37. Memorandum of a Conversation, the President’s Palace, Saigon, October 29, 19581
PARTICIPANTS
- President Diem
- General Maxwell D. Taylor
- Lieutenant General Williams
- Bridgadier General Bonesteel2
- Howard Elting, Jr.
On the occasion of a courtesy call by General Taylor on October 29, the President spent an hour and a half in a rambling exposition of Viet-Nam’s needs and strategic situation. He started off discussing the need for military equipment of all sorts, pointing out that while the position appears to be fairly good on paper, a great deal of the equipment is old and worn out. General Taylor commented that he had discussed the matter with General Williams earlier in the day. He added that this was a problem which we also had to deal with in the US, particularly from the point of view of training adequate numbers of technicians qualified to make the necessary repairs.
The President then made the point that the Vietnamese have shown great aptitude in the handling of machinery and generally as technicians. He said that they have only gradually come to realize their lacks and their needs from the point of view of skills, organization and technique as well as matériel because the French tended to keep top jobs and controls for themselves. Diem said the Vietnamese only began to realize their lacks when they tried to build roads and bridges for themselves or when they first began holding fairly large scale maneuvers. It was at these times that inadequacies really showed up.
Diem then went into great detail regarding the security situation, describing the reasons for moving something close to 30,000 people to the High Plateau in the last two years. He asserted that the Viet Minh are becoming nervous as they see South Viet-Nam’s army develop and the GVN consolidating its position and particularly as they see definite progress being made now on the economic front. Diem said this impelled the Viet Minh to redouble their efforts. He pointed out the security problems created by this being a divided country, by the difficulties of the terrain in Central Viet-Nam as well as in the delta area and by the long and vulnerable frontier. He said that all this presented an entirely different military problem from the one that the French had built up their installations to meet. The French [Page 92] had concentrated their military installations in Saigon and the other towns of the country because their concern was with the population of the country itself. Now the problem is entirely other. There is much to be done to create installations where they properly belong to meet the present-day military situation. As far as his troops were concerned, he was satisfied that they formed an effective force because he had been careful to move them around and to see particularly that those from the South got training in the rough terrain of the Center and the High Plateau.
In connection with the security situation the President produced a sheet of paper from his pocket which had about eight paragraphs typed on it, single space, from which he proceeded to read. He said it was information obtained on a most secret basis from a member of the ICC. According to this report various hotels in and around Hanoi were filled with Soviet, Czech, Polish and East German “tourists” who in reality were probably military experts and technicians. The report also spoke of the reinforcing of bridges on the two main routes coming down from China and the passage of truck convoys up to 50 in number covered with tarpaulins and presumably transporting ammunition and/or heavy military equipment because the trucks could be seen to be heavily laden. The information, at least as the President recounted it, appeared rather vague and indefinite.
At one point in the conversation General Taylor asked the President what his reaction was to the latest developments in the Taiwan Straits situation. The President repeated his well known opinion that it is essential to remain firm. He said that withdrawal from the offshore islands would have adverse repercussions throughout the Far East and indicated that he did not have a very clear idea of precisely what the US position is. General Taylor explained our position. The President did not react to this explanation.
General Williams asked the President if he would accept Laotian officers for training in Vietnamese military schools. The President said he would have to think this over very carefully, particularly as to reactions abroad. For instance, he said it would be very bad if the Laotians started to come in and then under threats or pressure from North Viet-Nam pulled back from such an arrangement.
General Taylor commented that the whole of Southeast Asia should be looked upon as a single strategic area. This led the President to discuss the various countries of the area. He started with a discussion of his brother’s trip to Laos a short time ago and then made some critical remarks regarding the abruptness with which the devaluation and financial reform was carried out in Laos as a result of US insistence. Mr. Elting remarked that the Government appeared to have survived the shock successfully and that the people seemed pleased with the reform. While stressing the friendly relations that [Page 93] have always existed between Laos and Viet-Nam, Diem was critical of the Cambodians and to a lesser degree of the Thais and Burmese.
Diem wound up with a plea for all the help we can give him on the grounds that Viet-Nam is the bastion of Southeast Asia. He said they need help in all areas because there is so much that needs to be done. At this point he mentioned the strain under which he and all his collaborators are working and spoke several times of the overwork which was beginning to tell on them all.
Comment by drafting officer: I had the impression for the first time that Diem is beginning to feel the strain and to appreciate more clearly the magnitude of the tasks that need to be accomplished. At the end of this talk he showed fatigue and also a certain unaccustomed humility.3
- Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Jet Aircraft. Secret. Drafted by Elting.↩
- Brigadier General Charles H. Bonesteel, III, Secretary of the General Staff, United States Army.↩
- In a letter to General Bonesteel, November 8, General Williams stated in part: “As to ‘comment by drafting officer’, last page, I can’t agree that the President is ‘beginning to feel the strain’. Mr. Elting sees the President quite infrequently, I see him frequently. The afternoon of the day of your departure, we were together about three hours. He was as full of energy, vigor and preplanning as ever. He has always, in my opinion, appreciated clearly the magnitude of the tasks that need to be accomplished.” (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Official Correspondence July–Dec 1958 (35))↩