Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

96. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

Washington, January 17, 1956.

SUBJECT

• The need to re-assess the Italian political scene

A fresh assessment of the Italian political situation is prompted by the recent passage of the important Tremelloni Tax Reform Bill with the parliamentary support of the Communists and Nenni Socialists and their claim that support given on this and several previous occasions has made the Segni Government dependent upon them. They claim that, in fact, the Center majority that put Segni in power has been liquidated by events and that a new majority, consisting of the Left and the Left-wing of the Center, has been formed in its place. Therefore, they assert, the “opening to the Left” has already taken place. It is immaterial whether any kind of “opening” has occurred (quite apart from the fact that there are so many current interpretations of the phrase “opening to the Left”). What is important is that the situation to which the Left refers requires evaluation.

Recent Instances of a Center-Left Majority

The Left cites as evidence of its argument the presidential election of Gronchi (April 29), the passage of the Military Tribunals Bill and the Interior Budget (both in October), the election of the Constitutional Court Judges (November), and the passage of the Tremelloni Tax Reform Bill (December). All except the first of these instances are discussed in detail in a memorandum prepared by DRW (enclosure #1)² and a breakdown of these votes, together with comments, is given in a memorandum prepared by WE (enclosure #2).³ It should be noted that there is no public evidence that Leftist support on the measures given above was prearranged, except in the case of the Constitutional Court where the Constitution required a 3/5 majority which the Center coalition does not enjoy. All of the above instances involved ad hoc majorities, formed for a single given occasion. The Military Tribunals Bill very likely would have passed without Leftist support. Segni could have got the Interior budget through by delaying the vote or having a re-vote, making it a confidence vote if necessary (on this issue the Left merely left the Senate floor, permitting a handful of Center Senators to prevail over the few Monarchists and neo-Fascists present). The Tremelloni Tax Bill also might have passed by a small majority without Left support.

What is the Explanation?

Basic to all of these instances of a Center–Left ad hoc majority is (a) the division among and within the Center parties, especially within the Christian Democratic party, and (b) the aim of the Left to create the impression that it is keeping the Segni Government in power, in order to provide circumstances propitious to the eventual formation of a new Government which is in fact based on a Center-Left majority. Ever since the national elections of June 7, 1953 the Center parties have been divided on almost every important issue, the basic division being that which separates the Liberals and the Right-wing Christian Democrats from the remaining Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Republicans. Premier Scelba found that he could not get a Reform Program through since he could never muster the unanimous support of Center Parliamentarians that was required for the passage of any measures of his Government’s internal program. Apparently Segni (probably pushed by Fanfani for some reasons and by Gronchi for others) has resolved to get through at least part of his reform program whether the Center coalition which put him in power and helped him formulate the program gives unanimous parliamentary support to his reform measures or not. It is likely that Segni, confronted in a pre-electoral period (local elections throughout Italy are tentatively slated for April or May 1956) by the alternative of further immobility through the lack of his Center majority’s unanimity on reform issues on one hand and the necessity of getting through part of his program for the sake of the election campaign, chose the latter.

Although there is no positive evidence of premeditated arrangements for Socialcommunist support (except in the unique case of the Constitutional Court Judges), there is reason to suspect that Gronchi rather than Segni is the behind-the-scenes manipulator. Gronchi of course is publicly committed to the establishment of a Government based on collaboration with the Nenni Socialists at the earliest possible moment. His wire pulling can be explained only partially in terms of expansion of the presidential powers and by Segni’s weakness. It is extremely doubtful if Gronchi’s maneuver could succeed for very long if the Christian Democratic party were united. The disunity in this party is to some extent a result of differences in ideology but also arises from (a) personal feuds between the “ins” and the “outs” and the former “ins” and the former “outs”; (b) the decision of Segni to press forward with his legislative program, which is based on a political estimate (which in itself is probably sound) that in a pre-election period continued immobilismo is disadvantageous; and (c) the powerful anti-reform vested interests controlling the Right-wing Christian Democrats.

Comments

It is not yet clear whether the Center or the Left will benefit more from the support which the Socialcommunists have been giving to certain of the Segni Government’s measures. Since these reform measures contribute to the realization of the Center coalition’s program and in the long run reduce or remove the social and economic basis of much of the Left’s attacks and platform, their ultimate beneficiary should be the Center. However, reports from Rome indicate that the short-run benefits of this legislation seem to be accruing in favor of the Left. There is much confusion among the public as to whether the Center or the Left should be credited with putting through the reforms. Unless this trend is reversed, this could be costly to the Center parties in coming elections.

The prestige of Nenni was greatly raised by the “Geneva spirit”, the effect of which has not disappeared, and seems to be enhanced still further by his party’s support for internal reform measures. The old, relatively clear-cut distinction between the Center and the Left seems to be fading and Nenni finds it relatively easy to proceed with a straight face to proclaim continued unity of action with the Communists at the same time that he expresses willingness to support the Government on domestic legislation. In continuing these two paradoxical lines of action he has the advantage that there is no significant international policy matter on the parliamentary agenda during the next few months that would force him to unmask himself (the Center being united on foreign affairs).

We have, then, a situation in which an essentially weak Segni Government could, despite the opposition on internal reform matters of the Liberals and a serious split in the Christian Democratic Party, continue in office so long as the Left finds it profitable to keep it there. And its remaining in power in that manner would very likely be under circumstances which would benefit the Left rather than the Center in either local or national elections.

How Can a “Shift to the Left” be Frustrated?

The democratic forces in Italy could endeavor to frustrate the Socialcommunists’ attempt to promote the formation of a new Center-Left majority by (a) precipitating national elections or (b) re-establishing Center unity by agreeing to shelve the most controversial legislation and by singling out at least a few measures upon which they will reach agreement and then carry them through parliament by a solid Center party majority, thus greatly reducing (by rendering unnecessary) the effectiveness of any Socialcommunist support. It is difficult to estimate which of these two alternatives involves the less disadvantageous probabilities for the Center. This, in fact, has been the dilemma of the Center ever since the last national elections in 1953. Clearly the Center must have a greater majority of the seats in Parliament in order to be able to make substantial legislative progress. However, the political climate in the country is such that national elections in the near future might very well produce even less favorable results than those of 1953. On the other hand, the Center has to have a record of legislative achievement to put before the public in an election campaign. It therefore stands to lose sympathy with the electorate by further immobilismo and further degeneration of Center party unity seems more likely with the passage of time.

[Heading and 1 paragraph (7½ lines of source text) not declassified]

Recommendation

That we take advantage of the presence of Ambassador Luce in Washington to discuss the foregoing.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/1–1156. Secret. Drafted by Engle and Freund.
2. Enclosure 1, not printed, was a memorandum entitled “The De Facto ‘Opening to the Left’ in Italy,” prepared by the Division of Research for Western Europe. It analyzed the Left’s claims that the government was now dependent upon its support, and concluded that whether or not any specific arrangement for collaboration existed between the Nenni Socialists and the Christian Democrats, the Left would continue to support government measures which minorities within the center coalition opposed in an attempt to either split the coalition or to force the government into abandoning its legislative program, thereby damaging its chances in the local elections scheduled for the spring.
3. Enclosure 2, an “Analysis of Parliamentary Votes Which the Left Cites as Evidence That a De Facto ‘New Majority’Based on Itself Had Been Formed,” prepared by the Office of Western European Affairs, is not printed. It details the support that each party had given to recent bills voted on in the Italian legislature.
4. Luce was in Washington in January for consultations.