Office of the Historian

240. Telegram From Jerome T. French of the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense, to the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale)1

Saigon, November 17, 1960.

SGN 239. Following are conclusions I have reached after 3 full days of discussions with various people here. Unable to see President, but have had lengthy discussions with others referred to your message.2

Situation is deteriorating rapidly as is U.S. capability to render constructive influence. There are many facets to coup attempt and its [Page 670] effect which require detailed discussion. Worst effect is bitterness, dissension and further demoralization which it appears will result and which is affecting even some who are instrumental in saving the day. This is not hearsay but what the individuals themselves have told me.

Viet Cong situation is much stronger than I believe is generally recognized in Washington. I believe that they are rapidly moving towards a position of strength comparable to that held prior to Geneva. ARVN Intelligence supplied to MAAG indicates they now hold secure pockets length of Country and are beginning to link-up such areas in Southern Region.

I am concerned to extent that I feel I should cut short trip and return Washington for early discussion situation here personally with you. Am leaving for Manila today if you concur in early return. Please advise via USARMA Manila.3 Otherwise will submit written report from there giving details.

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Papers: FRC 63 A 1803; Vietnam Correspondence 1960. Secret.↩
  2. Not further identified.↩
  3. In telegram DA985948, November 17, sent to French via the Army Attaché’s office in Manila, Lansdale replied: “Cut trip short as feasible for early discussions here.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Papers: FRC 63 A 1803, J.T. French Trip File) Lansdale summarized this telegram in a memorandum to Gates dated November 17. Stamped notes on the source text indicate that Knight and Lieutenant General John A. Dabney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Disarmament and Military Affairs, saw it. (Ibid., OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 092 Vietnam)↩