107. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State1
3407. Re Deptel 3209.2 Exploitation by Center leaders and press of impact Stalin denigration on Italian Communist Party and of resulting situation has been well conceived and skillfully executed and has included Nenni as major target.
General lines of attack by press, no doubt guided by parties concerned, have included: (1) Extensive reporting of Soviet Stalin denigration itself and connected satellite events (2) Even more extensive reporting of resulting situation in Italian Communist and Socialist parties on national level, never missing opportunity point out discreditable aspects current actions and statements Left leaders or to reproach them with their own past. Some Center papers, especially DC, have also undertaken build-up Saragat in attempt strengthen his hand vis-à-vis wavering elements in his own party and as possible beneficiary discontent in PSI should this spread considerably.
Segni in Popolo di Milano article, reported in today’s press, made own contribution to campaign with discussion Stalin denigration doubting ability present Soviet leaders change essential elements Stalin regime. (Article, incidently strengthens his hand vis-à-vis possible Soviet invitation for him visit Moscow whether or not he might choose accept such invitation.)
[Page 355]If national or international news of sort appropriate as basis current anti-Communist press campaign starts dry up, we hope ball can be kept rolling through reporting evidence of disaffection or confusion among Social Communists on local level. We are encouraged see two such stories in today’s press.
In evaluating possibility that this exploitation campaign or situation itself may result in more than temporary deflation some possibilities of gain previously open to Left and in assessing possible significance this deflation, we should bear following adverse factors soberly in mind:
- (1)
- For various reasons, prior to aggravation of situation in PCI as result Moscow Congress, Social Communist tactics of granting limited support to Segni government (nature and purpose of which outlined in Embdes 1499)3 appeared have disturbingly large possibilities of at least partial success; damage to these possibilities may not prove more than temporary and even in short run may not entirely cancel them out;
- (2)
- Owing nature Italian economic and social conditions there is large potential protest vote, most of which has been cast for PCI and PSI;
- (3)
- Owing situation in which PSDI has more or less been forced to take part in government, and thus become at least partially discredited in eyes of protest voters, there is nowhere to which disgruntled elements of Social Communist bloc are apt to go outside of bloc;
- (4)
- Current Soviet tactics may score successes outside of Italy which would have adverse reaction from our point of view on situation here; and
- (5)
- There is no way of being sure at this stage that in long run Moscow tactics may not prove net asset rather than net liability (as they are at present) to Italian Social Communists.
Within this framework, however, we have every reason to be both pleased and relieved by current developments on Left here.
Summary and partial analysis recent developments follow in separate telegram.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/4–556. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, London, Belgrade, and Bonn.↩
- In telegram 3209 to Rome, April 4, the Department expressed gratification with the press attacks on the PCI concerning the denigration of Stalin but requested clarification on the extent to which Nenni was included in the criticism. The Department expressed the hope that the Italian Center was taking full advantage of Nenni’s political vulnerability. (Ibid.)↩
- In despatch 1499 from Rome, February 28, the Embassy provided a detailed discussion of recent voting patterns of the Socialist and Communist Parties. (Ibid., 765.00/2–2856)↩
- Infra.↩