Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, September 11, 1957— 8 p.m.

989. I am gratified at assurance contained Deptel 1035 Sept 10² that Department plans consult Italy on ME problems whenever feasible. Prior to receipt of that tel I had drafted following message, which may be superfluous but might nevertheless still be helpful as background and indication of picture as seen from here:

Believe our recent telegrams and despatches have adequately reported increasing Italian interest in playing active role re ME. I am not sure however whether we have sufficiently brought out growing Italian insistence on being consulted re Middle East matters. My telegrams 894 and 926³ report direct requests for information and consultation, but we also hear indirectly from various sources that Gronchi and FonOff are most unhappy at being, as they see it, left on sidelines when major matters such as Syrian crisis are being dealt with. FonOff undoubtedly is realistic enough to know Itals cannot expect be treated as complete equal, since she cannot make equal contribution. Difficulty is Gronchi like many others does not see things that way and FonOff is hard pressed argue against those who say Italy should formulate own policy if her allies unwilling cut her in on their plans. Furthermore we sense certain natural resurgence of Italian national pride and hence sympathy with people like Gronchi and Mattei who insist Italy must be taken into account at least in those fields of special interest to her. This is not new development (Dept will recall Martino also felt strongly in this regard), but it is becoming more important because of relative weakness present Prime and Foreign Ministers and increasing activity and influence of Gronchi. (See despatches 238 and 312.)⁴

All our information indicates, in fact, that while many people dislike Gronchi’s ideas and his assertedly unconstitutional activities, no one is presently prepared check him effectively. Zoli and Pella seem too weak, personally and politically, and we understand Fanfani is unwilling risk intra-party fight until after elections.

These circumstances lead me to feel strongly that US, UK and France should make greater show of informing and consulting Italians on all matters affecting ME. If we do not do so, we risk serious weakening of excellent cooperation WE and NATO have hitherto received from Italy. We should also give encouragement to Italian activity in ME and make suggestions as to how it can be directed toward useful objectives and along safe channels. By informing, consulting, encouraging and suggesting we would appease national pride, remove pretext for uncoordinated actions and give FonOff and other realistic elements ammunition to defend themselves against free wheeling of Gronchi, et al. (We might also gain positive benefits in certain areas of ME.) I do not believe we are likely to convert Gronchi or Mattel to sweet reasonableness, but we should be able draw their teeth or at least strengthen opposition to their adventures.

Although I fully realize, from past experience, difficulties and disadvantages of handling ME questions in consultation with countries which have limited capacity assist but considerable capacity obstruct or cause delay, I consider in this case it would be lesser of evils take Italy at least partially into partnership.

French Minister⁵ yesterday expressed very similar thoughts to me and said he is renewing efforts get Quai d’Orsay pay more attention Italians. I think British Embassy shares these views in general.

Jernegan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 665.88/9–1157. Secret.
2. In telegram 1035, the Department of State informed Zellerbach: “We realize importance of our consulting Italians to give Foreign Office material to counter Gronchi initiative on foreign policy and will consult Italians whenever feasible.” (Ibid., 783.00/9–657)
3. In telegram 894 from Rome, September 4, Jernegan presented an account of Pella’s views concerning the Middle East and Africa. In telegram 926 from Rome, September 6, Jernegan reported concern by the Italians that they were not being kept informed of U.S. policy in the Middle East. (Both ibid., Central Files, 783.00/9–657)
4. Despatch 238 from Rome, August 21, reported on Italy’s petroleum interests in the Middle East. (Ibid., 880.2553/8–2157) Despatch 312 from Rome, September 6, contained analyses of leading Italian politicans’ views on the Middle East. (Ibid., 665.80/9–657)
5. Gaston Palewski.