Enclosed is a special report prepared by a Country Team study group on
the current internal security situation in Viet-Nam. A summary of this
report and an analysis of the main factors in Viet-Nam’s current serious
internal security problem are given below:
These signs indicate that aggressively worded statements emanating from
the DRV in 1959 may accurately reflect
DRV intentions. In May 1959 the
central committee of the Lao Dong Party passed a resolution stating that
the struggle for reunification of Viet-Nam should be carried out by all
“appropriate means”. Subsequently in conversations with Western
officials, Prime Minister Pham van
Dong made statements to the effect that “We will be in
Saigon tomorrow” and “We will drive the Americans into the sea”.
The need for a capable, well-equipped, well-trained, centrally-controlled
Civil Guard is even more keenly felt than previously.
Likewise, at the same time, signs of general apathy and considerable
dissatisfaction which the VC can play
upon have become more evident among the people in rural areas. Fear
among the peasants engendered by sustained VC terrorist activities against which the GVN has not succeeded in protecting them is
combined with resentment of the GVN
because of the methods which are all too often employed by local
officials. Coercion rather than suasion are often used by these
officials in carrying out the programs decided upon in Saigon. There is
a tendency to disregard the desires and feelings of the peasantry by,
for instance, taking them away from their harvests to perform community
work. The new agroville program requiring large numbers of “volunteer”
laborers has accentuated this trend. Improper actions by local officials
such as torture, extortion and corruption, many of which have been
reported in the press, have also contributed to peasant dissatisfaction.
Favoritism and fear of officials and members of the semi-covert Can Lao
Party have likewise contributed to this situation.
Enclosure 1
SPECIAL REPORT ON INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN
VIET-NAM
The Viet Cong attack on the Vietnamese Army installation near Tay
Ninh on January 26 is a dramatic illustration of the increasingly
aggressive tactics of the Viet Cong and of the difficulty the GVN is having in controlling the
internal security situation. The audacity of the Viet Cong in
conducting the attack, the likelihood of VC infiltration into ARVN, the indications of secret support of the VC by some of the local populace, the
successful planning and coordination in carrying out the attack as
opposed to apparent failure of ARVN
which had been told there might be an attack to be sufficiently
alert for such an attack and effectively counter once the attack had
been launched, are indications of many of the problems faced by the
GVN and discussed in this
report.
Recent Viet Cong Activity
A. General Situation
The increase in Viet Cong activity in recent months can be traced
back as far as the middle of September when the assassination and
kidnapping rate began to rise. It will be recalled that the
Government of Viet-Nam intensified its anti-VC measures during the spring of 1959 when it increased
its forces engaged in internal security operations. These operations
appear to have forced the VC to
curtail their activities for a period of several months, regroup,
strengthen and reorganize their cadres and establish new bases. The
added precautions taken by the GVN
during the period prior to and immediately following the August 30
National Assembly elections further suppressed VC activity. The two important
exceptions to this relatively static period of VC operations are the acts of sabotage
of farm
[Page 304]
machinery in May
and June (which backfired because of peasant resentment) and the
July attack on U.S. Army personnel at the MAAG detachment in Bien Hoa.
By September the VC position was
somewhat as follows: The VC had
failed to carry out their plans to disrupt the National Assembly
elections. This failure placed the VC
in a position of reasserting themselves in the countryside or facing
a gradual decrease of their influence as the GVN improved security and pushed forward its social and
economic reforms.
Reports … indicated that the VC by
September had become quite concerned over the possible effects of
various GVN programs which were
getting underway at that time. The GVN program for regrouping isolated peasants into
communities was just beginning, the various youth organizations were
becoming active in the villages and the new identity card program
promised to create difficulties for many VC cadres who had been provided with false identity
papers. The VC propaganda offensive
against these programs, which was already underway during August,
was intensified in September and VC
harassment and violence directed against GVN youth groups, project personnel and village
officials began to rise.
B. Assassinations and
Kidnappings
The figures presently available indicate that assassinations and
kidnappings perpetrated by the VC and
other dissidents got off to a slow start in September. The date on
which the GVN relaxed its
post-election security precautions is not available at the present
time, but the VC which committed only
74 assassinations and 4 kidnappings in the first 13
days of September subsequently intensified their activities and by
the end of September the total for the month amounted to 22
assassinations and 34 kidnappings, according to evaluated data from
various sources. From this point the figures have continued to rise
to levels considerably above the average for the past two years. A
chart prepared by the Embassy and based as nearly as possible on
constant criteria, is included as Annex I to this report. Deaths or
persons missing as a result of participation in armed combat are not
represented on this chart. Since reports are still incomplete for
November and December, the figures for these months are
tentative.
Although a complete analysis of assassinations and kidnappings is not
available at the present time, it has become fairly apparent that
since last summer the VC have added
the newly formed GVN youth
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groups to their list of
prime targets which continue to include village officials and NRM cadres. The vast majority of
incidents has consistently occurred in the Fifth Military Region
with a small number reported in the First and Capital Military
Regions. During September and October, the months for which final
figures are available, An Xuyen Province topped the list for both
assassinations and kidnappings, followed by Kien Giang, Kien Phong
and Phong Dinh. Other provinces in the Fifth Military Region,
although far from peaceful, vary considerably from month to
month.
C. VC Military Type Operations
VC activities involving military type
operations such as ambushes, clashes and attacks on GVN military and civil posts have
intensified in size and vigor over the past few months although,
according to available information, the number of such actions
increased only slightly through December. Statistics from GVN sources on actions and casualties
of both friendly and enemy forces for the period July–December 1959
are shown in an attachment. The accuracy and value of the casualty
statistics is, however, open to serious question. Comparison of
ARVN data with that obtained
from the NPSS and the SDC shows frequent discrepancies in
casualty figures.
The post-election intensification of VC attacks began with the completely successful
engagement of two ARVN companies on
September 26. The poor performance of ARVN during this operation exposed a number of
weaknesses which have been commented upon by many … MAAG sources … . MAAG’s evaluation of the factors
contributing to ARVN’s failure
include security leaks, inadequate planning, lack of aggressive
leadership, failure to communicate information to other
participating units and the failure of supporting units to press
forward to engage the VC (they were
close enough to hear the sound of gunfire at the time). Another
factor of importance illustrated in this ambush was the confidence
of the VC in their ability to
successfully conduct such operations. This self assurance and
aggressiveness appear to be characteristic of many actions taken by
the VC since September and have
probably contributed to the low state of morale reported in GVN security units by … sources.
Earlier in 1959 ARVN units were
ordered to conduct operations in Phuoc Thanh Province (VC Resistance Zone “D”). From March 8–19
elements of the 7th Division and a paratroop group conducted an
indecisive operation against the VC
in this area, mainly because of difficulty in locating the VC. Toward the end of March the elements
of the 7th Division were replaced by 3 battalions of the Airborne
Group, 2 infantry regiments and other miscellaneous units, to seal
off and block in the area. The Vietnamese Air Force employed 5 and
later 6 F8F fighter planes to conduct air strikes. These strikes
employed
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rockets, bombs
and strafing, but the only known result was the destruction of a
number of VC buildings and huts. As
the rainy season approached the emphasis was switched from
operations to providing security for road construction and other
civil works teams. Some patrolling in search of VC was continued throughout the rainy
season, but contacts with the VC were
minor and infrequent. By September, engineer construction troops had
reportedly been set to work doing road work, clearing the forests,
planting trees and building houses. The 5th Division was the
principal unit engaged in the operation and was still in Phuoc Thanh
as of late November, searching for VC. The bulk of the VC had
apparently moved on to continue their operations elsewhere.
Major incidents in October were the following: According to a …
report an ARVN section (which
normally consists of about 45 men) immediately surrendered when
attacked by a VC group on October 10
in Kien Phong Province. ARVN,
however, denies the occurrence of this incident. On October 30 a
group of 80 to 100 VC attacked the
Kien An District Office, Kien Giang Province, killing the district
chief, a policeman, six CG members
and four civilians. Seven civilians were wounded and the VC after releasing about 70 prisoners
from the local prison compound carried away 23 weapons and other
equipment plus the district payroll, which was apparently the target
of the raid. Exact VC casualties are
not known, but were estimated to be considerable.
… in December, the VC in An Xuyen, Ba
Xuyen, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, An Giang, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, and
Long An Provinces numbered 2900, about twice the September 1959
figure, divided into groups of 40 to 50 men. This … expressed the
opinion that VC attacks in November
on isolated Civil Guard posts and ARVN patrol units in Kien Phong Province present an
important change in VC strategy in
the southwest and that the VC plan to
become increasingly active in early 1960 in an effort to prove to
the people that the GVN is unable to
cope with the internal security situation. An example of this type
of activity is the November 14 VC
storming of Phong My Market in Kien Phong Province during which they
reportedly set fire to a defense militia post, the information hall,
three bridges and a motor-boat of the Kien Phong Security Service.
Minister of Information Thanh told British Ambassador Parkes on February 22 that the
VC’s are burning a large number
of information halls, and he is very worried by the lack of
protection and retaliation.
By November and December it had become apparent that the VC were operating in larger groups than
those used earlier in the year and that their attacks were well
planned and vigorously executed. It seems apparent, moreover, from
such large scale operations as took place in late January in the
provinces of Kien Hoa, Tay
Ninh
[Page 307]
and Phuoc
Long (Dong Xoai incident) that
the VC have further increased their
activities.5 Serious incidents are
continuing: ARVN intelligence
reports indicate that approximately twenty VC attacked a boat in Kien Giang Province on February 2
killing 12 Civil Guard and 13 civilians and wounding 11 Civil Guard,
2 other security personnel and 5 civilians and that as of February 7
VC terrorism was continuing in
Kien Hoa Province.
D. Other Recent VC Activities
A recent … report concerning a group of VC numbering nearly 1000 men (probably exaggerated)
entering a town 3 or 4 kilometers from Ben Tre on January 24 and
spending most of the day unmolested, spreading VC propaganda is not the only such
report of VC boldness. A similar
incident involving about 100 armed VC
occurred in Kien Giang Province on September 21. The fact that the
VC can, and have on a number of
occasions, entered fair sized communities, spent several hours or a
day propagandizing the population and then retired without meeting
GVN resistance would indicate
that the VC have an effective
intelligence system.
According to … sources, infiltration of the GVN security forces (including ARVN) has been a part of VC planning throughout this period. The GVN suspected that details of the
ARVN operation on September 25
and 26 was made known to the VC by
persons who had penetrated the government units. Infiltrations have
contributed to other VC successes,
possibly including the Tay Ninh incident on January 26. The VC, according to a …report, have also
made a special effort to obtain ARVN uniforms. Reports have been received … concerning
encounters by GVN patrols of what
was believed to be an ARVN patrol,
but which turned out to be VC.
Increased activity was also noted in Central Viet-Nam although the
problem there was less intense than in the South. According to …
VC armed strength in Central
Viet-Nam in November was about 300. According to … sources the
VC in the highlands of Quang Ngai
carried out daring attacks during November on the head offices of
communal councils and of the NRM.
They also destroyed bridges and sections of road in an attempt to
sabotage communications. Having gained influence among the
Montagnards to the extent of being able to establish bases in the
Highlands, the VC were reportedly
planning in November to extend their political and military
activities to the coastal regions.
[Page 308]
Around midnight on November 5, 25 to 30 VC (50–100 by another estimate) armed with automatic
weapons attacked a 15 man squad of the 2nd Battalion, 4th Engineer
Group guarding a temporary engineer equipment park near Gia Vuc (on
Highway 5) in Quang Ngai Province. Four members of the squad managed
to escape but the remainder were questioned and given a propaganda
lecture for 2 hours. One dump truck and 1 grader were burned and 1
tractor was damaged. ARVN
casualties were 1 killed and 2 wounded. The VC lost 2 dead left at the scene of action. On the
following night the timber decking on an Eiffel bridge near Gia Vuc
was burned by an estimated 60 Montagnard VC. The damage was repaired but the next night the
Montagnard VC returned and again set
fire to the decking, this time doing sufficient damage to require
3–4 days to repair.
These incidents, plus a relatively minor incident involving a VC attack on ARVN patrol on September 14 some 35 kilometers south of
the town of Quang Ngai are significant in that they represent the
first such reports received from Central Viet-Nam of this type of
violence in many months. VC activity
among the Montagnards, particularly propaganda activity, intended to
set the Montagnards against the GVN
and its programs for economic and social development in Central
Viet-Nam has been the subject of reports by … our consulate at Hue.
There have also been a number of reports of VC efforts to establish bases and to recruit
Montagnards for guerrilla activity.
During a visit to Kontum in late January our Consul in Hue6 found officials rather worried
about the security situation. The Chief of Kontum’s northernmost
district of Dak Sut said that during a three week period in January,
Communists had forced or persuaded three Montagnard villages to
withdraw into the mountains, out of reach of GVN administrators. This District Chief said that he
and the Kontum Civil Guard Chief both think that the Communists have
a major base in the Quang Nam mountains northeast of Dak Gle (the
northermost point on route 14), and predicted that communist
activities in northern Kontum and southwest Quang Nam provinces
would be stepped up in 1960. Our Consul was not permitted to go all
the way to Dak Gle because on January 18 a Civil Guard force
patrolling route 14 was fired on by a machine gun on a hilltop
between Dak Gle and Dak Rotah.
A large scale sweep intended to flush out Viet Cong in the mountains
of Quang Ngai Province has been underway since the end of October
1958. According to information obtained by USOM Public Safety Division, eleven companies of the
Civil Guard and one battalion of ARVN and two intelligence companies were employed in
[Page 309]
the initial
pacification phase. The operation was reported by mid-January to
have entered a second phase, that of securing the support of the
local population. The new chief of Quang Ngai Province,
Nguyen Van Tat, told our Consul in January
that additional Civil Guard posts are being set up in the Montagnard
districts of his province and that the Self Defense Corps will be
greatly expanded in the Vietnamese sections. Asked about the
progress of the sweep, he was non-committal, but he admitted that
the security drive “will not be over for a long time”.
E. DRV Intentions
In May 1959, the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party passed a
resolution or statement stating that the struggle for reunification
would have to be carried out by all “appropriate measures”. British
observers have taken this to mean measures other than peaceful.
“You must remember we will be in Saigon tomorrow, we will be in
Saigon tomorrow”, these words were spoken by Premier Pham van Dong in a conversation
with French Consul Georges-Picot on September 12, 1959.
In November, Pham van Dong
twice told Canadian Commissioner Erichsen-Brown that “we will drive
the Americans into the sea”. DRV
General Giap, however, later saw Erichsen-Brown to “reassure” him
that DRV intentions are
peaceful….
… sources have reported a gradual increase of the infiltration of
VC cadres and arms from the
DRV over the past few months
which has increased the VC strength
to about 3000 in the Southwest. (Based on available information …
estimates that the Viet Cong strength in all South Viet-Nam is
presently 3000–5000 men). Many of these new infiltrators … are
cadres who were regrouped in the North at the time of the Geneva
Accords and have had a number of years of intensive military and
political training. The principal infiltration route of VC cadres from the North continues to be
through Laos to Cambodia although reports are received of
infiltration by sea. A … source … reports that some of the cadres
arriving in SVN from the North have
the mission of establishing a VC
headquarters to include a general staff, a political section and a
supply section and to effect a large-scale reorganization of VC cadres in the southwestern provinces
(Fifth Military Region).
… the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) has continued to train its units in guerrilla type
warfare in addition to training in conventional warfare. In the
opinion of this Western observer, the PAVN could at any time undertake a successful campaign
against the GVN utilizing the type
of guerrilla tactics undertaken so effectively by the Viet Minh
against the French in the Indochina War. Another
[Page 310]
Western observer, a missionary who
resided over thirty years in Viet-Nam, has also stated that PAVN is in excellent condition to
carry on guerrilla warfare.
A recent … report indicates that the VC are presently planning to augment their forces,
particularly in An Xuyen, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, Kien Phong and
Kien Tuong Province and that they will press general guerrilla
warfare in South Viet-Nam during 1960. This guerrilla warfare would
be under the flag of the People’s Liberation Movement (reports of a
number of recent incidents mention the flying of a red flag with a
blue star). The VC reportedly
estimate that 70% of the people in the rural areas of South Viet-Nam
are either embittered by or indifferent toward the present
government. According to this report the VC are convinced they can bring about a coup d’état in
1960, and are presently considering three ways to do this: to incite
the GVN military forces to revolt
and to penetrate the new government to steer it into a neutralist
policy; to force the GVN to use
harsh repressive measures against the people by organizing
widespread popular uprisings, thereby laying the foundation for open
revolt; to set up popular front provisional governments in the
Trans-Bassac area as the general guerrilla warfare mentioned above
progresses (the VC estimate that they
have sufficient penetrations in or control over village level
administration to make this possible). The alternative which is
selected will, according to the source, depend upon VC progress during the first four months
of this year.
President Diem told the
Ambassador and General
Williams in late February about the capture of a
document by GVN security forces
outlining VC plans to further step up
aggressive attacks all over the country, including Saigon. These
operations are planned to begin in the second quarter of 1960….
Military Factors Affecting the Internal Security
Situation
GVN internal security operations in
1959 employed an average of 25 ARVN
battalions, 44,000 Civil Guards, 43,000 SDC, 6,000 Sûreté, as well as the Gendarmérie, Self
Guard Youth Corps and NRM members
for which figures are not presently available. This impressive
number of personnel has, however, failed to keep VC and dissident activities under
control. Numerous high-ranking GVN
officials have very recently stressed the necessity of more
anti-guerrilla training for the security forces. From a military
point of view an outstanding deficiency in the GVN effort has been the government’s
inability, or lack of desire, to recognize the following factors:
(1) It is actively engaged in an internal war and, therefore, must
take the measures which this situation entails. (2) There is a great
need for a strong central military command with wide powers for the
conduct
[Page 311]
of internal
security operations in the unpacified areas. (3) There is a need for
a capable, well-equipped, well-trained, centrally-controlled Civil
Guard to take over from the Military in pacified areas.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the apparent lack of
success in the GVN attempts to
reduce the internal threat of the VC
until now has stemmed from the lack of unity of command in a single
operational commander who has the means and the authority to utilize
all of the potential in the area of operations without regard to
province or regional boundaries and without regard to the existing
political subdivision of the area. Unity of command is the most
important basic principle of administration lacking here. The
Province Chief structure has caused a breakdown of coordination and
a fragmentation of command structure which has blocked an effective
attack on the internal security problem.
The fact that the GVN, though
striving to bring its military organization to a high state of
training, is constantly plagued by the diversion of an average of 25
battalions to an internal security mission is indicative that a
serious internal threat exists. The resulting piecemeal commitment
of the armed forces has obviously been generally unsatisfactory
because of the lack of a strong central command which could
effectively coordinate and control all security functions in the
area of operations. (See subsequent “GVN Reactions” section re recent action taken to
centralize command in the Fifth Military Region).
Political Factors Affecting the Internal Security
Situation
It is highly unlikely that any final solution can be found to the
internal security situation in South Viet-Nam if the GVN does not enjoy the support and
cooperation of the rural population. At the present time indications
are that the rural population is generally apathetic towards the
Diem Government and
there are signs of considerable dissatisfaction and silent
opposition. In part this attitude appears to result from widespread
fear of the Viet Cong and a belief that the GVN is relatively helpless to protect the rural
population from Viet Cong depredations. Unfortunately the longer
serious insecurity continues to exist in the countryside despite
GVN efforts to control it, the
more serious is the effect on the GVN’s prestige. Another effect is a growing belief
among the peasants that the Viet Cong will always be here as long as
North Viet-Nam remains under Communist control and that they must
adjust to live with them. (A realization of the long-range nature of
the problem among officials responsible for dealing with it could be
an advantage. In Malaya it has taken 11 years to reduce the security
situation to the minimum,
[Page 312]
and it is even more difficult to deal with it in a divided country
with long exposed frontiers).
There appear to be other reasons contributing to the difficulty
experienced by the GVN in attempting
to rally the rural population: a) Until recently it was becoming
more and more apparent that Diem was not being given accurate information on the
internal security and political situation in rural areas. As late as
the end of December, 1959, he was telling all callers how much
better the internal security situation had become, despite many
doubts raised by his listeners. Information was apparently being
presented to him by local officials in such a manner as to reflect
well upon the officials giving it. The President’s trips to the
provinces have appeared to be carefully “laid on” by local
officials. The President himself cannot be absolved entirely from
the blame, however, since his system of personal rule which permits
direct appeal from the individual provincial authorities to himself,
in a sort of intra-executive check and balance system, serves to
further weaken the administrative apparatus.
Recently, however, as indicated in the subsequent section on “GVN Reactions”, the Vice President7 and others who are not his usual
informers on security matters have spoken frankly with him and he
now seems well aware of the situation; b) Provincial and district
authorities exercise almost autonomous control in the areas under
their jurisdiction. Too often the personnel holding these positions
have been incompetent, having been chosen for reason of party
loyalty. Moreover, some have tended to view their jobs as a means to
personal advancement or financial gain8 often at
the cost of the population under their control. Press editorials
have attacked local officials for extorting money from peasants,
using torture to wring false confessions from innocent people and
conducting themselves in such a manner as to reflect adversely on
the prestige of the national government. In addition rumors continue
to circulate among the population concerning the alleged nefarious
activities of and favoritism shown to members of the Can Lao party.
While officials have been largely unable to identify and put out of
commission Viet Cong undercover
[Page 313]
cadres among the population, they have often
arrested people on the basis of rumors or of denunciations by people
who harbor only personal grudges. Police powers justified on the
basis of the needs of internal security have reportedly been misused
to extort money not only from the peasants but from land owners,
merchants and professional people in the towns. This misuse of
police powers and the kind of broad scale arrests on suspicion are
weakening the support of the population for the regime. On the other
hand, the application of swift, summary justice (such as the Special
Military Tribunals were created to hand out) designed to protect the
population against the Viet Cong threat, if carefully administered and “advertised” as such, can do
much to restore a feeling of security;9 c) While the GVN has made an effort to meet the
economic and social needs of the rural populations through community
development, the construction of schools, hospitals, roads, etc.,
these projects appear to have enjoyed only a measure of success in
creating support for the government and, in fact, in many instances
have resulted in resentment. Basically, the problem appears to be
that such projects have been imposed on the people without adequate
psychological preparation in terms of the benefits to be gained.
Since most of these projects call for sacrifice on the part of the
population (in the form of allegedly “volunteer” labor in the case
of construction, time away from jobs or school in the case of rural
youth groups, leaving homes and lands in the case of regrouping
isolated peasants), they are bound to be opposed unless they
represent a partnership effort for mutual benefit on the part of the
population and the government. (See subsequent section on “GVN Reactions” for indications of
Diem’s current awareness
of this problem.)
The situation may be summed up in the fact that the government has
tended to treat the population with suspicion or to coerce it and
has been rewarded with an attitude of apathy or resentment. The
basic factor which has been lacking is a feeling of rapport between
the government and the population. The people have not identified
themselves with the government. There has been a general lack of “a
sense of mission” in the building of the country among both the
local population and local authorities. In the past at least
Diem has contributed to
this attitude by his constant admonition to the villagers he talks
to on his trips throughout the country that they must work harder,
do more for themselves, and not complain. He has made little effort
to praise them for what they have accomplished or explain the
reasons for the demands he places on the population. He has none of
the demagogue in him, but is rather still the mandarin.
[Page 314]
Now that he realizes the feelings of the people, it is to be hoped
that he will show more solicitude for their needs and feelings, but
this will not be easy for him to do.
Possibly another factor adversely affecting the current attitude of
the peasants toward the Government is the decline over recent months
in the price of paddy. Since the population in the southwestern
delta is particularly dependent on paddy for its income, it would be
a normal political reaction for this development to increase
dissatisfaction with the government.
GVN Reactions to
Current Internal Security Situation
President Diem, who had
earlier taken the position in conversations with Ambassador
Durbrow that the GVN’s security operations had broken up
many VC camps and forced them to
regroup into larger forces, has modified his assessment considerably
after the Tay Ninh attack and other recent manifestations of
expanded VC activities. Previously
indicating that VC reinforcements had
come from Cambodia, Diem in
his latest conversation with the Ambassador on February 1210 stated the VC had been reenforced by well-trained forces from
North Viet-Nam. In his view the recent step-up in VC activities is basically a somewhat
desperate attempt to disrupt the progress of South Viet-Nam. He does
not appear to be deeply alarmed, but, on the contrary, feels that
with measures he has in mind the situation should greatly improve in
a few months. He believes the security forces need more
anti-guerrilla training, but also thinks more security forces are
needed in order to provide better protection for the entire
population. He has called for volunteers from military reservists
who had long guerrilla experience during the Indochina War as well
as from ARVN and the Civil Guard,
and has indicated that over 1000 have already volunteered.
Diem also now shows awareness
of many of the political factors which have contributed to the
deterioration in internal security. By the end of February in
conversations with the Ambassador and other foreign officials
Diem has become very
frank in admitting that many of the civilian administrators have
been incompetent and have abused their power. He has added he is
removing these and placing competent men in their jobs whose
principal duty will be to pay attention to the needs of the
population and make every effort to win their confidence. The
President has become quite aware of the adverse reaction of the
people to indiscriminate use of methods of coercion in carrying out
the government’s programs in rural areas. He explained to the
Ambassador at some length on February 22 the urgent
[Page 315]
need for civilian officials to explain
in detail the reasons for the government’s actions in these matters
in order that the population will fully understand how they will
benefit in the long run.
Ngo dinh Nhu, the President’s
brother and political advisor, also told … on February 5 that the
security forces need more anti-guerrilla training. He added,
however, that political measures are the real key to defense against
the VC attacks, and mentioned
specifically that GVN officials
should consider political aspects of a situation and not just
concentrate on rapid physical results to please the President. In
late January Vice President Nguyen ngoc
Tho, according to a … report, had a discussion with
President Diem in which he
pointed out his belief that the reports which the President had been
receiving on internal security were incorrect as they underestimated
the size of the VC network in South
Viet-Nam. He reportedly reminded the President that he had told him
a year and a half ago that the GVN
did not have a correct estimate of VC
strength and, unless this were obtained, the time would come when
the country would be unable to cope with VC subversion. Privately Tho was said to have placed the blame for GVN loss of support among the peasantry
on province chiefs whose only activity was to apply police powers
strictly. He also was said to have indicated that both Ngo dinh Nhu and the NRM leaders, through the province
chiefs, were responsible for providing completely erroneous and
optimistic reports about the security situation. In a conversation
with Ambassador Durbrow
shortly after the Tay Ninh attack Tho expressed concern over the
seriousness of the internal security situation, and he also urged
more anti-guerrilla training of the GVN security forces.
Lieutenant General Le Van Ty,
Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army, has also expressed the view
that further anti-guerrilla training is required. In addition,
according to MAAG, soon after the
Tay Ninh attack a meeting was held by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense11 with
the Chief of Staff and Corps and Field Commanders at which it was
decided to make certain recommendations to the President. These
recommendations included adherence to the chain of command by the
Presidency; assignment of commanders to be based on recommendations
of the General Staff through the Department of Defense to the
President as contrasted with recommendation to the President by
civilian and political advisors; clarification and definition of the
responsibility and authority between the province chiefs, military
regional commanders and local troop commanders; and centralization
of control of the various intelligence agencies.
Indications have been received that at least some of the ideas which
have been expressed by GVN officials
are being implemented.
[Page 316]
President Diem has told
Ambassador Durbrow that
Colonel Nguyen Khanh, newly
designated commander of the Fifth Military Region (the southwestern
area where insecurity is the worst), has been given full military
powers over the security forces of the area regardless of the
prerogatives of the province chiefs. Diem also said that the GVN is extending an earlier plan of appointing military
officers as deputy province chiefs responsible for security, and has
placed them under the control of the military regional
commander.
According to a … report, the Assistant Secretary of State for Defense
issued a directive on February 1 ordering concentration on
anti-guerrilla training and tactics and enforcement of maximum
security at all military posts.
Another … report states that President Diem, as a result of recent urgings for improvement
in relations between the Government and the peasants, has ordered a
slowdown in the program of building regroupment centers
(“agrovilles”). Secretary of State for the Presidency Thuan told Ambassador Durbrow on February 17, however,
that this program must be continued but perhaps at a slower pace, as
there is no way to provide protection to isolated farm houses other
than by regrouping such peasants into larger communities. He
admitted that the peasants have the normal human reaction of
disliking being forced to work on the regroupment centers, but he
believes that after the centers have been completed they will see
the advantages offered. Diem
told the Ambassador on February 22 that, while he must continue to
create “agrovilles”, he is not planning to push too fast until one
or two pilot towns are in being so that the peasants can learn for
themselves the many advantages of this sort of rural
organization.
… also reported that the NRM recently
dispatched special cadres to the provinces to obtain for the
President information on cases of dissatisfaction with high-handed
or dictatorial attitudes of local officials. Intelligence committees
have also been formed in each province which will report to the
President through the Minister of Interior.12
Diem told the Ambassador he
had been impressed by the centralized intelligence organization he
learned about during his visit to Malaya in mid-February. Diem inferred he is planning to
adopt this system.
