Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

113. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale)¹

Saigon, March 10, 1960.

This is reply to yours of March 4² this channel. Message is in three parts A, B and C.

Section A—Current Situation

1. Starting in July GVN made repeated sweeps in Delta area to forestall VC expected activities to embarrass Aug 30 elections. Sweeps were successful in that elections held without incident. However, these sweeps caused VC to discontinue operations in small harassing bands of three or four and to assemble in larger bands of thirty, fifty or hundred or more for raids on isolated Civil Guard posts and isolated villages. These large bands began to have local successes against regular troops placed under command of local province chiefs as time went on. Attacks continue with boldness and with small organized units primarily in large delta region and secondarily in 1st Region some distance west and north of Saigon. Entire VC force estimated 3000 to 5000. Attacks vary with no set pattern from squad to as much as estimated 3–4 company strength which largest to date at Tay Ninh on 26 January. Attacks typical ambush, raid, encircling attack with which you are familiar.

2. ARVN regular forces were committed under control and direction of chiefs of provinces in delta area who directly under Diem’s control. Province chiefs in some cases military. This resulted in disorganized commitment generally company size units to general average of 40 daily throughout delta and other areas as above. For some time battalion and regimental commanders had no control over own forces committed to delta operations which negated obvious planning, combined arms, and joint operations advantages. As of last ten days operation in delta being conducted under single military individual Col Khanh, who replaced Col Y, but he still acting directly under Diem. Thus mission of defeating small but growing guerrilla opposition has not been entrusted to general staff control as frankly Diem appears often to hold them in contempt.

3. As result above mal-organization and poor concept of and execution of operations, 12 of the 21 total infantry regiments utilized for these operations have not had opportunity to accomplish critically important advanced individual and small unit training during last months which so necessary as sound basis for subsequent training in how to use these fundamentals to defeat tactics and techniques of Viet Cong which well known by you. Maybe Col Khanh will be able to correct situation.

4. Of equal importance are factors of inadequate intelligence system with information flowing where needed; poorly conceived and executed Psywar program; and an ill-trained and organized “home guard” of which component Civil Guard force of 48,000 particularly ineffective as direct result of failure of government to present satisfactory program for same to USOM so as to obtain critically important radios (1136) and vehicles (over 800). They have French weapons and as you known have been given recently 5,000 USSMG’s.

5. Diem has ordered immediate organization of 10,000 Commando Force of seventy-five 131 man companies, a command group and support units. Primary strength (50 companies) to be committed in delta region. Concept for their employment still not clearly defined. Concept for organizing includes volunteers from regular officers and soldiers plus volunteers from Civil Guard. This draining off of volunteers will affect already understrength rifle regiments, particularly by partial creaming the crop. Equipping is major problem since not MAP eligible except for possible differential of 6,000 plus for which spaces available as result authorized 150,000 force basis and current total strength of 143,000 plus. Envision possible tough problems and decisions by me first and Country Team second as to possible attempts use MAP equipment for more than 6,000 which would still require approved TOE. Additionally, use of these spaces will restrict planned reserve program. Summary here is concept of Commando Force seems is [sic] ill advised without solid implementation of following plans or programs which MAAG has been pushing hard for many months.

Section B—Specific Requirements

1. Regular forces with emphasis on the rifle regiments must be superbly trained in fundamentals of shoot, move and fight at unit level followed by few weeks tough training in anti-guerrilla combat. This to be accomplished by rotating regiments between training and combat operations against VC. To date and because of Diem’s personal control of military forces we have been unable to obtain General Staff acceptance of such rotation program. Most senior officers are amenable to idea but must obviously conform to policy.

2. The rotation idea inextricably related to the tougher problem of suggesting that entire task be given to military with clear chain of command and control of all means civilian and military required in the areas of operations. Diem now insists Col Khanh given this authority directly under Presidency. Since Diem previously apparently desirous of not giving this much authority to Col Y, the result continued to be non-integrated employment of all means.

3. A sound military intelligence system to include an active planned collection and dissemination effort tied with non-military intelligence systems is essential. Information most important to anti-VC operations often delayed to military units. Political control of all critical intelligence, and the primary intelligence systems (Secret Service and Sûreté) coupled often with thoughtless or deliberate denial to the military users has been and is a major continuing problem which Diem realizes. Again obvious to you how essential timely intelligence is to these type operations.

4. To provide trained cadre to regiments and various staffs, MAAG had translated and turned over to General Staff in 1958 and 1959 all US manuals on Anti-Guerrilla operations and succeeded in introducing anti-guerrilla school course in October 1959 taught by VN Special Forces personnel. To date one course for 50 plus completed in December 1959 with no courses conducted since.

5. Since Psywar indispensible element to such operations much effort to accelerate delivery required military equipment made. This program continues to require much MAAG emphasis, though military Psywar program again controlled politically.

6. While not MAAG responsibility, believe properly organized and trained Civil Guard force essential to internal security program. GVN failure to effectively organize, equip and train this force as first line element to report, control and defeat in the beginning the random subversive acts by essentially individuals, was a major factor in permitting the VC to form into units. This failure resulted in obvious necessity to commit regular forces in the unfortunate manner described above to attempt to defeat the Viet Cong. Moreover, this same failure, plus the probable sense of frustration over efforts of regular forces so poorly employed under political control, generated in my opinion the idea of another force namely Commandos. With your knowledge you should be able easily to see picture of situation here. As described I fear the Commando Force is anything but the panacea am inclined to believe Diem regards it.

6 [sic]. Persuading the GVN to integrate Navy and Air means with surface elements against the Viet Cong continues as problem. Political control of forces obviously compounds this problem though recently air strikes have been employed several times and an air ground school instituted after more than a year of continuous recommendations and promises. Use of available L–19’s in continuous support of anti-guerrilla operations remains matter of continuous persuasion.

7. Related to the ground operations is problem of coastal surveillance to prevent increasing infiltration of small numbers of VC by means of junks and sampans from DRV area and from probable small bases in Cambodia. MAAG currently advising RVNAF as to how to counter with all means, civilian and military, available. Problem here again is integrating the means under capable single military individual.

8. Some discussion of requirement for US Special Forces personnel to train proposed Commando force. As you know major mission US Special Forces is to organize, train and control guerrilla forces. This training first and foremost by doctrine is weapons, advanced individual and small unit training. After this completed then created guerrilla forces stress special training as to raid, ambush, infiltration tactics, etc. As related, I do not underestimate importance such training and have sought precisely the same here. But problem is get regiments freed to conduct such training as above. Out of a total 78 infantry battalions they averaged 25 on pacification duty continuously during 1959. About 36 committed as of this date. In addition to misunderstanding above points by many there is their oversight of the requirement for this force in being to offer initial resistance to overt aggression should it occur. However to keep this force ready is one of Diem’s reasons for raising the additional Commando force. Moreover, there are some who fail to realize that MAAG is to advise as to training, not to seize command and actually conduct training. MAAG expects additional criticism along these lines from those who like to stir up trouble particularly if internal security situation deteriorates further.

Section C—Items for State Discussion

1. Most important is complete factual picture as to why anti-VC operations in VN cannot be completely successful until all means combatting the VC are centralized for control by a single military commander and staff responding to a superior civil emergency council or similar body. Council be composed of representatives all concerned departments: Interior, Commerce, Defense, Information, etc. This is a GVN problem at highest levels not solely a military one.

2. Importance of organizing, equipping and training other means particularly civil guard, police, Psywar, information and the like. Perfectly trained RVNAF could still fail achieve complete success if other means remain inadequate.

3. Importance of social, economic and political policies being implemented in the critical area. I do not know, but perhaps GVN has tried to do too much too rapidly since it appears civilian disaffection is growing or at least too many in the rural areas seem to be fence sitting. VC as you known cannot exist without some element of civilian population being sympathetic or at least indifferent. This is not my field but appears some GVN policies in action in the Delta are not palatable to populace.

4. As to what other items would be desirable for discussion outside of Defense I can’t judge from here. However, I gain the impression that GVN are of ever growing opinion that some Americans are too hide bound, unsympathetic, and unrealistic in their evaluation of GVN acute problems and how they should be solved particularly with funds and equipment.

5. In summary I’m not pessimistic. Unquestionably, the situation is delicate but hope that Col Khanh given a free hand and adequate Presidential support to keep snipers off his back will gradually produce a better atmosphere. Of course the VC always have the capability of reenforcing and can keep the pot simmering, if not at boiling point, indefinitely. I understand that all these remarks of mine in this message are in confidence.³

1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Lansdale. Secret; Operational Immediate; Noforn. This telegram is not numbered.
2. Lansdale’s unnumbered telegram from Washington dated March 4 reads as follows:

   “Recent Viet Cong guerrilla operations have prompted considerable attention in Washington. Before this subject becomes developed too firmly it would be most helpful and valuable to know your current thoughts, plans and the programs you are undertaking to improve Vietnamese counterguerrilla capability. Also would appreciate your indicating what items would be desirable in discussions outside Defense, such as State.” (Ibid.)

3. A letter to Williams from Lansdale dated March 18 reads in part:

   “Thanks for the extremely helpful details. Since your remarks have been in confidence, I have handled them to protect you, as you can see from the attached. Incidentally, it refers to a previous memo, which Douglas gave to State at the top. Please hold as personal information.

   “These views have been given to the topside all around, including Army and Felt’s own boss. I hope they clear the atmosphere. I still don’t like to see a bunch of backseat drivers interfering with someone at the wheel, and I guess I don’t have to tell you that you sure have a lot of them in the backseat behind you.” (Ibid.)

   The attachments mentioned are Documents 119 and 102, respectively. CINCPAC reported directly to Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations.