Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

82. Memorandum of a Conversation, Rome, July 23, 1955¹

Rome, July 23, 1955

PARTICIPANTS

• President of the Republic of Italy Giovanni Gronchi
• Governor of New York State W. Averell Harriman
• American Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce
• Interpreter: Mr. Luciolli

After the usual exchange of compliments the following subjects were discussed by President Gronchi and Mr. Harriman, in an hour’s conversation at the Quirinale.

The Geneva Conference

President Gronchi thought that a beginning had been made at Geneva² to relieve the tensions in Europe. But we would have to await the outcome of future Ministerial talks in October for concrete results. Meanwhile, the West must remain united and strong, since it was this strength that had made it necessary for the Russians energetically to seek more peaceful means of coexistence.

Italy was especially aware of the need to be militarily strong since no nation could maintain its independence that was not prepared to defend it.

Mr. Harriman expressed his accord with this view, and said that there would be no change in U.S. Western defense policies in future. He explained that President Eisenhower’s basic foreign policy is Truman’s. Accordingly, it is being forcefully backed by the Democrats, so that regardless of what administration might be in power in the U.S.A. in the next four years there will be no departure from the main lines of the past in cooperating with our Allies. Harriman then repeated what he had told Prime Minister Segni and Foreign Minister Martino:³ What he feared was that the Soviets would use the “relaxation of tensions” to step up a policy of creating popular fronts in every country in the world. Such an effort, he said, would be particularly dangerous in Italy, where there is already a popular front between the Nenni Socialists and the Communists.

The Unity of Action Pact

Governor Harriman asked Mr. Gronchi to explain why, unlike most European countries, the Italian Socialist Party was united with the Communist Party. Signor Gronchi replied that during the Mussolini era the Socialists and the Communists had been drawn closely together in making common cause against the Fascists, and that the bond between them had been greatly strengthened during the period of the Liberation and in the immediate postwar era.

Mr. Harriman asked if the President believed that it would ever be possible to effectuate a break in this pact. Signor Gronchi replied that he had often done all he could to persuade Nenni it was to his own interests to make the break, and to announce that he would support the DC s. He had tried to persuade Nenni of this not only in the past but also during the recent cabinet crises. But Nenni did not see it that way. Gronchi felt that the situation vis-à-vis Nenni was very difficult. It was a “vicious circle,” or “like a dog biting its own tail.” Nenni would not make the break until he felt certain the Socialists could become an effective part of the “democratic forces;” and the CD’s would not permit them to become such a part until they had broken with Togliatti.

The Entrance of the Socialists into the Government

Mr. Harriman asked President Gronchi if he believed that the Socialists should be taken into the government, and Mr. Gronchi replied that there was “no question at this time of taking the Socialists into the Government,” not perhaps “for two or three years.” The basic question was for the Government to secure their abstention, or support. This would widen the democratic base in Italy, and be a public recognition of the participation of the working classes in the political life of the country. Asked what concessions the Government would be expected to make to secure Nenni’s support, Mr. Gronchi replied that in the foreign policy field Nenni would expect the emphasis to be put on the defensive rather than aggressive character of NATO. As he was about to leave this point, I replied that the West had never put the emphasis anywhere else, that NATO was plainly and honestly conceived as a defensive organization, and had always been so presented and as such had been joined by all the European nations. Gronchi answered that obviously this was so, but that Nenni’s request was natural enough, since politically he had to seem to demand and get some foreign policy concessions. We must remember that Nenni had fought NATO,EDC and WEU, all in turn, that he had, of course, lost. The encouraging fact was that he was now making the best of the matter:—he had recently made speeches accepting NATO and WEU not only as faits accomplis but even indicated they would be useful to Italy, and the cause of peace, in certain conditions. He probably would proclaim NATO as entirely desirable, if he could secure from the government more emphasis on the fact that NATO must be used as purely defensive. In short, this talk was a political retreat tactic.

Mr. Harriman replied that in his view it would be bad propaganda for Italy to admit that NATO had ever at any time been anything else but defensive, and that government acceptance of such a line might lead Italy step by step to neutralism. Gronchi answered that while it might be true that Nenni’s views could lead to neutralism if Nenni were in the government, there was little danger from his views so long as Nenni remained outside the government, which, as Gronchi had said, would probably be the case for the immediate future. Moreover, the men in the government all of whom are firmly for the West, and for NATO concepts, would not change their internal government’s actions in behalf of stronger defense, and Western policies, simply because they emphasized publicly and for domestic consumption the defensive character of the Western Alliance.

The Segni Government

Mr. Harriman said he had had many talks with political personnages in the past three days, and he had come to the conclusion that the Segni Government and the Quadripartite seemed to be fairly strong. He believed, from what he had been told, that it might even become stronger as time went on. Mr. Gronchi agreed that Segni’s Government was basically stronger than Scelba’s. The reason Scelba fell was principally because Scelba had deliberately avoided the necessary “clarification” which Gronchi had consistently urged upon him, especially in the matter of the agrarian pacts. Segni, however, had taken his advice, and accordingly had succeeded in reforming the old coalition which was currently more unified because of the clarification. Asked as to the Segni Government’s “staying powers,” Gronchi replied that the political realities in Italy simply had to be faced: they are what they are, namely: there are still deep and irreconcilable disagreements between the parties of the coalition on basic economic programs, especially between the Liberals and the minor parties. Moreover, the minor parties (Republicans, Sarragatians) whether one likes it or not, are constantly dwindling in strength and election appeal. The disagreements on economic questions within the coalition prevent the dominant CD party from presenting a coherent and appealing program to the people. Signor Gronchi said that the plain fact was that this situation must sooner or later lead to the collapse of the coalition, and that in view of it, the CD s were faced with one of two alternatives, either (a) to go to new elections, when the coalition could no longer carry on, or (b) to form a monocolore government, with a coherent economic program, which would then be able to govern with the abstention or support of the Socialists, since such a program would force the Socialist leaders to support it, because the voters would be for it.

New Elections

Mr. Harriman said he hoped he would be permitted to give his advice at this juncture, which was to urge the President strongly to seek the alternative of elections. He, Harriman, had never seen in all his world experience any government survive “going to bed” with the Communist Left, and that until Nenni had clearly broken with the CP. any experiment which secured Nenni’s support now meant that the government was willing to be supported by the Communists. Gronchi replied that if elections were held in present circumstances, and in the absence of a broad progressive economic program, the situation following the elections of 1953 would merely repeat itself. After the election the same political problems would have to be faced all over again—with the same alternatives.

Mr. Gronchi then repeated his analysis of the political situation in Italy: he did not believe that the Segni Government would grow stronger. He thought that (a) the coalition was sooner or later doomed because the parties could not agree among themselves on economic measures, especially measures to solve the unemployment question, (b) only a CD monocolore government could agree on a sound economic program, “such as the Vanoni Plan,” (c) the Vanoni Plan, advanced by the CD s would secure the support of the Socialists for popular reasons, (d) a CD government, with the Vanoni Plan and Socialist support, would either not need to go to elections, or would win them.

The Vanoni Plan

Mr. Harriman replied that since his Marshall Plan days he had seen a remarkable recovery in Italy. He was greatly impressed by the statistics that had been shown him. He felt that international cooperation plus free enterprise were the best safeguards for Italy’s continuing progress. The Italian government would do well to pass the necessary investment and mining laws which would develop her growing and new resources which in turn would greatly aid unemployment. Mr. Harriman wished to point out, as a Democrat, that he was well aware of both Italy’s need for continuing economic assistance, and relief for over-population in the field of immigration. He thought he could assure Signor Gronchi that next year there would be a revision in the McCarran– Walter Act, and that he, personally, would do everything in his power, as he believed the majority of the Democratic party would, to secure this revision. His long friendship for Italy, whose interests he had had closely at heart since the Marshall Plan days could be counted upon in Italy. Taking his leave, he said that while he had no authority to invite Signor Gronchi to America, if Mr. Gronchi should be invited, he would, in his capacity of Governor of New York, do all in his power to make the visit a success.

I assured both Mr. Gronchi and Mr. Harriman that an eventual visit by Mr. Gronchi to America was a foregone conclusion, but that national ministerial meetings, national elections and so on made every statesman’s planning of state visits very difficult.

Mr. Gronchi took leave of us very cordially.

My note: Returning from the Quirinale with Mr. Harriman, he remarked that of the many interviews he had had in Rome, this interview was the only one that had alarmed him. He said he had the distinct impression that Gronchi would use his power in every way he could to collapse the Quadripartite and to open towards the Nenni left, before Nenni had broken with the Communists. He was aware that the device for this opening would be the Vanoni Plan, the adoption of which by the CD would probably break up the Quadripartite. He noted that Mr. Gronchi had made no reply to his remarks on the passage of investment or mining laws. The Governor said that he had spoken on the subject of Socialism very clearly and very strongly at luncheon to Mr. Vanoni. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] he repeated, as he left, what he had said in all his interviews in Rome, that such an opening would be the beginning of the end of a free democracy in Italy.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/7–2555. Secret. Drafted by Luce. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 151 from Rome, July 25.
2. Reference is to the Four-Power Conference of the Heads of Government, held in Geneva, July 18–23.
3. A summary of Harriman’s discussions with Martino and Segni was sent to the Department in telegram 232 from Rome, July 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1140/7–2155)