Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

262. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President¹

Washington, March 14, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles for the U.K.

1. At the NSC meeting on January 11, 1957, a presentation was made on our ballistic missiles programs which included a discussion of possible deployment of IRBM units in the United Kingdom.² At that time, no decision was sought as to deployment. As indicated in Secretary Wilson’s letter to you of January 28,³ the same presentation was later made the basis of discussion with Minister of Defense Sandys during the U.S.–U.K. defense talks of January 28–February 1, 1957. This presentation was based upon the Thor missile, but it was pointed out that our final selection might be the Jupiter, for which approximately the same factors would apply. While no promises or commitments of any sort were made or sought on either side, the British have indicated that they are receptive to the whole concept.

2. Having in mind the urgency attached to establishing an IRBM capability, it is believed that we should go forward with a program to establish an IRBM capability in the U.K. as soon as possible. Your meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan at Bermuda affords an excellent opportunity to finalize this program, if you decide this is desirable. The concept proposed raises major policy questions in two fields: I—IRBM Deployment, [1 line of source text not declassified]. These policy questions are described below and certain recommendations are presented for your consideration.

I—IRBM Deployment

3. The proposed deployment discussed with Sandys including the “emergency capability” (Tab A) would place in the British Isles the entire presently planned IRBM operational inventory through June 1960 and would have placed it entirely in the hands of the United Kingdom by the end of 1960. This raises major strategic and political questions. The Department of Defense, having carefully weighed all the strategic considerations, has concluded that the proposed deployment to the United Kingdom of the entire presently planned IRBM production through mid-1960 is the right course of action. The Department of State concurs, and the Department of Defense is studying what additional deployments of IRBMs should be undertaken in the U.K. and/or in other areas, both in the period through mid-1960, and in the period following 1960.

4. It now appears to the Departments of State and Defense to be undesirable and unnecessary for the United States Government to commit itself at the present time to put this IRBM capability entirely in British hands by the end of 1960. [12 lines of source text not declassified]The Departments of State and Defense therefore recommend that if the IRBM proposal is to be put to the British Government it be reshaped so as to modify the original proposal that all four squadrons of IRBMs will be placed in British hands by the end of 1960. Instead, the British would be assured that two squadrons (30 missiles) will be transferred to them, with the remaining two squadrons to continue in United States hands, without prejudice to a decision at any time to transfer the two United States squadrons to British hands if such action should be mutually acceptable to the two governments. This will not cause any delay in bringing the IRBM capability into existence.

5. Specific political understandings should be reached between the United States and United Kingdom Governments as part of the over-all IRBM agreement as to the purposes for which the IRBMs transferred to the U.K. would be used. The British would be requested to affirm that:

a. The IRBMs to be transferred to them would be deployed only in the United Kingdom.

[Subparagraphs b and c (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

d. Arrangements would be made for coordinating the selection of the targets against which IRBMs transferred to British hands would be used with over-all U.S.–U.K. target selection and coordination plans.

e. The U.K. will give sympathetic and prompt consideration to any future requests by the United States to deploy additional IRBMs in the United Kingdom or other U.K.-controlled territory.

The foregoing understandings are deemed to be essential in order to insure that the missiles will be devoted to appropriate purposes, and to protect U.S. interests (bearing in mind that the transfer of IRBMs to the U.K. will arouse intense public, Congressional and foreign interest). These understandings should be acceptable to the United Kingdom.

[Heading and 2 paragraphs (35 lines of source text) not declassified]

8. It is recommended:

a. That you approve the deployment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to the United Kingdom and the transfer of such missiles to British control, to the extent and on the basis set forth above, subject to our obtaining in advance the political understandings specified in paragraph 5 above.

b. That you authorize the necessary preparations for you to communicate this position to Prime Minister Macmillan at Bermuda next week, if you should decide to do so.

9. If you approve the above recommendations, appropriate steps will be taken to consult with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on these matters.

10. In view of the serious British foreign exchange position, IRBMs transferred to the U.K. would almost certainly have to be given to them on a grant aid basis. This would be done under the authority of the Mutual Security Program at a cost of approximately $62 million for equipping and training two squadrons and we would plan to fund this in the U.S. fiscal years 1958 and 1959. It is our intention to inform the appropriate Congressional leaders on this point.

Christian A. Herter
Charles E. Wilson⁴

Tab A

MEMORANDUM OF U.S.–U.K. DISCUSSIONS ON DEPLOYMENT OF U.S.-PRODUCED IRBMS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM⁵

The following paragraphs summarize a concept for a possible deployment of IRBMs in the United Kingdom which have been discussed between the British Delegation and the Department of Defense, without, of course, any commitment on either side, financial or otherwise. The present memorandum does not deal with political considerations, which are a subject for separate conversation.⁶

A. Deployment Plans

(i) In view of the importance of deploying a ballistic deterrent at the earliest possible date, the U.S. Defense authorities have outlined the concept of a crash program. This program would probably involve the use of contractor personnel, one experimental squadron of five missiles. If agreed to, this would involve deployment at a United States aerodrome in the United Kingdom as rapidly as possible. If decisions are taken soon it is hoped that such a squadron could be deployed by July 1958. This part of the program would be fully paid for by the United States and would be wholly U.S. manned.

(ii) Four regular sites would be developed as rapidly as possible, the experimental squadron being disbanded as these become available. The first two would be constructed by the United States and manned initially by U.S. service personnel. They would hope to have these operational by 1959. In parallel, the United Kingdom would undertake construction of two further sites with a view to bringing them into operation with British personnel at the earliest possible date. The target is that these two additional sites plus the United Kingdom takeover of the other two sites would be achieved by December 1960.

(iii) The U.S. would be responsible financially for all material produced in the United States. This would cover:

(a) The missiles.

(b) Specialized equipment.

(c) Spares required by the U.K. to maintain the missiles in an operational condition (subject to a cut-off date to be mutually agreed).

The remaining costs would be borne by the United Kingdom, to include:

(a) General supporting equipment.

(b) Cost of any additional land required, etc.

(iv) As regards training, the U.S. would be prepared to make available training facilities at a U.S. base for U.K. service personnel without charge. The U.K. would, however, be responsible for transport, messing charges, etc. Insofar as the U.K. requires missiles for use in training, the U.S. will provide these under (iii)(a) above.

B. Other Technical Considerations

(i) The U.S. intends to continue development of all major technical components in the IRBM, based on their program for the development of a larger missile. The U.S. also intends to continue the development of this model up to standardization at a range up to 2,200 statute miles.

(ii) The stage at which the weapon can be accepted as adequately developed for service use would be discussed and agreed between the appropriate U.K. and U.S. authorities.

(iii) The U.S. authorities would use their best offices to promote such arrangements between the U.K. and U.S. firms as may be necessary to carry out the program.

(iv) The safety conditions to govern deployment of these missiles on U.K territory would be discussed between the U.K. and U.S. service authorities and would be subject to U.K. agreement.

(v) The U.K. would be free to arrange for the missile to be fired on the Woomera Range in Australia if it so desires.

C. Warhead

References to the missile in this document do not include the warhead which will be dealt with separately.

[Here follows a detailed proposed schedule of deployment.]

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, IRBM for UK. Top Secret. Tabs B–E [4 pages of source text] were not declassified.
2. This portion of the discussion of the National Security Council is printed in vol. XIX, p. 401.
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.
5. Top Secret.
6. See Document 254.