Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, September 12, 1956— 6 p.m.

1125. Reference Socialist unity. Commin’s departure from Rome last week signaled end of phase in process which looks to eventual reunification of Italy’s two Socialist Parties, split since 1947. As expressed in series Embtels this subject and in Deptel 948,² there are grave doubts this process as presently developing will produce unified party genuinely committed to democratic ideals in either external or domestic field. It is of course impossible judge speed with which organic unification might come, but present events indicate there is imminent at least a degree of unity of action which might in itself be harmful to development democratic Italian institutions and simultaneously United States policy objectives.

If this is true, [4½ lines of source text not declassified] if only for tactical considerations United States cannot be in posture of flat opposition to concept Socialist unity. We must therefore strive avoid impression we regard achievement unified party on basis Democratic Socialist positions as inconsistent United States policy in Italy. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

[2½ lines of source text not declassified] Present PSDI thinking, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appears envisage (1) no insistence on PSI purge of its Commie-controlled elements, and (2) willingness proceed with unification bypassing essential trade union question. While we believe neither Saragat nor Matteotti nor their followers have any desire for future unified party under Communist influence or control, snowballing of pro-unification sentiment and consequent political inexpediency of placing oneself in any way in opposition to unification, makes them apparently disposed (1) to trust in doubtful hypothesis that unified party will of necessity be democratic in character, and (2) to proceed with at least initial steps of unification process without requiring as prerequisite any concrete steps on part of PSI to free itself from Communist influence in either political or union fields.

Whether or not Commin’s mission authorized by COMISCO, fact is his actions have put COMISCO in picture here in major way.COMISCO has, at least theoretically, three alternatives: (1) Repudiate Commin’s initiative; (2) accept Commin’s report with or without approval and let nature take its course in unification process, and thus be half-committed to recognizing resulting unified pary; (3) itself take initiative to influence process in desirable direction.

In long run unified party’s chances of success depend on its acceptability to COMISCO to degree perhaps difficult for someone not familiar with Italian scene to understand. For similar reasons, Nenni now vitally needs at least appearance of COMISCO approval of steps he has taken or is purportedly preparing take. As result, we believe COMISCO has very high potential bargaining power in unification question.

[3½ lines of source text not declassified] We would like suggest in furtherance our objectives certain other considerations which might prove useful in approaches, particularly with regard London COMISCO meeting September 20 which will hear Commin report on situation and presumably report by Matteotti or other Italian PSDI. We fear PSDI delegates attitude will not be sufficiently realistic, and Commin’s actions and statements up to now indicate rather serious lack of understanding of Nenni, PSI and Italian problems in general.

Some of above points might be useful in further approaches members of COMISCO executive, other influential figures. There are listed below additional specific points for such approaches:

1. Nenni control of PSI far from complete, and Filo-Communist elements appear have majority on directorate and central committee. (There is undoubtedly substantial slice of party memership and local party officials also under PCI influence or control.) This demonstrated by September 4 resolution of directorate which had typical Communist stamp and in no way reflected commitments Nenni apparently had made to Saragat and Commin, especially in reference to “banishing of discrimination” which of course refers to PCI and outrageous claim that CGIL “natural and democratic base” for trade union unity.

2. We would like point out Nenni is master of smokescreen technique, that his record resembles what has been described as dance of one step forward and two steps back, sometimes modified to two forward and one back. His two steps forward at Pralognan have been matched by equivocal statements since that time on both foreign policy and relations with PCI. Wish further to emphasize vast difference between occasional Nenni statements with that of party when it speaks as unit through directorate and news organ Avanti. It is thus entirely wrong take Nenni’s individual forward steps out of context as unfortunately Commin and even Spaak have done in connection Nenni’s editorial on Suez, which was gesture not maintained by Avanti which at present is carrying straight pro-Soviet line.

3. We cannot believe showing by COMISCO of any reserve regarding unification process as now proceeding would have effect of “driving Nenni back into Communist arms”. Nenni in our view driven by ambitions for great political success; if he can achieve this without facing fundamental question his relations with Communists, he will continue avoid these questions. Conversely if faced with COMISCO reserve he will be under strong pressure from own ambition and pro-unification sentiment within PSI electorate to take serious forward steps.

4. COMISCO in our view should seek avoid posing “conditions” which could be met by basically meaningless gestures. It should instead clearly recognize dangers from its point of view of present course unification and force Nenni into attempts overcome them.

5. COMISCO should be aware that even when certain Nenni statements and acts appear anti-Communist in some aspects and effects, they may at same time fit into Moscow concept of developments it favors and prepared to further.

6. COMISCO might wish consider probable consequences of first congress of eventual unified party without prior purge of pro-Communist PSI elements. It should be remembered PSI is over twice size of PSDI, and delegates would undoubtedly be chosen on some sort proportional basis.

7. COMISCO should realize that even limited PSDI–PSI unity of action agreement which taken as step preliminary to reunification would probably be sufficient upset Italy’s present quadripartite government. This would lead either to center-right formula (obviously repugnant to Social Democrats) or to center-left formula giving great power to PSI while still badly penetrated and influenced by Communists.

[1 paragraph (14½ lines of source text) not declassified]

Luce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/9–256. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Brussels, Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, and The Hague.
2. See footnote 3, supra.