235. Editorial Note
In a letter to his parents dated November 13, Joseph A. Mendenhall described his experiences during the attempted coup d’état in Saigon. The sections which follow omit reference to personal matters:
“This was the first coup d’état or attempted coup d’état we have lived through, and it’s a very exciting experience. We were awakened by a telephone call about 20 minutes of 4 o’clock in the morning Friday, Nov. 11, from an American friend who asked whether we had heard the firing of guns. I said no as we slept in an air-conditioned bedroom, but stepped out on the upstairs terrace where we could hear firing very plainly. [Mrs. Mendenhall] was alarmed because she was afraid it was a Communist attack, but I told her I was pretty sure that it was not, and that it was instead an attempt by non-Communists to overthrow the Diem Government.
“I called the Ambassador who was up and had heard the shooting. Our friend Bill Colby who lives almost next to the entrance to the Presidential Palace had already phoned the Ambassador to tell him that armed forces were firing in front of his house on the Presidential guard houses beside the big entrance gates to the Palace grounds.
“At the Ambassador’s request I immediately began to round up communications personnel to get to the Embassy to send messages to Washington. The chief of the Communications Unit lives next to us, so I went over and got him and then telephoned the marine guard at the Embassy to go pick up communications clerks if he could get out of the Embassy safely. By that time other Embassy officers living nearby had gathered at our house, and several of us got into a car and went over to the Ambassador’s residence.
“At the Ambassador’s residence I immediately began drafting telegrams for the Ambassador’s approval reporting information as it [Page 661] reached us. I would then telephone the cables to the Embassy for immediate transmission to Washington, and the first few were sent via a method which will put the information on President Eisenhower’s desk within ten minutes after its arrival in Washington. We read later in the local papers that Hagerty, the President’s Press Secretary, had announced that the President who was in Georgia was being kept posted. I was also busy telephoning my Vietnamese friends to get as much information as we could on what was happening. It soon became clear that it was paratroopers who were trying to oust the government, and that they were anti-Communist.
“About 9 a.m. another Embassy officer and I decided to try to get to the Embassy because we were afraid the telephone lines between the Ambassador’s residence and the Embassy might be cut. We took a long way around in order to try to avoid the area of firing, but finally ran into a road block and had to return to the residence which we had left an hour earlier.
“I remained there until noon, and then passed by home for a bite of lunch. As the Ambassador still wanted me to go the office, I again tried after lunch. The firing had been silent for 3 or 4 hours, and this time I made it although I passed right by a gun emplacement.
“I arrived at the Embassy about 1 p.m., and from then until the next afternoon at 3:30 p.m. remained continuously in the Embassy. All of the Political Officers were kept on duty all night. I did get out for dinner Friday evening at a neighboring restaurant. I slept in my office arm chair from 12:30 a.m. to 5 a.m. with a break at about 3 a.m. when I checked up on developments. At 5 a.m. I was awakened by a development in the negotiations between the government and the rebels, and from then on was busy again. At 6:15 a.m. Pres. Diem announced by radio that he agreed to form a new government with the rebels, but at that very moment heavy firing broke out again in various parts of the city. Two or three officers and the Ambassador stepped out of the Embassy balcony to see what was going on, and one of the officers was hit by a ricocheting bullet, but was not seriously wounded.
“By mid-morning Sat. reinforcements loyal to the government were flowing into town from the provinces, and we were afraid much more serious fighting might break out. But they were so superior in number that the paratroopers began to surrender, and by shortly after noon on Saturday the revolt was over.
“This afternoon we drove around the city to look over the aftereffects and damages. There is remarkably little considering the amount of firing. Certain buildings are considerably pock-marked by bullet holes. The wall in front of the Colby’s garden was hit several times, and one bullet went right through their bedroom while Bill was using the telephone.
“Enough excitement for one week—this is one we won’t forget ….” (Letter in possession of the author.)
[Page 662]In an interview held with members of the Office of the Historian on December 27, 1983, Mendenhall stated that Durbrow was “shocked” and “stunned” by the coup, “it was such a surprise to him. And he was initially terribly upset about it.” The memorandum of the interview reads in part:
“The very first bits of information on the coup, he [Mendenhall] stressed, made it clear that the event was not related to Viet Cong activity.
“Mendenhall recommended that the Embassy take a neutral position toward the coup, for it soon became clear that the other side was ‘as much a friend of ours as Diem was’ When two friends are fighting, said Mendenhall, it is best to maintain a neutral position until one sees who is coming out on top. ‘The worst thing is to have supported the loser.’
“Durbrow and Mendenhall did not reach the Embassy until noon on the 11th. Around mid-afternoon, Diem called Durbrow, who played it ‘rather non-committally,’ which Mendenhall felt was ‘absolutely correct at the point’ because the situation was by no means clear. ‘As a matter of fact,’ remarked Mendenhall, ‘it looked as though the rebels were probably going to win at that stage. I would date the serious deterioration in relations between Diem and Durbrow from that moment forward’. Mendenhall believed, nevertheless, that this was the correct line to take. When asked about the details of the call, Mendenhall said he thought Durbrow urged some gesture of compromise, either during this call or perhaps a later one, so that a serious rift would not remain between the government and the armed forces that could adversely affect the common struggle.
“During the coup Durbrow and Mendenhall had repeated contacts with Colby, who talked with the Ambassador about what he could see from his residence. Colby may have even reached the Embassy before them.” (Department of State, PA/HO Files, Vietnam Interviews)
In interviews with a Department of State historian held April 2 and May 4, 1984, Durbrow stated that although there had been rumors of a coup off and on for months, he had no foreknowledge of this coup attempt and was certainly not in favor of it. He had been awakened at 3 a.m. on November 11 by a call from Colby and received reliable information on the leadership of the coup attempt by 6 a.m. He arrived at the Embassy’s chancery later that morning. For a while it was “nip and tuck” as to which side would win. Durbrow said that he did not recollect a call from Diem the first day of the coup, but was not sure. He did remember calls from Generals Duong Van Minh and Nguyen Van Khanh, and from Nguyen Van Thuan. He remembered also a call at about 3 a.m. on November 12 from Vo Van Hai, Private Secretary to Diem, whom Durbrow believed was being held captive by the rebels at Tan Son Nhut. The Ambassador said that he had gotten a “hunch” Hai was being held at gunpoint during the conversation, and that the hunch later had turned out to [Page 663] be correct. Hai had asked Durbrow to call Diem and urge the President to resign with an assurance of safe conduct out of the country. Otherwise, Hai said, the rebels would shell the palace. “So I said … it’s none of your damn business what I tell Diem and I will not do what you ask at all. I will back up Diem.” The Ambassador also stated that if the shelling took place all aid to Vietnam would be cut off. The shelling did not take place.
Asked whether the Embassy, during the coup attempt, had backed Diem fully, adopted a neutral stance, or supported the rebels, the Ambassador stated: “I had no confidence in any rebels doing any good for Vietnam or for us for anybody else.” He stated also that he “was 100% in support of Diem.” Later, however, he had urged Diem “not to be too rough on the rebels.” (Ibid.)
A contemporary record of a phone call from Diem to Durbrow on the afternoon of November 11 has not been found.
In an interview with a Department of State historian held January 6, 1984, William Colby stated that “in the conversations between Diem and Durbrow during the coup Durbrow was not just supportive of Diem. I mean that’s clearly admitted, there’s no doubt about it. And Durby’s point was, suppose they won? The United States has to be there. This isn’t our coup and this isn’t our government. And so, no, we’re [we were] not 100% in support of Diem in this fight. Diem took that as a total washing of hands” and was also suspicious of the presence of Americans at rebel headquarters. Colby stated that he had maintained contact with Nhu during the coup attempt and had indicated to Nhu “some degree of support within the limits of what the Ambassador’s policy was.” Right after the coup attempt Colby called on Nhu: “I think he sensed that I had been reasonably supportive. The policy had not been one of total support.” At another point in the interview Colby stated: “We were not supporting the government against them [the rebels] and we were not supporting them against the government.” (Ibid.) See also footnote 3, Document 241, and William E. Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), pages 163–165.
In an undated paper titled “The Paratrooper Coup in Vietnam”, General McGarr described his activities during the coup attempt and speculated about the possibility of Communist involvement in it. (Attachment to unsigned letter to Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Dul, January 1, 1961; Hoover Institution, Williams Papers, Miscellaneous Data) A variant text of this paper, also undated, includes material on the need for political and military reform in Vietnam. (Michigan State University Archives, Fishel Papers, 1959–1960 Military Situation (11)) Neither text is signed, but General McGarr verified his authorship in an interview with a Department of State historian held February 14, 1984. (Department of State, PA/HO Files, Vietnam Interviews)