” are in the making which he hopes will be concluded successfully.

5. Interest in SEATO Meeting

Diem asked whether Admiral Felt had commented on the SEATO Meeting. I replied that the Admiral had not discussed the question except to remark that as is usual at these meetings, SEATO military plans were discussed.

Comments:

Although I was with Diem for about an hour and a quarter, it was not too clear to me why he had asked to see me apart, perhaps, from trying to find out about developments in the Taiwan Straits. While he brought up this subject first, he did not discuss it in detail after the first few minutes. He wandered from one subject to another but my guess is that he was endeavoring to assure himself that we would continue to pay part of the costs for the SDC since he kept coming back to this subject. He saw General Williams the day before and also talked at some length to him about the SDC. Diem did not specifically ask if we would continue to support SDC.

It is also interesting to note that despite what Nhu told me about communist efforts to organize the Montagnards in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam (Embtel 243 and Despatch 86⁷) Diem did not claim that the communists were concentrating on organizing the Cambodian Montagnards.

Diem’s remarks about the effective training of the SDC by the NRM probably means that he is extending to the village level the strong arm of the Can Lao covert party, for which the NRM is the front. If this added control is carried out in a friendly sympathetic manner, it could be beneficial, but if the party control becomes too dictatorial and severe this could harden the regime and cause more dissension. Diem knows his own people, realizes that the vast majority are illiterate and superstitious and understands the need to have an effective counter subversion organization, but it is to be hoped that he does not go too far in using force through the party apparatus to control the population. He is doing a great deal for the country through the resettlement, land reform and agricultural credit programs as well as in the public works field, which as they progress should increase the sympathy of the masses for the regime. He is getting around the country more and more even to the most remote parts. On these trips he emphasizes the need to work harder, to go in for more self-help projects, to increase productivity and to be alert to the communist danger. He does not, however, go in for much praise for the accomplishment attained. The people listen attentively but one notes little enthusiasm or warmth in the presence of the President. Perhaps this is due to the basically phlegmatic nature of the people who have been kicked about by experts for centuries and therefore by instinct and tradition have adopted a wait and see attitude and are not prone to show enthusiasm. This makes it difficult to evaluate the basic attitude of the masses to the regime. As we have said before, however, Diem while perhaps not loved, having too cold a nature to induce much warmth, is respected.

Now the question arises whether enthusiasm for Diem and/or the regime will have a chance to grow if the Can Lao party acts in too arbitrary a manner as it extends its control throughout the country. The Embassy … have been working for some months on a study and evaluation of the Can Lao.⁸ When this is completed we should have a better idea of its influence for better or worse.

The rallying of various dissident elements to the government in the Delta Area should be helpful in controlling the internal security situation in that region, if Diem’s claims are true. From various sources it appears to be a fact that a considerable number of additional dissidents have rallied recently to the government.

Elbridge Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/9–3058. Secret; Priority. Drafted by James T. Rousseau, Second Secretary and political officer at the Embassy. Copies pouched to Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, Hue, CINCPAC, and CINCPAC PolAd.
2. In telegram 576, Durbrow reported one aspect of an apparently separate conversation with Diem on September 24 in which Vietnamese-Cambodian relations were discussed. (Ibid., 651G.51H/9–2458)
3. In telegram 577, Durbrow reported that during a conversation with Admiral Felt on September 19 and again in a conversation between Diem and Durbrow on September 24, Diem urged that a road from Vietnam to Pakse in Laos be built for strategic, economic, and political reasons. (Ibid., 851G.2612/9–2458) A memorandum of the conversation dated September 19 is in Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Conversations with Diem 12 June 58–27 Dec 58 (167).
4. In telegram 578, Durbrow reported a conversation with Diem on the morning of September 24 in which the Vietnamese President wished to offer advice on the Tawain Straits crisis. Diem was convinced, according to Durbrow, that if the United States remained firm, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China would not engage in all-out war. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2458)
5. In telegram 586, Durbrow reported that during one of his conversations with Diem on September 24, the two men discussed their expectations of the ICC–sponsored proposed talks between the Republic of Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on technical matters relating to the demilitarized zone separating them. (Ibid., 751G.00/9–2558)
6. Attached, but not printed.
7. In despatch 86, September 9, and telegram 243, August 8, Durbrow reported the gists of long conversations he had with Nhu on August 8 and September 5 on Cambodian-Vietnamese relations. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51G/9–958 and 751G.11/8–858, respectively)
8. See Document 56.