262. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President1
SUBJECT
- Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles for the U.K.
- 1.
- At the NSC meeting on January 11, 1957, a presentation was made on our ballistic missiles programs which included a discussion of possible deployment of IRBM units in the United Kingdom.2 At that time, no decision was sought as to deployment. As indicated in Secretary Wilson’s letter to you of January 28,3 the same presentation was later made the basis of discussion with Minister of Defense Sandys during the U.S.–U.K. defense talks of January 28–February 1, 1957. This presentation was based upon the Thor missile, but it was pointed out that our final selection might be the Jupiter, for which approximately the same factors would apply. While no promises or commitments of any sort were made or sought on either side, the British have indicated that they are receptive to the whole concept.
- 2.
- Having in mind the urgency attached to establishing an IRBM capability, it is believed that we should go forward with a program to establish an IRBM capability in the U.K. as soon as possible. Your meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan at Bermuda affords an excellent opportunity to finalize this program, if you decide this is desirable. The concept proposed raises major policy questions in two fields: I—IRBM Deployment, [1 line of source text not declassified]. These policy questions are described below and certain recommendations are presented for your consideration.
I—IRBM Deployment
- 3.
- The proposed deployment discussed with Sandys including the “emergency capability” (Tab A) would place in the British Isles the entire presently planned IRBM operational inventory through June 1960 and would have placed it entirely in the hands of the United Kingdom by the end of 1960. This raises major strategic and political questions. The Department of Defense, having carefully weighed all the strategic considerations, has concluded that the proposed deployment to the United Kingdom of the entire presently planned IRBM production through mid-1960 is the right course of action. The Department [Page 701] of State concurs, and the Department of Defense is studying what additional deployments of IRBMs should be undertaken in the U.K. and/or in other areas, both in the period through mid-1960, and in the period following 1960.
- 4.
- It now appears to the Departments of State and Defense to be undesirable and unnecessary for the United States Government to commit itself at the present time to put this IRBM capability entirely in British hands by the end of 1960. [12 lines of source text not declassified]The Departments of State and Defense therefore recommend that if the IRBM proposal is to be put to the British Government it be reshaped so as to modify the original proposal that all four squadrons of IRBMs will be placed in British hands by the end of 1960. Instead, the British would be assured that two squadrons (30 missiles) will be transferred to them, with the remaining two squadrons to continue in United States hands, without prejudice to a decision at any time to transfer the two United States squadrons to British hands if such action should be mutually acceptable to the two governments. This will not cause any delay in bringing the IRBM capability into existence.
- 5.
-
Specific political understandings should be reached between the United States and United Kingdom Governments as part of the over-all IRBM agreement as to the purposes for which the IRBMs transferred to the U.K. would be used. The British would be requested to affirm that:
- a.
-
The IRBMs to be transferred to them would be deployed only in the United Kingdom.
[Subparagraphs b and c (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
- d.
- Arrangements would be made for coordinating the selection of the targets against which IRBMs transferred to British hands would be used with over-all U.S.–U.K. target selection and coordination plans.
- e.
- The U.K. will give sympathetic and prompt consideration to any future requests by the United States to deploy additional IRBMs in the United Kingdom or other U.K.-controlled territory.
The foregoing understandings are deemed to be essential in order to insure that the missiles will be devoted to appropriate purposes, and to protect U.S. interests (bearing in mind that the transfer of IRBMs to the U.K. will arouse intense public, Congressional and foreign interest). These understandings should be acceptable to the United Kingdom.
[Heading and 2 paragraphs (35 lines of source text) not declassified]
- 8.
- It is recommended:
- a.
- That you approve the deployment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to the United Kingdom and the transfer of such missiles to British control, to the extent and on the basis set forth above, subject to our obtaining in advance the political understandings specified in paragraph 5 above.
- b.
- That you authorize the necessary preparations for you to communicate this position to Prime Minister Macmillan at Bermuda next week, if you should decide to do so.
- 9.
- If you approve the above recommendations, appropriate steps will be taken to consult with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on these matters.
- 10.
- In view of the serious British foreign exchange position, IRBMs transferred to the U.K. would almost certainly have to be given to them on a grant aid basis. This would be done under the authority of the Mutual Security Program at a cost of approximately $62 million for equipping and training two squadrons and we would plan to fund this in the U.S. fiscal years 1958 and 1959. It is our intention to inform the appropriate Congressional leaders on this point.
Charles E. Wilson4
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, IRBM for UK. Top Secret. Tabs B–E [4 pages of source text] were not declassified.↩
- This portion of the discussion of the National Security Council is printed in vol. XIX, p. 401.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.↩
- Top Secret.↩
- See Document 254.↩