Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

97. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 24–56

Washington, February 7, 1956.

THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN ITALY

The Problem

To estimate probable political developments in Italy through 1958 and their implications for Italian domestic and foreign policy.

Scope

The most notable recent development in the Italian scene has been the growing interest in the possibility of parliamentary cooperation between the governing center coalition and the parties of the extreme left, particularly the Nenni Socialists.² This estimate is principally devoted to an examination of this possibility and of other discernible trends in the Italian political scene. [4½ lines of source text not declassified]

Conclusions

1. The current political situation in Italy is characterized by growing popular pressure for more rapid progress in a domestic reform program, by the governing center coalition’s lack of the cohesion and discipline necessary to enact such a program, and by the extreme left’s tactics of supporting the coalition in important votes on domestic issues. Most Italians believe that the danger of general war has receded and there is a feeling that Italy should give primary attention to the solution of its domestic problems. Despite continued industrial growth and comparative financial stability, the severe problem of unemployment remains and the need for social reform persists. (Paras. 11, 31, 36)

2. The Christian Democratic Party lacks the cohesion and discipline necessary to fashion strong and stable governments now that the fear of Communism in Italy appears to have diminished. The party suffers from factionalism and personal rivalries, and the coalition governments which it has dominated have not accomplished enough of their reformist programs to satisfy their electorate. Some of those in the party who favor more rapid progress in domestic reforms are prepared to obtain the necessary votes by reaching some accommodation with elements to the left. In particular, President Gronchi has advocated parliamentary cooperation between the Christian Democrats and the Nenni Socialists, and has been exercising his influence to encourage this development. As of the moment, however, most Christian Democratic leaders are opposed to an open partnership with the Nenni Socialists so long as the latter retain their Communist ties. (Paras. 13, 16–19, 40)

3. The Communists have suffered some setbacks during the past year. These losses have occurred both in the trade unions and in the Sicilian regional elections. More important than the actual loss of votes has been its psychological effect—a widespread impression in Italy that the Communist Party has passed the zenith of its electoral strength. Nevertheless, the Italian Communist Party is still the largest in Western Europe, its electoral appeal remains great, and the recent setbacks cannot be regarded as a decisive reversal of trend. (Paras. 24–25)

4. The Nenni Socialist Party has become increasingly important in Italian politics because of its recent electoral gains, Communist setbacks, and the increased interest of certain Christian Democrats in pushing social reform. The Nenni Socialists have been encouraging the idea of cooperation between themselves and the Christian Democrats, and some of them have cultivated the impression that a growth in Nenni Socialist electoral support might eventually enable them to break with the Communists. Nevertheless, it is improbable that Nenni would give up his alliance with the Communists, even in order to enter a coalition with the center. (Paras. 27–30)

5. The Christian Democratic Party will dominate all Italian governments between now and the next general elections. Because of lack of agreement and discipline within the party, many of its leaders will probably welcome, and some may even solicit, the votes of the Nenni Socialists to push the reformist program to which the Christian Democrats are committed. In this event, a tacit collaboration between the government and the Nenni Socialists would probably emerge. We believe it unlikely, however, that such collaboration would be translated into a formal agreement. (Paras. 38–40)

6. Such a tacit collaboration between the government and the Nenni Socialists would be precarious and possibly short-lived. It could be endangered both by increasing demands from the extreme left in return for its support and by the restiveness of the Christian Democratic right in supporting a government which was consistently advocating reform legislation. (Para. 41)

7. If this tacit collaboration should break down, the situation might relapse into virtual immobility, or during a period of severe governmental crisis could result in a formal agreement between the center and the extreme left. We believe, however, that the Christian Democratic leaders will in general continue their present course, avoiding either formal collaboration with Nenni or the virtually static government which would follow were they to surrender to rightist pleas for a halt in the reform program. (Para. 42)

8. In the next general elections, which must be held by 1958, we believe the parliamentary strengths of the various parties will not be greatly altered. The political center of gravity will probably shift somewhat to the left. However, the maneuverings of parties and factions, the struggles for personal power among political leaders, the nature of progress toward reform, and possible changes in the international situation might alter the direction or dimensions of present trends. (Para. 45)

9. We believe that Italian foreign policy is likely to continue its pro-Western character. Italy will probably, however, display increasing independence and seek to avoid the appearance of subservience to the United States. (Para. 46)

10. However, if Nenni Socialist collaboration were to continue for some time or to become formal, or if the Nenni Socialists actually participated in the government, there would be serious danger that Italy’s pro-Western policy would be gradually eroded even though not officially abandoned. (Para. 48)

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate, which considers political and economic trends in more detail.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. An attached chart showing the party composition of the Italian Chamber of Deputies as of January 1, 1956, is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 7 February 1956.”

   Another note on the cover sheet indicates that NIE 24–56 was a supplement to NIE 24–54, “Probable Developments in Italy,” November 16, 1954. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

2. This possibility is currently characterized in Italy as the “opening to the left.” However, the phrase has no precise or generally accepted definition. It is used to describe a variety of possible arrangements, from mere parliamentary support of center coalition reform measures by the Nenni Socialists to a Popular Front government including Nenni Socialists and Communists. [Footnote in the source text.]