230. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Secretary of Defense (Gates)1
SUBJECT
- Vietnam
With the news that President Diem has put down the revolt in Saigon and is rapidly re-establishing his authority, it would be useful to give some thought to what comes next. Here are some initial personal thoughts which might be of help in considering the situation.
The revolt undoubtedly has taught a lesson to Diem. He might well read this lesson as teaching him to mistrust large segments of the armed forces and, possibly, the utility of the way MAAG advisors are placed with Vietnamese units. After all, officers and men in the revolt were quite close to the American military. Thus, it is possible that he will tend to take even closer personal command of the armed forces and do some shaking by his own personal direction. If so, then this will make General McGarr’s role with President Diem of vital importance to the United States. It would be useful to get State’s agreement to free General McGarr to confer with President Diem as closely and as continuously as necessary, under only broad guidance to attain U.S. objectives, without the Ambassador insisting upon McGarr checking with him every five minutes.
Of course, the lesson we would like him to learn is that he should change some of his ways, since some of his people felt strongly enough about it to take up arms against him. This is normally a task for the Ambassador, when it comes to conveying U.S views on such delicate internal matters to a Chief of State. However, it is most doubtful that Ambassador Durbrow has any personal stature remaining. Diem must feel that Durbrow sided with the revolters emotionally. Perhaps he even feels that Durbrow’s remarks over the months helped incite the revolt. Thus, it would be useful to get Durbrow out of Saigon. A graceful way would be to have him come home to report.
[Page 654]The necessity of keeping the troops alert to the Viet Cong danger has been passed to General McGarr already. It is the most immediate concern.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Papers: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam Correspondence 1960. Secret. Also printed in Department of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1328–1329. Printed with that text is a covering note dated November 12 from Lansdale to Colonel Edwin F. Black, a Military Assistant to Douglas. The note reads: “Please pass to Secretary Douglas. Thought you would like to add your own comments.” A note by Black, dated November 16, reads: “Mr. Douglas, Concur. The sooner we get Brown and Durbrow out of S.E. Asia the better.” Copies of the memorandum went also to Lemnitzer and Irwin.↩