106. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State1
3278. 1. Radiation effects of Moscow’s explosion of Stalin myth continue to be felt apparently with increasing intensity by Togliatti and PCI leaders. Reports on disorientation of communist base reaching PCI parliamentarians resulted in meeting of PCI chamber group March 22 which has not yet been completed. According to accounts in center press which find some confirmation in carefully edited account in communist UnitaTogliatti found himself in uncustomary position of being “on the stand”. Allegedly three basic questions came out in discussions: (1) why CPSU had decided so suddenly to destroy Stalin’s memory without taking into account possible reactions in other communist parties; (2) why Soviet leaders who must be considered as co-responsible with Stalin for his errors should wait until now to destroy him; and (3) why Togliatti, as member communist international executive and as resident of Moscow, was not aware of Stalin’s criminality. Point was made that if Togliatti was not aware, had he protested to Soviet leaders, and if he was aware, why did he keep it from PCI central committee?
2. Press reports indicate that although Giancarlo Pajetta (who is hard-headed, clever and sinister confidant of Togliatti) tried to brush matter aside by appealing to comrades to accept directives without questions, Togliatti replied to questions as follows, (1) while he and Thorez had told Soviet leaders after secret session that revelations would cause severe disorientation to communists in Italy and France, latter had replied that needs of CPSU required severe and sudden shock. Other communist parties might be temporarily hurt, but CPSU would receive immediate benefit; (2) Togliatti admitted co-responsibility of Soviet leaders, but pointed out that action against Stalin at time his greatest popularity would have destroyed CPSU. Stressed that Soviet leaders had been preparing Soviet citizens for this development during last three years and that this preparation had greater echo in USSR than in Italy; (3) Togliatti stated he was aware of certain “violations of revolutionary legality” and had discussed them with CPSU leaders, but pointed out that reasons guiding his actions were those guiding Soviet leaders (see 2 above) and that as “simple émigré” in Moscow he did not have close touch with Stalin. Added that while [Page 353] Tito, who was in power, could take risks by defying Stalin, Communist parties not in power could not assume responsibility of action which might break up Communist movement.
3. Togliatti concluded yesterday’s session by appealing for party unity.
4. Meanwhile Nenni and PSI are engaging in maneuver apparently designed to turn disorientation Communist base to advantage of PSI and to act as shock-absorber for extreme left in general, including PSI, which has felt shock of recent Soviet developments. Nenni’s attitude since conclusion CPSU congress and in particular since revelations on desecration Stalin’s memory (see Avanti editorial March 22 in Tousi 395, March 23)2 has taken line that CPSU congress had most positive result in acceptance of multiplicity of ways toward socialism and that this point has regrettably been overshadowed by crude and sudden attack on Stalin which has been launched without proper historical discussion. Nenni has endeavored establish fact (through Avanti editorial signed by editor) that he does not agree with method this attack on Stalin and that it necessary salvage Stalin’s “great historical personality” (this presumably aimed at those in PCI and PSI who are bewildered by adulation of Stalin one day, desecration of him next day). Stressing that debate on “cult of individual” and Stalin’s errors were of interest to all workers movements and must be debated (this makes Nenni champion and leader of workers against those trying to choke off debate), Nenni stated important point to develop was “democratic way of Italian socialism which we have traveled courageously for long time” (i.e., Nenni has always been right on this and workers would do well to travel with him). Nenni concluded that he still considered “capitalist bourgeoisie” his main adversary as it had tried use democratic method to consolidate power (presumably this means that although other Western European socialist parties have no difficulty cooperating with other democratic forces, Nenni will still march side-by-side with PCI). Nenni’s views will be further developed in Avanti article signed by him and appearing March 25.
5. In our opinion Nenni’s tactics of distinguishing between PSI and PCI, which probably are concerted with Togliatti, will succeed in soaking up most of present discontent and confusion amongst Socialcommunist base and thus prevent possible defections to democratic camp. In all probability effects of this situation on PCI and PSI will be clearly visible in administrative elections. On other hand doubtful whether Togliatti will agree to Nenni taking any position or initiative in Parliament which PCI cannot match. While for time being Togliatti will probably be obliged lie low and accept (even at times with ill-grace) PSI reaping benefits of PCI discomfiture,PCI undoubtedly [Page 354] believes that Togliatti will gradually build up PCI’s “new look” and enable him to take over from Nenni in playing game of “democratic way of Italian socialism” which, as will be recalled, Togliatti claimed at recent PCI central committee meeting as his invention.