Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

94. Letter From the Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

Rome, December 1, 1955.

Dear Livie: On March 24, 1955, Undersecretary of State Hoover forwarded the Embassy two copies of the Outline Plan of Operations for Italy approved by the OCB on March 2, 1955.² At the same time he requested that our comments and a progress report be sent directly to you.

The Outline Plan has been studied by all the representatives of the OCB member agencies in Rome and discussed at a number of the weekly meetings of these representatives held under my direction. The situation in Italy has been so unstable for the last six months that it did not seem as if any report could be of value. A report was prepared in July, but by the time it was ready to go forward the situation had changed.

There are forwarded attached, nonetheless, two copies of a report prepared in the Political Section of the Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] embodying not only the suggestions of USOM and USIS, but also the results of conferences with those and other sections of the Embassy. I concur with this report and think it presents as sound an analysis of the situation today and the prospects for tomorrow as is possible under the circumstances.

As you have noticed, not only from my reports, but also from my conversations with you, I have been most concerned by the possibility of a slipping to the left in Italy. The Soviets moves during the summer have had an effect here both in internal as well as foreign policy. The Center Democractic forces had strengthened themselves by spring time, and if they had struck some really hard blows at Social-Communist strength, they might have eliminated the danger from that quarter. But they didn’t really try very hard to launch an effective anti-Communist campaign; they merely made noises to please us! Thus, with the change in the international scene they found themselves in a box. Now the situation may have improved somewhat.

I think we must continue to support the Center—a move to the Left is unacceptable, while a move to the right would be politically unpalatable in Italy today. On the other hand, I don’t think we should expect any earth-shaking anti-Communist moves. If we can head off an “opening to the left” by which the Socialists are used as an organized party by the Government, and if the international situation continues to result in the détente’s not being translated into real Soviet concessions of substance, I think there is some chance that the trend of organized labor away from the Communists will continue, that the drop in influence of the Communist press will be maintained, and that the slight political amelioration of the center parties, especially the Christian Democratic Party, will increase. The two ifs are important.

Having submitted this report on the OCB plan of March 2, 1955, we shall await further instructions, in the meantime carrying on as indicated in the Plan and our report. We would, however, like to suggest some changes to NSC 5421/2.³

With best regards.

Most Sincerely,

Clare

Attachment

Rome, November 15, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Operations Coordinating Board Outline Plan for Italy, March 2, 1955

Memorandum From V. Lansing Collins, Jr., [less than 1 line of text not declassified]to the Ambassador in Italy (Luce)⁴

I. General

As directed, the following comments are submitted for your approval and transmission to Mr. Merchant in reply to Under Secretary of State Hoover’s letter of March 24, 1955. These comments are the result of discussions at the regular meeting of the OCB agency representatives and of a series of meetings between Mr. Collins and Mr. Francis Deak, Chief of the Economic Section; Mr. Fulton Freeman, Special Assistant for MDAP affairs; Mr. Edward T. Longs, Acting Labor Attaché; and Miss Barbara White,USIS. The full cooperation of other sections of the Embassy was received when needed to answer specific points. The memorandum has received the concurrence of the Minister and of the Counselor.

1. The Outline plan of operations for Italy, hereafter called “The Plan”, is based on NSC 5411/2. Certain revisions of this NSC paper seem called for and will be submitted soon. These suggested revisions will be generally reflected in the comments regarding the Plan.

2. One general comment regarding the Plan is that many of the items therein are unduly specific and thus become outdated quickly or give unwarranted emphasis to minor programs. An effort will be made to suggest an elimination or rewording of these items.

3. The Present Situation outlined on page 1 of the Plan no longer seems to reflect “steadily growing” Communist strength as mentioned in the Plan. In the summer and fall of 1955 it rather seems that Social-Communist strength has been stabilized and to some extent balanced by strengthened Democratic forces, although the Social-Communists continue to represent a most dangerous bloc. The basic problem now facing the US in Italy, it seems, is whether Democractic forces can act effectively to eliminate the Social-Communist threat or will permit it to live on undisturbed awaiting either a more propitious moment for the seizure of power or the encouragement of Italy’s taking a neutralist position through an understanding between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats. 1955 has been marked by Government immobility resulting from inability of the Democratic forces to get together and form a really effective Government. This immobility might only really be solved by new elections. The advent of the Segni Government in July 1955 augurs no improvement on this score. There is, moreover, much evidence that responsible Center leaders, particularly the President of Italy, Gronchi, are seriously considering methods to cooperate with the Nenni Socialists.

4. While the Operational Techniques mentioned in paragraph 3a (page 1) of the Plan remain valid, the considerably smaller amount of direct economic aid available lessens greatly the bargaining position of the US. In using this technique the effectiveness of the “carrot” approach should not be overestimated in the relatively prosperous Italy of today. Insofar as paragraph 3b (page 2) of the Plan is concerned, it should be noted that the policy outlined has been initiated and will be continued; these programs appear later in the actions agreed upon section and therefore might possibly be omitted from this paragraph which relates to operational techniques rather than to the details of the Plan. It is suggested that the word “additional” on line 1 and the words “increase its efforts to” in paragraph 3b3 should be deleted and the sentence changed to read “the United States should encourage the development and strengthening of anti-Communist and/or pro-Democratic organizations.”

5. The paragraph Timing and Emphasis, paragraph 4 (page 2) of the Plan, should be recast to state merely that while the full impact of the Plan can not be expected immediately, there will be interim effects which will show up in the next National elections. Emphasis should still be given to the South (including Sicily and Sardinia) because of economic conditions there without, however, losing sight of the serious problems which must be faced in the rest of Italy. There are depressed areas in the North, such as the area southeast of Bologna and the Trieste Territory. Furthermore, the months to come will be extremely critical ones for the free trade unions in the North.

6. Throughout the Plan reference is made to the Scelba Government’s anti-Communist campaign often spoken of as the December 4, 1954 plan or program. It should be borne in mind, it is submitted, that the December 4 announcement and the earlier statement of the Spring of 1954 were merely policy declarations of the Scelba Cabinet. They were thus policy declarations of a government no longer in power which have not been and are not going to be specifically endorsed by the Segni Government. The Segni Government has never indicated that it would pursue an anti-Communist program labelled as such. In fact, the Segni Government has taken little or no anti-Communist action of any kind. It is therefore submitted that the Plan should contain no language treating these Scelba Government declarations as anything more than what they were. Thus the results can better be gauged.

[Here follows the body of the 21-page report, consisting of detailed comments on each paragraph of the “Actions” section of the OCB Outline Plan.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.65/12–155. Top Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Document 67.
3. Reference should be to NSC 5411/2, “United States Policy Toward Italy,” April 15, 1954; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VI, Part 2, p. 1677.
4. Top Secret.