Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

273. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 29, 1960—7 p.m.

1231. Re Embtel 1217, rptd CINCPAC 255,² and CHMAAG 1607 to CINCPAC only.³ Although General McGarr concurred basically with Embtel 1217 which he went over before it sent, he received impression, after further study later, that statement (fourth paragraph from end) “Therefore, if Diem continues fail carry out necessary reforms and present deterioration continues, US should actively initiate search for best available substitute and do as much as we can to arrange as orderly a transfer of power as possible,” indicated I did not recommend that we back up Diem fully now and intimated that we might take action to undermine his strength and discredit GVN internally more or less in immediate future. In order clarify my point I informed Gen McGarr that possible action to replace Diem was predicated on possibility that “present deterioration continues” and if it should, then to prevent Commie or front organization taking over and leaving us out in cold we should search for suitable substitute and try arrange as orderly change of power as possible. Since McGarr sent this interpretation with my concurrence to CINCPAC in ref CHMAAG tel, I thought it might be helpful spell out point to Department. McGarr as stated in his tel to CINCPAC believes before we start such search we should “give Diem adequate military resources to resolve problem of protection population from V.C. and thus be able to adopt other measures” (i.e., liberalization programs).

I agree Diem should be given adequate military resources to put down VC threat but still believe that VC threat will continue grow unless effective measures are also taken simultaneously to win over population as well as protect it. On basis conversation McGarr had 21st and I had 23rd with Diem (Embtel 1216⁴), it appears Diem was indicating he cannot effectively introduce any worthwhile liberalization reforms until he can protect population which he claims cannot be done unless granted 20,000 additional troops. If this turns out to be the case, I sincerely believe Diem’s chances of defeating VC threat will be greatly minimized. However, it is apparent from the continued scale of Communist guerrilla operations in Viet-Nam and the blatant Soviet aerial intervention in Laos that responsible leaders of the bloc are determined to push us in Southeast Asia as far as they think they can. The latter development justifies the need for additional well-trained forces in being in this area. Consequently while until now I have had reservations on need for 20,000 level increase, it now seems clear, part [apart?] from Diem’s inclination to give most emphasis to use of force to try to solve his internal security problem, that other factors have entered the picture from a purely U.S. point of view so I withdraw my reluctance to any increase which may be deemed appropriate by Washington. We must however continue press Diem hardest on need for positive and immediate political action to gain support, and examine closely his success along these lines to determine whether the “present deterioration continues” to the degree that would oblige us to seek or accept alternative leader for SVN.

McGarr, in the reference telegram to CINCPAC, also expressed concern over statement in Embtel 1217 that “prospects of overt Communist aggression are minimal at this time.” Because of increasing PAVN capability, Soviet airlift and deteriorating situation Laos, McGarr believes it “militarily dangerous minimize threat of external aggression, particularly during dry season,” since such minimization could result in destroying balance of forces required meet internal threat and still maintain posture to meet external attack. This obviously matter open to different evaluation, but I raise question whether more calculated risk than Gen McGarr deems advisable, should not be taken use maximum forces available here to fight present guerrilla-terrorist threat, which could cause overthrow Diem without any overt aggression.

General McGarr also believes my statement in reftel “in my estimation we must be prepared to face long drawn-out full-scale guerrilla war” gives erroneous impression that continued terrorism internally is only foreseeable threat. He believes “such interpretation dangerous as would lead to continually increasing fragmentation ARVN forces in anti-guerrilla security operations with aggravation neglect of training mission which would”⁵ continue dissipate ARVN strength and destroy its ability meet overt aggression. Again this boils down to degree we should take calculated risk of concentrating on meeting present guerrilla war at which [sic] we both believe will continue for long time, which poses serious danger of overwhelming free Viet-Nam, against maintaining balanced posture to meet possible overt aggression at some indefinite time in future.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.OO/12–2960. Secret. Repeated for information to CINCPAC PolAd.
2. Document 271.
3. Not printed.
4. Document 270.
5. The source text indicates close of quotation at this point.