Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy¹

Washington, February 15, 1955— 6 p.m.

2590. From Hoover and Stassen.

1. Department continue prefer Italians retain responsibility for proposing other topics if any for agenda Scelba visit (memo conversation January 24 between Merchant and Luciolli).²

2. Have noted your report of conversation with Scelba, your 2885 and your 2929.³ Following is result our further considerations since your departure regarding relationship Scelba visit to Italian economic plan. On balance believe we should not go beyond position you assumed with Scelba regarding further precision his economic proposals. In particular our reluctance in this regard based primarily on two considerations: (a) Such a suggestion would imply commitment US Government to support an economic aid program; (b) is not practical commit US to support on unilateral basis short-term economic program within framework development program presently under study in OEEC before OEEC consideration more advanced. (We would wish indicate our agreement his statement last sentence second paragraph reftel re role OEEC.)⁴ Should Scelba wish bring with him further details re plans for implementation first few years of economic program we would be interested in seeing them as you have already indicated to him. However he should understand and should make clear to Italian public that it is not contemplated that during his visit consideration of development program will be sufficiently advanced to permit concrete US commitments. We recommend he present visit to public as indication Italy’s major power status and as opportunity for discussion world problems with President and Secretary and not as merely attempt obtain further US aid. Economic matters may also of course come up in Washington discussions. You may explain confidentially for his background that as matter of standing policy we wish discourage any impression that in order for official visits to US to be worthwhile visitors must obtain promise additional aid while here.FYI in line this thinking we believe approved PL 480, OSP programs etc. should be announced as completed in their natural course (subject of course to satisfactory start in implementation December 4 program⁵ and reassuring prospects continued performance). Announcements should not be held aside for release all at once on occasion Scelba visit. This would not prevent announcement at that time of programs whose consideration completed shortly before his arrival should we believe opportune. End FYI.

3. Fully recognize substance para 2 bears with it risk of misinterpretation that we are motivated by lack of confidence in Scelba Government and are by this means seeking indirectly to strengthen his possible rivals Vanoni and Fanfani. This is definitely not case and important we avoid actions or statements that might reinforce such impression. We continue to believe Scelba Government [1½ lines of source text not declassified]. Is also Government with which we have to deal and which it is in our interest to encourage as an effective moderate Center Government willing to take ecessary measures to weaken Communists. (These are our political objectives either with Scelba or with any successor Government.) For these reasons it would be consistent with our policy should Scelba’s personal position be strengthened as result of his visit. Correspondingly we should not hold back from such measures on grounds it would add to his prestige at possible expense his competitors. In spite of foregoing however and because of uncertainty of next few months developments in Italian Government believe we should continue avoid being drawn into Italian intrigues in support of Scelba vs Vanoni and/or Fanfani or vice versa.

4. Would it not be possible to enlist Scelba’s personal support of OEEC plan by assuring him our desire assist him obtain full credit for having secured indications US support for plan during Washington visit? For example he could say before leaving Rome that one of the objects his visit was to create vital US interest in Italy’s short and long-term development programs within framework OEEC study and ultimate recommendations.FYI while Scelba here we could announce appointment McGowan who could dramatize US interest by accompanying Scelba back to Rome before proceeding to Paris as US representative to OEEC Study Group. Another possibility would be establishment as result visit special interagency committee to examine plan (para 3 Ecoto 669).⁶ We could also attempt secure Eximbank agreement to issue statement during Scelba visit of its interests in Italian development program in OEEC and during visit device might be found for putting special emphasis on importance we attach to specific and detailed program for implementing first three or four years activities under plan which we understand OEEC Secretariat has requested from Italians. End FYI. Scelba could by suitable provision in communiqué quite properly claim upon return to Italy responsibility for high-level US interest in early stages of plan.

5. OCB has given go-ahead for staff study of possible composition “package” along lines draft Operational Plan but not decision yet made whether package approach possible either in connection Scelba visit or thereafter.⁷

6. We would also inform Scelba when here of bilateral conditions that would apply to any assistance US might provide in support any multilaterally approved plan.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.5–MSP/2–1155. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by John Wesley Jones and William E. Knight.
2. In this memorandum, Merchant reported that Italian Chargé Luciolli had asked what topics the Department wished to discuss with Scelba. Merchant had replied that the Department expected the Italians to suggest the agenda. (Ibid., 033.6511/1–2455)
3. Regarding telegram 2885, see footnote 4, supra. Telegram 2929 is printed as Document 62.
4. This sentence of telegram 2885 reads: “Scelba replied firmly that it was his intention to discuss certain economic questions directly with United States officials, and without prejudice to the role of the OEEC in European economic affairs.”
5. See footnote 3, Document 61.
6. Not found in Department of State files.
7. The portion of the notes of the OCB meeting, January 26 [½ page of source text], was not declassified. For the Outline Plan of Operations, March 2, see Document 67.