Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

271. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 24, 1960—7 p.m.

1217. Depcirtel 879.² Principal watershed for current phase of development of Viet-Nam is Geneva Agreements of 1954, which enabled country become independent but divided it into Communist northern half and non-Communist southern half. In initial confusion and due partly to residual Communist control many parts of South Viet-Nam in 1954, appeared likely country could not survive as independent entity, but would shortly be merged with Communist north. However, due determination of substantial majority of people, advent to power and skilled leadership of markedly anti-Communist government of Ngo Dinh Diem, and strong U.S. diplomatic and both civilian and military support. South Viet-Nam survived its critical first two years, established framework for existing political institutions, integrated about 800,000 refugees into economy, and began development effective military forces. By 1958 after earlier preoccupation with security and political matters GVN began devote more attention to economic development, which has shown marked progress.

In initial period of consolidation President Diem had support of great majority of country. However, starting in 1957 this support gradually decreased among large segments educated elite in cities because of Diem’s mandarinal concepts, Ngo family monopoly of political power, and failure to permit development political institutions or allow broader exercise of democratic freedoms, at least some of which could have been granted despite Communist threat. In addition Diem has conspicuously failed to establish real political rapport with population. If he had 10 percent of demagoguery of Sukarno … he would be one of most effective leaders in this part of world. Prosecution of basically worthwhile but arbitrarily implemented agroville program in 1959–60, other forced labor programs and high-handed attitude of local officials also resulted in growing alienation of support of peasants. At this time also Communists changed tactics from subversion and propaganda to full scale guerrilla terrorist war, partly because GVN economic and social development was progressing at such rate that softer tactics were considered to be inadequate to take over country.

U.S. policy throughout period 1954 to present has been to provide strong and unequivocal support for Diem government as only entity in sight capable of maintaining integrity of South Viet-Nam as viable non-Communist state. While giving extensive support to GVN security forces, U.S. sought persuade Diem to give balanced emphasis to economic development and to establishment of governmental institutions essential to vitality of an independent nation, but we were not as successful as we might have been in view of security threat. We also made continuous efforts but had little success in persuading Diem to take political measures in effort reverse popular trend away from his regime. Diem contends this impossible if people not given military protection. U.S. has also sought persuade Diem improve relations with Cambodia (which considers Viet-Nam traditional enemy) both to avoid giving Cambodia reason for moving toward Communist bloc and to obtain greater Cambodian cooperation against Communist insurgents. Despite our efforts and pointed warnings GVN in early 1959 tried overthrow Sihanouk by ill-fated Dap Chhuon revolt. After this failure our efforts met with some intermittent success in latter part 1959 and latter part 1960, but could again deteriorate acutely at any time without warning because long standing suspicions both sides and Sihanouk’s periodic leftish swings. Conversely GVN relations with Laos good whenever anti-Communist government in power there. U.S. tried minimize GVN involvement in Laos to avoid DRV reaction despite GVN’s deep concern at any indication increased Communist strength in Laos.

Foregoing catalog of successes and failures properly identifies President Diem as key to situation. He has been principal motivating force for most of GVN’s activities since his accession to power, and little or no action has taken place in which he was not interested or which he opposed. He is very much the mandarin, is a devoted, incorrupt nationalist with strong sense of mission, deep religious faith (Catholic) and conviction that his judgment is invariably correct. In last respect, he can and does point to a series of critical decisions over past five years which he made against his advisors, foreign and domestic, and in which he proved successful. He has sincerely referred to some of these as “miracles” including defeat recent coup. This strong and stubborn character has led him into excessive centralization of power, however, and impatience with any real trends toward or expressions of democratic political life, which he asserts is too great luxury for underdeveloped [country?] engaged in guerrilla war with Communists. As result. Diem is particularly sensitive to threats his position, is most disposed to give primary attention to security measures designed strengthen that position, and therefore is particularly difficult to induce to make political and social changes.

At present Diem government confronted by problems which constitute most serious challenge it has faced since 1955: 1) greatly expanded Viet Cong guerrilla and subversion threat; 2) greatly increased non-Communist discontent developing into growing opposition; and 3) problem of internal fiscal reform to provide local resources for development and military programs which Diem insists should be provided primarily by foreign aid.

Viet Cong guerrilla war has steadily intensified since late 1959, with armed personnel in units rising from about 2,000 to present ARVN estimate of 9,800. Communist Party in North Viet-Nam made it clear at party congress in September 1960 that DRV actively seeking overthrow Diem government by subversive (i.e. primarily guerrilla) methods and its replacement by “united front” government willing negotiate reunification South Viet-Nam with DRV. Obvious that DRV means reunification on Communist terms. To meet this threat GVN has 150,000 armed forces, about 60,000 Civil Guard, and other security forces, but they have not yet received adequate training for variety reasons to meet new VC tactics of large scale guerrilla war, in view prior emphasis on meeting overt threat from north. Organizational and command structure at higher levels ARVN has not been adequately oriented toward dealing with missions of armed forces to include conventional and unconventional warfare. Also Diem’s proclivity to bypass channels and to deal directly with military units at all levels has been handicap.

Partly because of growth of insecurity and partly because of Diem’s failure to progress on political front and remove sources of political discontent, dissatisfaction and opposition to his government growing in virtually all circles and are perhaps at highest pitch since he took over in 1954. Temptation toward change through violent action has been strengthened by 1960 developments in Korea, Turkey and Laos. Army elements actually tried seize power through coup in November because of dissatisfaction with government’s political methods and failure defeat Communists, but bulk of army remained loyal and responded Diem appeal to put down revolt. Nevertheless, government and security forces probably weakened by distrust in aftermath of coup. Much talk of another coup is heard, and real possibility exists another coup or coups may take place, which, while they might be unsuccessful, would further weaken Diem government to such extent that Commie takeover will be facilitated.

GVN under Diem still seems strongest non-Communist group in sight and remains firmly oriented to West. Its shortcomings as enumerated above are sometimes exaggerated by foreign press, while overlooking its substantial accomplishments and perhaps applying higher standards than most Asian countries can meet. View deterioration of situation. Embassy believes Diem must continue receive all necessary U.S. military assistance beyond his own resources to deal with Communist threat. However, to accomplish primary objective of maintaining South Viet-Nam as viable non-Communist state GVN must also take effective action broaden base its political support. We must therefore continue by all feasible and appropriate means press this on Diem.

Despite growing criticism (some triggered by rumors) of Diem government by more and more elements in and out of government, non-Communist Vietnamese, who still substantial majority of population South Viet-Nam, continue have hopeful attitude towards U.S. Local appreciation of U.S. support still widely in evidence. However, non-Communist Vietnamese coming increasingly expect U.S. to take principal role in somehow bringing about major change in attitude of Diem government, which we have and should continue press for. In absence such change, deterioration in presently favorable attitude most Vietnamese towards us must be expected, and support for violent overthrow of Diem government, with unpredictable effect on Viet-Nam’s international orientation, will probably grow.

Thus, unless present trends reversed, there good possibility Diem government may be overthrown and replaced. Therefore, if Diem continues fail carry out necessary reforms and present deterioration continues U.S. should actively initiate search for best available substitute and do as much as we can to arrange as orderly a transfer of power as possible. Whether with a revitalized Diem regime or with a suitable replacement U.S. should continue collaborate in struggle against Viet Cong guerrillas and well-begun but still unfinished task of promoting progressive political and economic development.

Because of risks of any external intervention prospects of overt Communist aggression are minimal at this time, but this possibility should be borne in mind. In my estimation we must be prepared to face long, drawn-out full scale guerrilla war which might develop to such extent we might find it necessary respond to GVN request bring in U.S. forces.

Prospects for next half decade are that U.S. support for Viet-Nam’s security forces will retain high priority (primarily against guerrillas as long as that continues be main threat). At same time U.S. assistance for economic development will continue be required for peaceful economic and social competition with Communist regime in North Viet-Nam. Politically, U.S. should support as much as circumstances and situation permit, development of political institutions and expanding personal and political freedom to point up contrast to Communist system and assist Viet-Nam to maintain its independence as a free nation.

In view Diem’s firm anti-Communist stance his confidence in U.S. ally remains predicated on firm U.S. approach in dealing with Communism.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12–2460. Secret. Repeated for information to Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, Paris, London, Singapore, Hong Kong, and CINCPAC PolAd.
2. In circular telegram 879, December 19, the Department requested that the recipient Far Eastern Ambassadors or Principal Officers prepare a concise, year-end review placing the current situation in historical prospective, relating the historical summary to U.S. policies, and recommending future policy; in the words of the telegram, a “think piece.” (Ibid., 120.201/12–1960)