Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

228. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 12, 1960—2 p.m.

1049. Prior receipt Deptel 775² I decided I must speak firmly with Diem. It evident from troop movements in front of Embassy and from first-hand observers various places center of city troops apparently loyal to Diem moving in to surround paratroopers at Palace and that probably large blood-letting about take place. Following are facts and summary ten minute phone call 0920 12th with Diem.

I opened conversation by stating I deeply concerned at growing evidence pointing to large bloodbath which I insisted must be avoided. I then told him we had worked all day 11th and during night to try to convince rebels not to fire on Palace and thus create bloodbath but to negotiate. I then said that after all these efforts I extremely perturbed, particularly after he had made his announcement of agreement with rebels, that more and more apparent loyalist troops were converging on Palace. I emphasized in most emphatic manner that if loyalist troops were planning to shoot it out with rebels this would have most disastrous effects for all concerned. All that he had done since taking over power and high prestige he held in Free World would be lost. Diem stated that early morning 11th when troops started he thought rebels were Communists. I assured him all our evidence to contrary and Diem frankly admitted his first information wrong. He said he too agreed bloodbath should be avoided and he had instructed Colonel Khiem, loyalist commander fifth military region, to negotiate with rebels in order divide rebel and loyal forces into separate zones to avoid bloodbath battle. I expressed hope such arrangement could be made but reiterated large number troops moving towards center and just at that moment several armored cars moving past Embassy that direction at fast pace.

Diem then said he had been negotiating with rebel’s during entire night and while he had agreed their terms, rebels kept broadcasting to people to demonstrate in front of and invade Palace in morning. When he pointed this out to them they promised try to prevent any demonstrations. In other words, rebels had not acted in good faith. I then said I had just heard from eyewitnesses that tanks and troops apparently defending Palace had shot into large mob near Palace, wounding and probably killing many. I reiterated this must stop immediately or entire population would rise up against both loyalists and rebels, and Communists would take over city. I added if bloodbath not avoided, all of Vietnam would go Communist in very short time. Diem then said rebels had broken cease-fire between 0600 and 0630 twelfth and his troops had to reply. I stated we had firm information firing broke out in morning through error and therefore it not too important but repeated he must negotiate immediately with rebels to avoid further shooting.

Diem confirmed he had agreed to creation of provisional government of generals and had agreed to meet with these generals at convenient place near Palace, for instance, foreign ministry, but that rebel generals had not shown up. I stated this probably due fact sporadic shelling continued around Palace and possibly to fact loyal troops had fired into crowd. After Diem reiterated several times rebels had not acted in good faith I told him that all information we had received indicated rebels desired maintain cease-fire, and again exhorted him as friend to not jeopardize all he had done to build up Vietnam and his own prestige if bloodbath takes place and to urge Colonel Khiem to negotiate immediately. He promised to do what he could.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11–1260. Secret; Niact. Received at 4:25 a.m. Repeated for information niact to Manila, priority to Bangkok for Felt, priority to Phnom Penh and Vientiane, and to CINCPAC PolAd. Passed to OSD and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
2. Telegram 775 to Saigon, November 11, drafted by Cleveland and cleared by Parsons, reads:

   “If still appropriate you may wish inform Diem and at your discretion get word to coup leaders that we consider it overriding importance to Viet Nam and Free World that agreement be reached soonest in order avoid continued division, further bloodshed with resultant fatal weakening Viet-Nam’s ability resist Communists” (Ibid., 751K.00/11–1160).

   The text is also printed in Department of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, p. 1327.