104. Despatch From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Current Security Problems Facing the GVN
On February 12 I called on the President at his request and during the course of a two-hour conversation (see enclosed Memorandum of Conversation2), which is summarized below, we discussed at length the problem of how best to meet the current security problems facing the GVN.
Summary
Diem stated that while the organization of ARVN into corps and divisions was basically useful so that the ARVN could organizationally cooperate with allied forces in case of war, he pointedly emphasized the difficulty of organizing the comparatively small armed forces of Viet-Nam to meet both the threat of an all out conventional attack by the Viet Cong and the increasing Viet Cong guerrilla type of operation. Diem indicated he is now convinced that the immediate problem facing Viet-Nam is the stepped up Viet Cong guerrilla operations which will probably continue for a long time and strongly inferred he now believed too much attention had been given to training the ARVN along conventional lines. Contrary to what he said in our last talk, he stated that the Viet Cong had recently been reinforced by well trained forces from North Viet-Nam, who had come via Laos and Cambodia. Diem concurred with my suggestion that all the security forces should be given more anti-guerrilla training, but he did not believe that this alone would be sufficient to develop a system under which the entire population could be given better protection against Viet Cong depredations. He emphasized that it was unfortunate that as much as one-third of ARVN forces as now organized in large units and a large percentage of Civil Guard are tied down with staff and specialist duties or isolated in small groups guarding bridges and other installations. He had come to the conclusion, therefore, that more security forces are needed who can be spared and trained to carry out actual operations, particularly against guerrillas.
After explaining these factors, Diem said he had decided that the most expeditious way to train existing security forces for anti-guerrilla [Page 284] operations would be to recall to active service 10,000 volunteers from the some 100,000 military reservists who had had long guerrilla experience during the Indochina war. He said that most of the volunteers would be formed into platoons or companies to which two Civil Guard comparable regular units would be attached and that others would be assigned to ARVN units. In this way by training and operating together the experienced volunteers would teach the others guerrilla operations. Some might also be assigned to train the Self Defense Corps in guerrilla tactics.
In response to Diem’s various points I stated frankly that I thought there were at present sufficient security forces in the country to meet the problem and I questioned whether it was necessary to recall to active service such a large force. I added that if all the security forces were properly trained, particularly in anti-guerrilla operations, there would be no need for additional forces. I said that I was pleased the Civil Guard training would now move ahead expeditiously and I agreed that the Civil Guard, as a national police, should be trained to combat Viet Cong subversive or guerrilla operations.
Referring to the recall of military reservists Diem pointed out that his experts had concluded that the cost would run to 200–250 million piasters a year. Since I had expected Diem was building up to a request for a larger military budget, I interrupted him to explain the various reasons, particularly the diminishing piaster revenues, why the overall military budget should not be more than $165 million in piaster equivalents, and why we could contribute only about $124 million of the total sum. I pointed out that if the current effort to improve the system to collect taxes were successful GVN revenues should increase substantially. (I did not get the opportunity to point out how this problem could be met by devaluation.) Diem then stated that one of the reasons why he had transferred Ha Van Vuong from the Ministry of Finance to the Presidency was because he had had experience in the ways and means of collecting taxes as a former Inspector of Finance in the North.
Diem then referred to the appointment of Colonel Nguyen Khanh as military commander of the Fifth Military Region (Mekong Delta) and said that he had given Colonel Khanh full powers to carry out all operations against the Viet Cong in the Delta area and full authority to issue orders to province chiefs and other civilian and military authorities and security forces in his region. He said that he had also directed the province chiefs, whom he had selected very carefully for their administrative abilities, and the NRM cadres to pay more attention to the other needs of the population which had been neglected in the past.
[Page 285]Comment:
During the entire conversation about the internal security situation, Diem, in contrast to his remarks on this subject on January 27, showed no deep alarm and seemed to feel satisfied that in a few months after the 10,000 volunteers had rejoined the security forces the internal security situation would greatly improve. He made it clear that in his estimation the recent flurry of Viet Cong activities was basically a somewhat desperate operation, an effort on the part of the Viet Cong to disrupt the progress already made and prevent planned progress from taking place. Diem referred particularly to the development of the “agrovilles”,3 the organization of the youth into anti-guerrilla bands, and the general success of the resettlement program not only in the High Plateau but in the Delta area as well, as achievements which sparked the Viet Cong reaction. I am not sure this is true but it may have played a part in the Commie calculations, whose tactics have, in fact, changed considerably. Another factor which may explain in part the recent Viet Cong successes is the reported apathy of some of the rural population to the efforts being made by the Government to better their lot,—i.e., community development, resettlement and construction of “agrovilles”. These reports indicate that bureaucrats have not properly explained the basic motivations and aims of the Government, Instead, they have concentrated on getting the job done by forcing the peasants to work excessively on community development projects or have in general been too autocratic in their dealings with the people. Thus instead of winning over the rural population by these very worthwhile schemes, the bureaucrats have tended, by their “get the job done” methods, to antagonize a considerable section of the rural population, who therefore are not cooperating with the Government in its anti-Communist campaign. It is possible, therefore, that the Communists are taking advantage of this growing attitude.
After his long explanation as to how he planned to meet the Viet Cong threat and the additional funds it would take to carry out these plans, I was somewhat surprised that he did not ask that we reconsider the Country Team approved military budget for 1960, i.e., $165 million overall with a United States contribution of just over $124 million. I gave him the opportunity to bring up this matter on several occasions when I expressed my concern regarding the costs of the “volunteer” operation and the pending shortage of GVN piaster revenues. Since he did not ask directly for more United States aid or an upward revision of the military budget, I received the distinct impression that the principal reason why he asked me to call was to [Page 286] explain in some detail why he felt obliged to change the emphasis of ARVN and other security force training from conventional to anti-guerrilla. About ten days ago at a dinner the Vice President talked to me at some length about the security problem and stated that in his opinion it is essential that the ARVN training be changed so as to concentrate more on anti-guerrilla tactics and operations.4 (It is perhaps pertinent to point out that in the conversation with Diem he made a particular point to single out the Vice President as being one of the most intelligent and clear thinking of his collaborators.)
Although Diem’s new “volunteer” plan, similar to his previous plans, obviously calls for not only more security forces and emphasizes the need to use force to meet the growing Communist threat, he seemed, for the first time in a long while, to be sincerely cognizant of the need not only to protect the rural population but to do more to win them over. He, too, seemed to be aware of the fact that bureaucrats had been acting in an arbitrary manner and thus had antagonized large sections of the population. It is essential to redouble our efforts to encourage him to put more emphasis on the people’s needs rather than thinking solely in terms of armed force to meet the Viet Cong threat.
Well before the recent flurry of Communist terrorist acts I had been thinking about the internal security problem, the type of training and organization of the ARVN, and whether we should not reassess the situation to see whether our basic concepts are all still valid. Several of my foreign colleagues have also expressed concern about this matter. As I told Diem, I had come to the conclusion that more emphasis should be given to anti-guerrilla training and an organizational set up better suited to meet the unconventional threat. I believe, therefore, that all concerned should think this problem through again. Whether Diem needs 10,000 extra men in the security forces is open to question, but the basic problem of training emphasis and organizational set up is one which should be seriously reviewed.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/2–1660. Secret. Copies of this despatch were sent to CINCPAC PolAd, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, and Hue.↩
- Attached, but not printed.↩
- See also Document 169.↩
- No record of this meeting has been found.↩