Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

136. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 10, 1957¹

Washington, September 10, 1957

SUBJECT

• Signor Giuseppe Saragat’s call on the Secretary

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary of State
• Signor Giuseppe Saragat (leader of the Italian Social Democratic Party, four times Vice Premier of Italy)
• Signor Egidio Ortona, the Italian Minister
• Signor Mario Franci, Italian FSO, Saragat’s escort officer
• James B. Engle, Italian Desk,WE

The Secretary welcomed Signor Saragat and expressed pleasure that their acquaintance in Rome of October 1955² should be renewed here in Washington. The Secretary said he was familiar with the political position that Signor Saragat had taken over the course of years in support of democratic society in Italy. In these times of struggle against dangerous threats to freedom, courageous actions had to be taken by men of faith and ideals; he knew Signor Saragat was one such man.

In reply to a question from the Secretary concerning the effects of the Soviet repression in Hungary on the extreme Left in Italy, Saragat replied that although the “good” elements in the Italian Communist Party (notably Reale and Giolitti) were horrified, the remainder remained unmoved while the mass of the left-wing electorate was positively impressed by the unopposed demonstration of Soviet force. Though the Italian Communists were momentarily thrown off balance by the Hungarian insurrection, the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt not only permitted them to retrieve their psychological position in Italy in short order but even to strengthen it as a result of the increase in Russian prestige. While the West did not lift a finger to challenge the employment of Soviet force in Hungary, the British and French, after Soviet threats, were forced out of Egypt. As a consequence of the successful employment of Soviet power, the Italian Communists, whose position in Italy usually depends upon Soviet fortunes elsewhere, had a greater superiority complex than ever.

The Secretary inquired, whether Saragat would care to comment on the prospects for Socialist reunification in Italy. Saragat said that Nenni probably wants to achieve a break with the Communists for two reasons: (a) though Nenni obviously has not been converted to democracy at one stroke like St. Paul on the road to Damascus, he has nevertheless grasped the fact that parliamentary democracy can really do something useful for the Italian working class; and (b) Nenni, now 66, wants to be Premier before he dies; he sees that he cannot succeed unless he changes his tack; and he thinks President Gronchi may one day summon him to form a government provided he can demonstrate his independence from the Communists. In weighing Nenni’s own objectives and endeavors, however, one has to realize that Nenni does not at present enjoy the support of a majority of his party. In fact, only one-third of those at the last party Congress (February 1957) backed him. No one in Italy now talks of Socialist unification and it is unlikely that this will become an issue again before the national elections next spring. If Nenni’s followers in the party should gain ground in the elections at the expense of his critics, then maybe the question of unification would be reopened.

The Secretary said we had the impression that Gronchi was an active President. Saragat, reacting quickly, said that Gronchi’s actions as President always had to be regarded in the light of two factors: (a) Gronchi owed his election to the Communists and Nenni Socialists, particularly to Nenni; every now and then he had to do something to “pay them off”; and (b) he feels he must compensate for the fact that, unlike De Gasperi, he was never able to gain the leadership of the Christian Democratic Party or the Government. This failure left him with a determination to secure the substantive power of the State by another means; through imposing an interpretation of the Constitution that favored the widening of the Presidential prerogative at the expense of the Government. Admittedly, the text of the Constitution is somewhat ambiguous. However, it was clearly the intent of the Constituent Assembly, of which Saragat was the President, to establish a parliamentary regime like France and not a Presidential Republic like the United States. Saragat, elaborating further, said that Gronchi’s principal effort to force a trend in the direction of the Presidential form was his insistence on assuming the power of appointment, the power of checking the Government’s actions and the right to take active part in the formation of Government policy. Saragat said that his Social Democratic Party and the other lay democratic parties opposed Gronchi in this matter unreservedly, while the Christian Democrats opposed him “with prudence.” He thought Gronchi a sincere democrat but limited by his political education and his pride. The extent of Gronchi’s threat to the Constitution should not be overestimated, however, as all the democratic parties oppose his pretensions [2½ lines of source text not declassified], Saragat said that, if the Constituent Assembly had wanted a Presidential Republic, it would not have provided for the indirect election of and a seven-year term for the President.

The Secretary said he was especially preoccupied with the Middle East. He knew Italy was concerned, too, as a Mediterranean power. We felt that the Soviet Union had made a dangerous decision in 1955 when it altered its Middle Eastern strategy by adopting a strong anti-Israel policy and supplying large quantities of arms to Arab countries. Curiously enough, that decision seems to have been taken exactly at the time of the Geneva Conferences.

In taking his leave, Saragat assured the Secretary that he and his party shared the Secretary’s ideas on world policy. While his party’s contribution did not loom up very large when compared with the total Western effort in the defense of freedom, it was nevertheless of significance. He felt that much depended upon the solidarity of the various constructive forces in the West; in this connection he realized he and his party enjoyed sympathy in the United States. The Secretary, in closing, said that, in his five years on the job, he had always been pleased to be associated with Italian leaders. Italy had followed constructive policies such as cooperation in NATO, support for European unity and the working out of a pacific Trieste settlement. Democratic Italy and the United States had very similar views, they got on well together, and the results were happy for both countries.³

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, Italy. Confidential. Drafted by Engle. In a memorandum of September 4, Elbrick informed Secretary Dulles that Giuseppe Saragat was visiting the United States in an unofficial capacity, September 4–13, as a guest of the America–Italy Society. Elbrick recommended that the Secretary see Saragat because of his support for U.S. policies and the U.S. presence in Italy and because of his work in preventing his party from being forced into a coalition with the Nenni Socialists. (Ibid., Central Files, 765.00/9–457)
2. See Document 89.
3. Saragat met with Deputy Assistant Secretary Jones on September 12 before leaving Washington. According to the memorandum of their conversation, Saragat stated that he and his party were opposed to the Zoli government because its support came from the votes of the Right and the tolerance of the Left. He also stated his doubts concerning the possibility of cooperation with the Nenni Socialists. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6511/9–1257)