Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

140. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)¹

Saigon , April 19, 1960 .

Dear Jeff : I am sorry to have to bother you personally about one of my perennial problems out here—General Williams. We have talked about the General on several occasions and as you know I have personally concurred in two extensions of his stay in Viet-Nam because I was convinced he was doing a good job in training ARVN, and particularly because he has the confidence of Diem. Since the General’s tour is over this August and he is retiring from the Army, I did not believe I would have to bother you again about any of his activities here.

[Here follows a discussion of personnel matters.]

As you know from our despatches and telegrams, Diem and others have been pressing me to shift from basically conventional to stepped-up guerrilla training here and they have complained about the large percentage of military personnel tied down at headquarters and in various staffs. I think that Diem and others have been a bit too precipitous in flailing around in all directions because of the stepped-up Viet Cong guerrilla activities, but nevertheless it has been clear to me that for some time in the past more attention should have been given to anti-guerrilla training. For various reasons which General Williams seems to believe are completely valid not much of this training has been done. I personally have questioned for almost a year whether we were not doing too much conventional war training to fight another World War II and whether it was necessary to have the Divisional, Corps and Headquarters organization, which is being set up here. I still don’t understand why, for instance, there is a need for a fairly large number of 155 mm. howitzers in a country with very few suitable roads, but the powers that be agree that these might be useful. In any event, as you know, efforts are being made in various quarters to step up anti-guerrilla training at the urgent request of Diem and other high-ranking GVN officials.

In this general connection, Colonel Comstock reported to me about two weeks ago that when he called on Colonel Khoi, Chief of Staff to the acting Minister of Defense, Dung,² to take up another matter with him, Colonel Khoi took the occasion to discuss various ARVN problems with Colonel Comstock. Khoi raised such matters as the lack of sufficient officers and NCO’s, the need for more civilian personnel in the Armed Forces set up in order to release for active duty many NCO’s and officers who are assigned to central military agencies, as well as the problem created by the high percentage of recruits and draftees in tactical units, many of which Colonel Khoi thought should be replaced by regular long-term experienced soldiers. Colonel Khoi then brought up in some detail the problem of giving more guerrilla training in the Army. Colonel Khoi stated that after considerable study the ARVN general staff in June 1958 ordered a program of commando or guerrilla training to be started in Nha Trang. He pointed out that the plan called for those being trained at this school to return to their respective units to train other cadre in guerrilla tactics. Colonel Khoi added that despite the fact that ARVN and DOD believed this program to be necessary, MAAG interjected in two letters to the Chief of Staff, ARVN, dated July 14³ and November 10, 1958⁴ (copies attached) recommending the abandonment of this plan. Colonel Khoi then explained that some individual guerrilla-type training was originally started in 1956 and was abandoned in 1958 after MAAG had objected. Later in September and December 1959, two classes of about 50 men each were again given guerrilla training. Colonel Khoi concluded that apparently MAAG does not see the importance of commando-guerrilla type training and wants to emphasize conventional-type training.

During this conversation Khoi gave the impression to Colonel Comstock that he was talking for Acting Minister of Defense Dung although Khoi did not state so specifically and indicated to Colonel Comstock that he should pass his comments on to me. In order that Colonel Comstock and I might have better understanding of Colonel Khoi’s position, he gave Colonel Comstock thermofax copies of the two letters of July 14 and November 10, 1958 referred to above which I had never seen. Whatever may have been MAAG’s intent in sending these letters, turning down this particular program perhaps for what they considered to be valid reasons, the ARVN and DOD apparently took them to reflect a general position against training of this sort. Furthermore, during this conversation the question arose concerning the desirability of Acting Secretary of Defense Dung talking to me about the problems the Colonel had raised. Colonel Comstock told Khoi that he was sure that I would be glad at any time to discuss any matter with Dung and all he would have to do was to call and I would gladly go see him. (Copies of Colonel Comstock’s memorandum of conversation with Khoi are attached.⁵)

When Comnstock reported this to me I suggested that we wait and see whether Dung would ask to see me, but I received no word from him during the next ten days. In the meantime on one other occasion Colonel Khoi specifically asked Colonel Comstock if he had reported the March 26 conversation to me which Comstock stated he had done.

In the meantime I received from General Williams an information copy of a memorandum dated April 4, 1960,⁶ enclosing a paper dated September 7, 1958, entitled “Notes on Anti-Guerrilla Operations” which was sent to the GVN for information and guidance.⁷ I had never seen or heard of this paper either. This paper outlined in some detail the types of training necessary to combat guerrilla operations and ended by stating that all Vietnamese security forces “should establish effective indoctrination and training courses in anti-guerrilla warfare”.

Since Dung did not get in touch with me and there seemed to be conflict between the contents of the two letters of July and November 1958 recommending that guerrilla training be stopped and the suggestion in the September 7, 1958 “Notes” that all forces should be given such training, I decided to discuss this question as well as Khoi’s remarks with General Williams. I so informed Colonel Comstock who asked specifically that he be present so that he could explain the matter in some detail. On April 12 Colonel Comstock and I discussed the Khoi conversation with General Williams and I specifically asked about the apparent inconsistency of the two MAAG letters suggesting that guerrilla training be stopped and the “Notes” urging that all units be given such training. General Williams obviously seemed somewhat perturbed that I had received copies of the two letters of July and November of 1958 and when I pressed for an explanation of these inconsistencies the General, who was leaving for Pearl Harbor in two days, stated that this was a very complex matter which would take a long time to explain and he had a great deal of other things to do before his departure. He did say, however, that in essence MAAG had recommended against continued guerrilla training because it would interfere with the training of NCO’s and the conventional-type training needed by ARVN units. Colonel Comstock was very frank and factual in giving General Williams the points raised by Colonel Khoi. However, when Comstock stated that Khoi had indicated most definitely that he hoped Colonel Comstock would not only tell me about the conversation but would pass on the points he had raised to the U.S. Department of Army, General Williams without giving any further explanation said in a fairly irritated way something to the effect that if Comstock wanted to send this on to ACSI he could and that he (Williams) could explain this matter satisfactorily at some later date, adding that ACSI could ask General Myers who signed the letter of July and November 1958 for an explanation since General Myers is now in the Pentagon. General Williams then said that he was going to take this matter up with the Vietnamese Department of Defense because he did not believe that Colonel Khoi was in a position to discuss matters of this kind. Both Colonel Comstock and I agreed.

The next day Dung called at 7:00 p.m. to say that he wished to see me urgently. When I called, Dung said he was very much perturbed about what he had heard that day from a MAAG officer about the Khoi conversation and he had called Khoi to his office to give his version of the conversation in the presence of Colonel Kent, General Williams’ representative. According to Dung, Khoi confirmed the conversation with Comstock but added he was not talking on behalf of the Ministry of Defense but he was merely giving his personal views. Dung added it was obvious that if he had desired to see me as Khoi had inferred, Dung would have called me. Dung explained that Khoi was young and impetuous and did not have very much experience and reiterated that he was only speaking personally. Dung added that the GVN understood why MAAG had suggested in its letters of July and November 1958 that guerrilla training should be stopped and therefore Khoi was wrong in his analysis of the matter. I thanked Mr. Dung for this explanation and said that the matter would be dropped.

Since General Williams was leaving the next morning I called him on the phone to let him know what Dung had told me and that the matter was now closed. General Williams then stated in somewhat angry terms that he was going to get to the bottom of this and have Colonel Comstock give sworn testimony about the Khoi conversation inferring that he did not believe that Comstock was telling the truth. I reminded General Williams that Comstock asked to be present at our conversation on the 12th since he wanted to make sure that the various elements on our side were fully coordinated about the matter and all were cognizant of the Khoi conversation in order to assure that the GVN did not make an end run against our team. I added that Colonel Comstock had acted in good faith, had repeated the Khoi conversation to me immediately and reiterated that Comstock had asked to be present when I discussed the matter with General Williams. Therefore I said in categoric terms if General Williams was going to insist on taking “sworn testimony” from Colonel Comstock, thus inferring that Comstock was not telling the truth, “I will fight you every step of the way”. General Williams then said he had to protect his reputation in which I concurred but added it was just for that reason that we had discussed the Khoi conversation with him so that the record would be made straight.

[Here follows a discussion of personnel matters.]

I learned later from Wolf Ladejinsky that, apparently after Dunghad reported the matter to Diem, the latter sent word to General Williams at the airport on April 14th that Colonel Khoi was not authorized to talk on such subjects since he was merely the liaison officer for all Service Attachés.

I might add that Colonel Khoi is well known as a very active member of the Can Lao Party military group, and therefore any remarks he makes must be given full consideration. Dung, also, of course, is a member of the Can Lao Party and therefore, despite his “explanation to me”, it is open to question whether Khoi was merely talking “personally”.⁸

In any event, I hope that you will take the necessary steps to see that ACSI is informed about this matter in order to protect Colonel Comstock. I am sending a copy of this letter to Admiral Felt for his personnel information since it is possible that General Williams discussed this matter with the Admiral or others in CINCPAC.

Sincerely yours,

Elbridge Durbrow

PS. (For Parsons Only)

I am also enclosing a copy of a memorandum I am sending to General Williams ⁹ in order that I can have a full understanding of the status of RVNAF training including guerrilla training and a fuller explanation why the letters of July and November 1958 were sent to the Chief of Staff as well as be sure he gives me full and frank information in the future.

1. Source: Department of State, Durbrow Files: Lot 68 D 404, Vietnam. Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Tran Trung Dung’s title was Assistant Secretary of State for Defense. Prime Minister Diem was also Defense Minister.
3. Document 23.
4. See footnote 3, ibid.
5. Dated April 7, not found attached. A copy is in Department of State, Durbrow Files: Lot 68 D 404, Vietnam.
6. Document 127.
7. See footnote 2, ibid.
8. In a letter to General Myers, April 13, Williams commented on Colonel Khoi as follows: “He is Brother Can’s hot shot Can Lao party man injected into DOD to give Mr. Can a certain element of control and a listening post there. Frankly, I believe he is deep in the fight between Nhu and Can and is attempting to attack Nhu (and Thuan) indirectly through MAAG who has, I believe, their staunch support.” Williams also stated his belief that Thuan had not known (in advance) of Khoi’s request to Comstock. (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Personal Correspondence 1960 (75))
9. Dated April 19. Not found enclosed, but printed infra .