254. Notes on a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Minister of Defence (Sandys), Washington, January 29, 19571
After some preliminary sparring as to who should open discussion, Secretary Dulles suggested that they deal first with question of way in which U.K. handles cuts in their NATO forces, which they had decided to make. He pointed out that their action will have an effect on what the U.S. does, as we have strong pressure to cut our forces too. If, for example, they should base their cuts on a new concept of NATO strategy, it would be exceedingly difficult to avoid applying it to the U.S. and causing withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Europe. We will, in any case, have to cut some as a result of streamlining and increase in our atomic weapons power, but how far we go will be influenced by their method of approach.
Sandys responded that they would welcome our ideas and would be glad to take them into account. They felt that the U.S. could only use solvent allies and they cannot stay solvent and continue to spend on defense at present rates. They have made a series of short-term cuts which had proved wasteful. It is now necessary to undertake a major reorganization to get on a basis which can be satisfactorily maintained. They have talked generally with SACEUR about their plans and expect [Page 686] to discuss them with the WEU Council in February.2 They hope that SACEUR, in recognition of the increased atomic strength, on which they are having current discussions with Secretary Wilson, will be able to recognize that the reduction in strength is not comparable to the cut in manpower from 80,000 to 50,000. They realize he probably cannot say the reduced numbers are equally effective. With his help, thought that while there would be some shock to NATO as a result announcement their plans, it should not be too serious. It would also be helpful in securing the majority approval of this cut from WEU, which they plan to seek. They had sounded out some of the WEU members informally and think that there will be no trouble.
He then turned to German question and emphasized they are not holding their weight and won’t for awhile. He thought that negotiations for German assistance in the forthcoming fiscal year would work out in a way with which they could live, but after this year they cannot find any significant amount of foreign currency to maintain troops and will, before the end of the year, present this problem to the NATO Council for consideration.
Secretary Dulles agreed that it was important to take into account both the U.S. and the German aspects. The Germans are moving ahead but not as rapidly as we had hoped. He had given at NATO meeting in December figures on U.S. contribution and suggested that we were currently bearing more than our fair share. Adenauer had been made aware of our feeling on this and U.S. did not think Germans were in good position to question steps on our part to cut. However, he wished to emphasize again that it was not desirable to justify U.K. cuts on strategy or by comparative measurements which are designed essentially to meet U.K. position but which may have bad effect. Generally desirable “to fuzz it up”. Should be no departure from mission given to SACEUR in December. We feel in State at least that it is important not to assume that atomic weapons are answer to everything. U.S. fair share is largely in this field where we are farthest ahead and only country able to take cost of this program. [3 lines of source text not declassified] There is a real need for ground forces, the creation of which is primarily the job of the local peoples on the spot. [7 lines of source text not declassified] In conclusion, it would be best to justify their cuts by referring to economic, financial, strategic, and new weapons considerations and not base them on a single theory.
Sandys agreed and suggested we tell SACEUR that he must recognize the economic difficulties of the U.K. and then U.K. can discuss with him how to handle question.
[Page 687]Secretary said he had already briefly, during December meeting, mentioned to SACEUR necessity that he be responsive to realities and help U.K. take this necessary step in respectable, honorable fashion and avoid violation of Brussels commitment.3 He must cooperate and not force issues to breaking point.
Sandys then referred to question as to whether remaining forces could best be organized as three or four divisions. Favored three as more efficient militarily. Would want to discuss with SACEUR what was best from his standpoint. Secretary responded that if we have any views we will pass them on. He pointed out we were cutting numbers in our divisions everywhere, not just in NATO. This will mean fewer men but same number of divisions. If it was militarily feasible to keep four divisions, that would be fine, but if not sound militarily, believe military considerations should prevail. Sandys agreed and question was balance of advantage which can’t be settled here. Hoped U.S. would inform SACEUR of discussion on this point and views about his attitude which had been expressed by Secretary Dulles.
Secretary then turned to question of IRBM. Sandys said talks going very well. Secretary said there were some political aspects which we would want to raise in due course, but not now. Sandys asked what kind of questions he had in mind. Dulles indicated they deal with conditions of use in which there was, for example, considerable Congressional interest. Sandys replied he assumed he was referring to nuclear heads. Dulles said he thought both missiles and heads might be involved. Gray intervened to point out that missiles would be retained by the U.K., but heads would be retained in U.S. custody. In due course the U.K. would have operational control of four squadrons under plans being discussed, but in accordance with U.S. legislation, the U.S. would still control heads. Dulles asked if conditions of this were being discussed. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]
Sandys indicated that they had reached a tentative agreement this morning on such an arrangement subject to confirmation by principals. Thought could work out arrangement with respect to heads like that in effect for nuclear bombs for V bombers with heads under U.S. custody, but delivery system entirely under U.K. control. Thus, if U.K. made own nuclear head for IRBM, which was long way off, would be free to do so and use as they pleased.
Dulles said that this discussion had dealt with negative aspect of political question which he had raised, but there was also positive aspect of use. Sandys thought this too could be treated like arrangements for V bombers. There could be coordination with U.S.A.F. on [Page 688] target selection, talks on which already agreed so far as V bombers concerned. Would be simple add question IRBM targets to these talks. Emphasized again that IRBM and bomber were same thing in principle and should be dealt with just as extension of bomber problem. Dulles said this was just the sort of question we will want to be in a position in due course to answer.
[1 paragraph (24½ lines of source text) not declassified]
Discussions then turned to question of Korean withdrawals, covered in separate memorandum.
- Source: Department of State, Martin Files: Lot 74 D 484, S/WF. Top Secret. Drafted by Edwin M. Martin. Numerous handwritten corrections to the roughly-typed text have been incorporated. Separate notes covering the portion of the conversation dealing with Korea are printed infra. ↩
- The WEU Council met in London on February 26.↩
- Reference is to the treaty signed at Brussels by France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, March 17, 1948, providing for collective defense.↩