83. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Foreign Minister Martino and the Ambassador in Italy (Luce), Rome, July 29, 19551
In a long conversation with Foreign Minister Martino, he made the following points:
Gronchi and the Opening to the Left
According to Martino, President Gronchi continues to feel that his ideas concerning the political scene are misunderstood by the American Embassy.
[Page 283](My Note: Gronchi’s main idea, clearly set forth in many other Embassy despatches, is his persistent conviction that the present Quadripartite government formula is doomed, and the experiment of a CD. monocolore based on Nenni’s support, in terms of a vast economic reform program, is the only alternative to calling general elections which, he believes, the coalition would lose.)
Martino said that Gronchi had been greatly encouraged by the friendly reception his views had received from Cy Sulzberger (New York Times) and Cleveland (Max Ascoli’s The Reporter). Martino made it quite clear that he, like other leading members of the Coalition, were in disagreement with Gronchi. However, he said, Gronchi was correct in his view that the present Segni government is by no means “solid,” and that another crisis may occur in the Autumn.
The issue that would precipitate the crisis, was “Foreign Policy.”
A Future Crisis in Italy’s Foreign Policy
Mr. Martino had, that very morning, been reporting on Italy’s role in Geneva to the Foreign Affairs Commission. The general feeling in the Commission was, that while the results of Big Three diplomacy at Geneva were as good as could be expected, and were especially successful from the propaganda point of view, Italy’s role was that of hardly more than a bystander. De Marsanich (MSI Deputy) and Cantalupo (Monarchist), members of the Commission, had been particularly vocal on the score of Italy’s continued exclusion from the international deliberations of the Big Four and had insisted that in future decisions taken on the great questions of disarmament and East-West relations, Italy should have the voice she deserved in view of her importance in Western Europe. Italy, they felt, should be able to take part in some of the deliberations in the October Geneva meeting. It was to be hoped, he said, that Italy would be included in the London disarmament discussions, and gathered that the Secretary at Geneva had given Magistrati assurances that Italy’s voice would be heard.
I reminded the Foreign Minister of the conversations he had had on the score of Italy’s role in international deliberations with Secretary Dulles in the Department during the Scelba visit, and repeated that the practical fact was that those nations carrying the greatest burdens of peace, and supplying the overwhelming part of the defense and security of the West had naturally the obligation to assume the major responsibility and therefore to exercise the major role in these deliberations. Martino agreed, especially he said, in the German question, which was a result of wartime decisions by Russia, Great Britain, France and the U.S., and in the questions which predominantly concerned the U.S.A. in the Pacific. Nonetheless, he said, the questions of the relaxation of tensions between the USSR and Western Europe profoundly concerned Italy, the more so since (a) Italy had “the greatest [Page 284] Communist problem” of any European nation, and (b) the neutralization of Austria had increased the strategic and political importance of Italy. He said that nationalistic sentiment was growing rapidly in Italy, and that the Center Forces were being crowded hard by both the Right and Left to insist more firmly on Italy’s voice being given more attention by the “Big Three,” especially by America in view of Italy’s close cooperation with the West. Martino then said, “This may become a real issue before long, and if it is not resolved in Italy’s favor, there may be a shift in our foreign policy.”
He said that President Gronchi felt especially keen on this score of U.S. failure to give Italy a voice in international conferences.
Gronchi, he said, intended to write a letter to President Eisenhower on the subject.2 He asked me what I personally thought of the wisdom of sending such a letter. I told him that, of course, a head of a state was always free to communicate whenever he desired with the head of another state, but that what I would think of the letter would depend entirely on its contents. Naturally, I assumed it would be a friendly and constructive letter. Martino replied that this would, of course, be the case—as he himself would write it. However, Gronchi was being advised by some not to send the letter at this time, but since he had apparently made his mind up to send it anyway, Martino thought the best thing was to agree with him but carefully to work out the message himself.
Government Stability
Martino would make no guesses as to how long the government would last, except to repeat that the role Italy in the future was permitted to play by the Big Three would have a great effect on the prestige of the government.
Gronchi’s Visit to America
He then told me that since Governor Harriman’s visit, and his invitation to Gronchi to give him a great reception in New York,3 Gronchi had revived his interest in going to America. When did I think that the President might receive an invitation?
I replied that I had no idea whatever of the President’s or Secretary’s views concerning the timing of a Gronchi state visit, but I was certain that they would be greatly occupied in the autumn months with the Ministerial meetings. Moreover, when Mr. Gronchi went to America he would naturally wish to be presented, as Scelba had been, to the whole Congress. The Congress would not return until January [Page 285] 1956. However, I said, I had some personal thoughts on the timing of Gronchi’s visit. In 1956, I explained, the U.S.A. would be entering into its quadrennial presidential election throes. In view of the fact that there were millions of American citizens of Italian origin in the U.S.A., a state visit in a presidential election year by Mr. Gronchi—who has already expressed his desire to visit these groups—was bound to give rise to some charges by both the Democrats and Republicans running for election in districts which had many Italo-Americans, that Mr. Gronchi was being “used” to help get the Italian vote. I said that while everyone knew that Mr. Gronchi would never permit himself to be so used—and would not wish to intervene, even inadvertently in domestic politics in the U.S.A., since it would plainly be counter-productive to the best interests of Italy—such charges might be irresponsibly made. And, “politics is politics” in America no less than Italy. Therefore, although I had absolutely no knowledge of the President’s or Secretary’s views as to a Gronchi visit at this time, I was inclined to believe from my own experience of domestic politics in presidential years, that there would be few visits of heads of state, except for specific or extraordinary reasons. I said no doubt after 1957, and after the new administration had settled down, Mr. Gronchi would be more than welcome.
Martino said he ought to have figured that out but now he understood perfectly. He hoped that Brosio or Luccioli would also explain the situation to Gronchi, since he has gotten it into his head, especially since Scelba’s visit, that if he is not soon invited it must be because of personal prejudice against him. He explained that Gronchi has already indicated that he intends to visit “many countries,” but that obviously the question of an American visit must first be considered.
(My Note: Mr. Gronchi may have in mind following an American visit with a Russian visit, and may find it difficult, for obvious political reasons and suspicions as to his desire to move Left, to head for Moscow until he has first been to the U.S.A.)
Mr. Gronchi’s Election
I took this occasion to remark to Mr. Martino that until two or three days before the election of Mr. Gronchi there had been considerable talk that Martino himself was a formidable “dark horse” for the Presidency. Mr. Martino said that indeed he believed until almost the eve of the election that he might be elected President. He said that this would probably have been the case if “Donna Ida (Mrs. Einaudi) had not interfered at the last minute.”
It seems that Martino had been assured by Einaudi that Einaudi did not wish to be reelected, and accordingly his choice was Martino. On the other hand, Einaudi said, it would hurt Martino’s chances if he made this clear too soon before the elections, since some of the votes [Page 286] which he could otherwise hold for Martino would go at once to Merzagora. Einaudi would wait to make his position plain until the eve of the election. Accordingly, when the Liberals and Saragatians, who wanted neither Merzagora or Gronchi, announced for Einaudi this had the effect of “freezing Martino,” and neither he nor the Liberals could work for Martino’s candidacy. On the eve of the election, Martino had a long talk with Einaudi, and tried to persuade him either to renounce publicly his desire for reelection, or to announce equally firmly that he did want to be reelected. Martino argued that Einaudi’s ambiguity on his real intentions was certain to result in Einaudi’s receiving very few votes (which he pointed out to Einaudi would be humiliating) and spoil Martino’s chances. According to Martino, Einaudi himself could easily have been persuaded of this view, but at the last moment Donna Ida, convinced that Merzagora would fail, and Gronchi would be unacceptable, persuaded her husband that it was his duty to say nothing, and let himself be drafted. When Einaudi saw what happened on the second ballot, it was too late for him to make his influence felt in Martino’s behalf, the more so since his prestige had suffered a consequent diminution.
Benvenuti Sacked
I asked him why Undersecretary Benvenuti had been dropped, and replaced by Folchi, Mr. Gronchi’s man, especially as Benvenuti had been one of the most ardent, vocal and able exponents of Western policies. Martino replied that Benvenuti had made a strong attack on Gronchi immediately before his election in the Council of Ministers, and that Gronchi had not only demanded his replacement but insisted he be replaced by Folchi, his man Friday. However, as Benvenuti was well-liked in the Foreign Office, a job had been found for him as Italian Delegate to the Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration [Migration], Mr. Martino then insisted that Gronchi was not opposed to Benvenuti’s policies—but rather to the personal attack Benvenuti had made on him.