Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

67. Outline Plan Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board1

Washington, March 2, 1955.

OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS FOR ITALY

I. Introduction

1.

Reference: US policy towards Italy is contained in NSC 5411/2.2

2.

Present Situation: At present Communist bloc electoral strength is growing steadily, particularly in Southern Italy. If national elections were held today the bloc would probably win several percentage points more than the 34 percent of the vote recorded in 1953. This trend, if not arrested, will ultimately present Italy with the alternatives of succumbing to Communism by democratic processes or of instituting an authoritarian regime to combat a Communist rise to power. This basic fact conditions the entire approach of the U.S. Government toward Italy. An effective government based on all the Center parties [Page 225] is now in power and all parties in the government agree a vigorous anti-Communist and developmental program is necessary. [4½ lines of source text not declassified]

3.

Operational Techniques:

a.

Primary responsibility for taking the necessary anti-Communist and economic-social actions rests with the Italian Government. In spite of Italian agreement that vigorous anti-Communist and developmental programs are needed, it is doubtful whether really effective action will be taken by the Italians without the firm and constant support and influence of the U.S. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

b.

To achieve a significant reduction in Communist strength and work for the preservation of constitutional, democratic government in Italy:

(1): The U.S. should encourage and assist the Italian Government to take more energetic action to harass and weaken the Communist bloc’s organizational strength;
(2): The U.S. should give additional encouragement and assistance to the Italian Government for the purpose of increasing its efforts to press ahead with reforms and development programs to alleviate significantly conditions on which Communism feeds. The U.S. should examine the possibility of having overt assistance to Italy available for use if found to be in the U.S. interest subject to conditions in paragraph a. The magnitude of such an assistance program, if eventually decided upon, would be subject to review and determination as the Italian Economic Expansion Program became more clearly defined; its components might include contributions from PL 480, OSP, Eximbank loans, and possibly other forms of governmental aid.
(3): The U.S. should increase its efforts to encourage the development and strengthening of anti-Communist organizations.

4.

Timing and Emphasis: U.S. objectives can be achieved in Italy provided the necessary Italian and U.S. actions are taken promptly. The anti-Communist and developmental programs are necessarily long range in focus. Their full economic, social and political effect will be some years in developing. However, positive actions taken under this program can have desirable interim effects and there is time for significant results by the next national elections. (These could be held next Fall, but are more likely to occur sometime between the Spring of 1956 and 1958 in which year they are constitutionally required.) For this program to have the maximum impact on the attitudes of Italian voters, it must be initiated promptly, at the latest within the next six months.

Major emphasis in this program should be focused on the South of Italy.

[Page 226]

II. Actions Agreed Upon

(Paragraph references are to the numbered paragraphs and subparagraphs in NSC 5411/2)

Paragraph 14: “[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to strengthen the Center and encourage non-extremist minor parties to support the Center government.”

1.

Greatly increase U.S. encouragement to all Center parties to support their organizational activity and continue this encouragement as long as they continue increasingly to take effective action and mutually to collaborate on the issue of anti-Communism. Target date: January 1955. Primary: State. Supporting: USIA.

2.

Plan the official visit of Prime Minister Scelba in March 1955 in such manner as to add the maximum possible strength to Center forces. Target date: March 1955. State.

3.

Seek to arrange visits to the United States through sponsorship of private U.S. organizations of other key Italian political figures such as Secretary of the Christian Democrat Party Fanfani, President of the Chamber Gronchi, President of the Senate Merzagora, Christian Democrat Youth Leader Emilio Colombo, and others. Target date: Late Spring and Summer 1955. Primary: State. Supporting:USIA, FOA.

[Numbered paragraphs 4 and 5 (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

6.

Encourage the Democratic Socialist, Republican, Liberal and Christian Democrat Parties to continue their collaboration in the Government. Target date: Continuing. State.

Numberered paragraph 7 (7½ lines of source text) not declassified]

8.

While recognizing the occasional necessity for trade unions to adopt a special position on purely labor questions, continue to encourage the free trade unions and the Scelba Government to collaborate closely. Target date: Continuing. State. Supporting: FOA.

[Numbered paragraphs 9 and 10 (10½ lines of source text) not declassified]

11.

Encourage the Italian leaders to sponsor a series of seminars of the type held at Pesaro in September 1954 for stimulating activities among Democratic civic groups in provincial communities. As an outgrowth of these seminars encourage the establishment by Center elements of democratically oriented cultural centers in provincial communities. Target date: Continuing. USIA. Supporting: State.

Paragraph 15:

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]:

“a. To reduce the strength and effectiveness of the Italian Communist Party and of pro-Communist groups.
“b. To prevent Italy from falling under the domination of the Italian Communist Party, or of the present Italian Socialist Party.”

12.

Encourage [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Italians to take effective action to reduce Communist organizational strength and pursue reform and economic development programs. [6½ lines of source text not declassified]

13.

In order to implement para. 12 above, the U.S. Government should be prepared to give serious consideration to assisting the Italians with the economic development program they are presently working out, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. To this end, the United States should examine the resources from which a “package” of assistance of various kinds might be made up for negotiation with the Italian Government, if in the interest of the U.S. and as soon as it was considered appropriate. Such a package could include sums already programmed but might also include additional sums in the form of Eximbank loans, PL 480,OSP, and possibly other forms of aid. The desirability and size of this overall aid package could not be finally determined until the United States was fully satisfied with the validity of the economic program the Italians had worked out and with the adequacy of the Italians’ own efforts in this field. (See also paras. 26–29 and para. 43 below). Target date: First quarter 1955 and continuing. FOA, State. Supporting: Defense, Agriculture.

14.

Continue intensive administration of the various U.S. procurement programs in Italy in such manner as to weaken Communist and fellow-traveling organizations. Target date: Continuing. State. Supporting: Defense, FOA.

15.

Continue U.S. policy of seeking wherever possible through administration of the programs under paras. 12, 13 and 14 above and by other means to strengthen non-Communist labor unions, cooperatives and other democratic organizations by actions such as the following:

a.: Negotiate and implement programs under Title II and III of PL 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, in a framework that will help combat Communist influence by working through welfare activities, such as supplemental feeding of needy children, social service centers to aid needy people. Target date: First quarter 1955. State. Supporting: FOA.
b.: Explore further and implement, if possible, free union-to-union activities that can be assisted through PL 480 surplus foods. Target date: First quarter 1955.FOA.
c.: Be prepared to provide appropriate relief under the Title II, PL 480, in the event of disaster or emergency taxing the economic resources of Italy. Target date: Continuing. FOA.
d.: Within the limitations of PL 480, work out a Title I sales program that will assist economic development in Italy. Target date: First quarter 1955. Agriculture. Supporting: FOA.

16.

Seek to encourage private American business in Italy to take measures to assist free labor organizations and weaken Communist organizations. Target date: First half 1955. State, FOA.

[Numbered paragraphs 17 and 18 (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

19.

Continue efforts to program shipments of goods under aid programs, particularly MDAP, in such manner as to help break the Communist near monopoly of port labor. Target date: Continuing. State, Defense. Supporting: FOA.

20.

Continue implementation of the law requiring individual seamen’s visas in such manner as to break Communist control over seamen’s organizations and assist the development of anti-Communist organizations. Target date: Continuing. State.

[Numbered paragraph 21 (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

22.

Continue support (through books, magazines, films, seminars, etc.) to indigenous groups, in particular, Associazione Italiana per la Liberta della Cultura. Target date: Continuing. USIA.

23.

Consider the desirability of encouraging the Italians to establish an experimental community recreation and welfare center in a small community to counter effects of Communist social centers and help build rooted local support for democratic programs. State, USIA, FOA. Target date: Continuing.

24.

Continue visits of U.S. Sixth Fleet units to various Italian ports as opportune. Target date: Continuing. Defense.

Paragraph 15c: “To prevent Italy from falling under the domination of neo-Fascist groups.”

[Numbered paragraph 25 (5½ lines of source text) not declassified]

Paragraph 16: “Encourage the Italian Government to adopt and carry out a broad constructive program capable of attracting maximum popular approval and decreasing Communist popular appeal.”

26.

Use U.S. influence to encourage the Italian Government to press forward with developmental programs already underway and to work out realistic additional plans and specific courses of action for the next few years. (See also para. 13 above.) Target date: First half 1955.FOA. Supporting: State.

27.

Encourage the Italian business community to adopt more liberal business policies which might encourage modernization, price reduction, expansion of markets, development of new products, improved relations with employees, etc. Also encourage conservative political groups in Italy to develop and support such policies. Target date: Continuing. State, FOA. Supporting: USIA.

28.

Provide an appropriate American team member to participate in the OEEC review of the Italian proposals for economic development. Target date: January 1955. FOA.

29.

In discussing with OEEC members the program of multilateral assistance to underdeveloped areas seek to persuade OEEC that Italy should be included in such programs. Target date: January-March 1955. FOA. Supporting: State.

30.

Seek to encourage the Italian Government to arrange a series of meetings of Italian industrialists and businessmen throughout the South to explain opportunities under Loan Funds, possibilities of exploiting local industrial materials and the political implications of socio-economic reform. Target date: January 1955. USIA. Supporting: State, FOA.

31.

Render publicity support to welfare programs under PL 480. Target date: Continuing. USIA.

32.

Continue to urge the Italian Government to improve the atmosphere for private foreign investment in Italy and to encourage domestic investment in the South. Target date: Continuing. FOA. Supporting: State.

Paragraph 17:

[4 paragraphs (11 lines of source text) not declassified]

Re: Paragraph a.:

[Numbered paragraph 33 (5½ lines of source text) not declassified]

A. The following are pertinent excerpts from the Council of Ministers communiqué of December 4, 1954:

“…3 the President of the Council referred to careful studies conducted in the recent months which document the existence of a vast commercial network under the control of the Communist Party. The activities of this network are often facilitated by complacent political activities in certain sectors of public administration; by a studious deviation of local regulatory bodies under Communist control; by complicity of certain private entrepreneurs; and by the assistance of certain foreign states. Furthermore in certain sectors it was disclosed that in addition there has been a systematic violation of the law or the application of the law incompatible with the requirements of public interest.

“In order to redirect commercial operations into legal channels and to break the established position of special privilege the Council of Ministers has promulgated a series of directives under existing law and required specific ministers to apply them vigorously in the field of their responsibility.

“With regard to business and economic activities: [Page 230]

1.: A re-examination of licenses of any kind with a view to the revocation of those found to have been obtained illegally, or to be not in the public interest, or to be used by their assignees to favor totalitarian movements;
2.: A similar re-examination of concessions to municipalities (concessioni amministrative) with particular attention to those pertaining to the use of public property or the exercise of public services;
3.: A revision of the lists of those companies entitled to compete for performance of public functions (Note: as private subcontractors for activities which the municipality or province cannot itself perform), with a view to excluding from competitive bidding or private negotiation those which are found to have been created in order to favor totalitarian movements;
4.: The stepping-up of close surveillance over cooperative societies in order to single out those among them which betray the cooperative spirit and in which the cooperative structure has become merely an instrument for the attainment of political ends;
5.: The adoption of the same criteria of vigilance in cases where organs of the state or quasi-public organizations have discretionary powers for dispensing subsidies, contributions and facilities of any kind, always keeping in mind the basic principle of the preeminence of the public interest;
6.: The exclusion of the letting of public contracts by these organs and organizations to companies which operate to the advantage of organizations carrying out anti-democratic activities;
7.: In the field of foreign trade licenses will not be granted to firms which are found to be operating with the above aims.

“As far as public administration is concerned, in order to prevent the possibility that activities which should be carried out for the benefit of the country be diverted instead to subversive ends, the Council of Ministers resolved as follows:

1.: There should be singled out in every administrative sector appointments and jobs of particular responsibility to be entrusted exclusively to persons whose loyalty to the democratic state is unquestionable;
2.: It should be prohibited to administrative organs of the state either to make loans of any kind not provided for by law or to allow the use, even on a temporary basis, of public property for the activities or demonstrations of groups or organizations whose aims are known to be totalitarian;
3.: Directives shall be adopted by which a similar prohibition will be made to local and quasi-public organizations as well as organizations subsidized by the state or with state capital.

“With reference to those organizations subject to supervision and guidance, the Council of Ministers noted the measures already adopted to make supervision by the regular organs of control more active as well as the extraordinary inspection already planned and underway in some communal and provincial administrations for the purpose of eliminating political partiality.

[Page 231]

“In addition the Council decided to intensify its supervision of the employment of workers with the aim of eliminating monopoly and privilege.

“Finally, the Council directed special attention to the current situation created by foreign tendentious and false radio propaganda, emphasizing its harmful effect on the credit, prestige and interests of the country, its confusion of public opinion as well as its systematic defamation. In addition it brought out the fact that the broadcasts are sponsored by an organ of a state with which Italy maintains normal diplomatic relations and that they represent serious interference in the internal affairs of our country.

“The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honorable Martino, reported to the Council of Ministers on the steps taken in this connection during the last few days with the diplomatic representative of that state; the Council has postponed further discussion of the question until the results of the Ministry’s protest are known. The Council further decided that henceforth any Italians implicated in such criminal activity will be denounced to appropriate judicial authority.”

[Heading and 6 paragraphs (15 lines of source text) not declassified]

Re: Paragraph b:

[Numbered paragraph 35 (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

36.

Continue intensified implementation of the Offshore Procurement contracting authority and, when applicable, the various other aid programs in such manner as to penalize individuals and plants who are not taking effective action against Communism and reward those who are. [5½ lines of source text not declassified]

Re: Paragraph 17C:

37.

Continue to use U.S. influence to encourage the Italian Government and private employers to grant preference to the greatest extent possible to non-Communist unions in negotiations for collective bargaining agreements, in hiring and firing and in all matters relating to labor-management relations. Target date: Continuing. State, FOA.

38.

Explore the possibilities of developing union-to-union projects involving not only U.S. but also European unions and international federations to aid the Italian free unions on direct union problems and for humanitarian objectives. Encourage European free unions to take some lead in this. Target date: Continuing. FOA.

39.

Continue to bring trade union specialists to observe American industry, technology and trade union methods. Strengthen the labor technical exchange work in the operation of the Mission. Target date: Continuing. FOA.

40.

Explore the possibility of sending U.S. trade union productivity experts to Italy. Target date: First half 1955. FOA.

41.

Continue exploration of feasibility of intensive in-union training program in the U.S. for promising young leaders of the free trade union movement in Italy. Target date: Continuing. FOA.

42.

Continue study of possible means of ensuring the security of the military line of communications in Italy against Communist attempts at sabotage in time of crisis. The direct measures to accomplish this must in the main be undertaken by Italy, but there may be appropriate political and military actions which the United States could undertake to support Italian efforts. Target date: Continuing. State. Supporting: Defense.

Paragraph 18: “Increase pressure on the Italian Government to extend tax reform and more stringently enforce tax laws.” (The Italian Government is taking action on its own initiative. Therefore, no pressure is necessary in next six months.)

Paragraph 19: “Be prepared to assist the Italian economy if such assistance is required to prevent serious deterioration of the economic and political situation.”

43.

No serious economic deterioriation is expected in the next six months and no emergency economic defense support aid is anticipated over this period. However, from the long range point of view the danger of extensive growth of Communist strength in Southern Italy clearly requires on political grounds examination of the possibility of extending special assistance for development of the South. (See paras. 12 and 13 and 26–29 above.) Target date: First half 1955 and continuing. State. Supporting: FOA.

44.

Explore actions which will result in increased U.S. personnel spending in Italian markets and encourage procurement services to purchase in Italy supplies, materials and services for support of U.S. military forces. The extent of action possible under this program will in part be determined by Italian ratification of the NATO Status of Forces Treaty. (See para. 54.) The latter will permit the deployment to Italy of U.S. forces and the undertaking of construction and related activities of benefit to the Italian economy. Target date: Continuing. Defense.

Paragraph 20: “Continue technical assistance programs.”

45.

Continue to support a limited Technical Exchange Program in Italy. Target date: Continuing. FOA.

46.

Strengthen the National Productivity Committee (CNP) through normal operations and through use of Section 115K of MSA 1952 funds which are expected to be released to CNP shortly. Target date: Continuing. FOA.

47.

Wherever possible under the Technical Exchange Program help to develop programs looking to the absorption in the economy of unemployed young people and intellectuals. Target date: Continuing. FOA.

48.

Press for necessary action of the Italian Government and private groups to permit early initiation of operations under the industrial development funds established from the counterpart of FY 1954 defense support aid. Target date: First quarter 1955. FOA.

49.

Continue through the Mutual Weapons Development Program to afford financial support for certain research and development items. Target date: Continuing. Defense.

Paragraph 21: “Continue to seek wherever feasible, the reduction of barriers to trade between Italy and other countries outside the Soviet bloc, including the United States.”

50.

Continue to encourage the Italian Government to maintain liberalization of trade in Europe and reduce barriers to trade with the free world countries. Target date: Continuing. FOA. Supporting: State.

Paragraph 22: “Initiate and support international and other measures for the emigration and resettlement of substantial numbers of Italian nationals and refugees living in Italy.”

51.

Continue efforts to speed implementation of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. Target date: Continuing. State.

52.

Continue efforts to encourage other countries to provide greater emigration opportunities for Italians through the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration and through direct appeals where appropriate. Target date: Continuing. State. Supporting: FOA.

53.

Continue to support the President of the UN Committee on Refugees in his plan for resettlement of “hard-core” refugee cases. Target date: First quarter 1955. State. Supporting: FOA

Paragraph 23: “Implement the projected agreement on military rights and facilities with due regard to maintaining friendly Italo-American relations.”

54.

Develop implementing memoranda covering each installation as suitable facilities become available, as agreed upon by the responsible military commanders of the two countries. Target date: Continuing. Defense, State.

55.

Should the Italian Parliament slip from its present schedule for ratification of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement renew pressure for speedy ratification. Target date: First quarter 1955. State. Supporting: Defense.

[Page 234]

Paragraph 24: “Conduct vigorous information and educational exchange programs in Italy directed at winning Italian acceptance of and support for U.S. policies and objectives.”

56.

Continue to show USIS exhibit on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in principal cities of Italy. Target date: Continuing. USIA.

57.

Initiate program to assist Italians in developing peaceful uses of atomic energy. Target date: January 1955. State, USIA.

58.

Participate in Milan and Verona and Palermo Trade Fairs. Target dates: March 1955, Verona; April 1955, Milan; May–June 1955, Palermo. Commerce. Supporting: USIA.

59.

Within existing programs utilize to the maximum extent present resources of USCINCEUR to provide specially trained full-time community relations experts (military or indigenous personnel) to handle troop-community relations, doing so in close collaboration with USIA and Embassy staffs and with an overall objective of seeking to prevent problems in advance. Target date: Continuing. Defense. Supporting:USIA, State.

60.

Encourage Italians to take full advantage of opportunities made available for members of Italian armed forces in training installations both in the U.S. and Europe. Target date: Continuing. Defense.

61.

Implement program to invite 300 senior Italian army officers to visit U.S. army installations in the U.S. Target date: Continuing. Defense.

62.

Continue program to brief MAAG and other military personnel and dependents prior to assignment to Italy. Target date: Continuing. Defense.

63.

Assist Seventh Army Symphony Orchestra in conducting a five-week tour of eight Italian cities (Milan, Leghorn, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Naples, Bari, Palermo). Target date: February 1955. Defense. Supporting:USIA.

Paragraph 25: “Encourage U.S. non-government organizations and individuals to undertake appropriate programs in support of U.S. policy.”

64.

Seek to enlist the cooperation of U.S. non-governmental organizations in arranging visits of influential Italians, including key Italian industrial leaders. Target date: Continuing. State. Supporting: USIA.

65.