Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

320. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, December 6, 1957—6 p.m.

934. Pass White House.

1. In hour and half conversation with Tito in presence Foreign Secretary and Vilfan on Brioni this morning, I opened with President’s message of sympathy and wishes for rapid recovery.² Tito said he is much better, that treatment is effective and he thinks operation can be avoided. He asked that I convey his most sincere thanks to the President and his hope that he in turn is now fully recovered to health. I also gave Tito the President’s personal opinion that Yugoslav recognition of East Germany represented retrogressive step.

2. After having expressed our admiration for Tito’s courage in establishing and maintaining Yugoslavia’s independence under most difficult circumstances and recalling extent to which we had given material support to this Yugoslav policy, I described reasons why US is now concerned that Yugoslav independence is not being maintained as heretofore. In this I followed closely Secretary’s remarks to Humo³ (and therefore do not repeat argumentation here) adding that since that conversation Yugoslav Government had recognized East Germany, an action which we regretted. Recalling Secretary’s conversation with Tito on Brioni in November 1955⁴ when former had outlined agreement on Germany that heads of states had arrived at and how we hoped to proceed, I pointed out that Yugoslav recognition was in effect support for Soviet Government which had promptly violated its own commitment. This Yugoslav action together with others mentioned had so aligned Yugoslav policy with Soviet that it raised legitimate concern in American opinion respecting continuation of independent policy, particularly when relationship between CPSU and UCY was taken into account. In conclusion, I said that while US had no intention or desire to interfere in internal Yugoslav affairs, there was no sentiment in US for support of Yugoslav regime per se and that support we had been able to give found its justification in the independent line Yugoslavia had followed until recent months.

3. Tito said he would begin his reply by referring to letter he had sent Eisenhower several years ago.⁵ In that letter he had tried to explain how he looked at our relations and particularly aid questions. Yugoslavia, he was convinced, did have an independent policy but its application gave rise to so many difficulties in US and had led to such suspensions that they interfered with our good relations. He had expressed opinion in his letter to President that he would prefer to cease military aid entirely if it gave rise to such difficulties and today situation was worse than ever. As military aid seemed to cause such difficulties for us (to the extent of embittering our relations) and as it affected ability of Yugoslavia to carry out what it had judged to be truly independent policy, his government had now decided to propose discontinuance of military aid and suggested that our representatives convene to decide quietly how this could be best accomplished. He said this was considered decision of his government and he thought it was best way out. I replied that I would of course submit it promptly to Washington and that, speaking personally, it might provide solution. I remarked there would be number technical questions involved in closing up the program as it had continued over so long a period. Tito agreed and Foreign Secretary remarked it should be kept absolutely secret until both governments had worked out procedures for discontinuance,

4. Referring to the President’s remarks on recognition of East Germany, Tito said he wished to clarify certain points. His action was not hasty or ill-considered and had been in the air for over a year. It would have been done sooner had it not been for Soviet attacks early in 1957 against Yugoslavia. It was not planned as move to make things more difficult for Adenauer nor, as had been suggested in Western press, result of deal between him and Khrushchev. It represented logical continuation of independent foreign policy based upon principles long enunciated. Until recognition was accorded Yugoslavia could not have free hand in its relations with Eastern European states and its influence would diminish. He would ask us to realize that it was logical development given Yugoslavia’s middle position and should be accepted as based upon principle that way must be found to settle great issues between blocs. I inquired if these principles implied that Yugoslav recognition could therefore be expected of other divided countries such as Korea, China, and Indochina, if his principles implied acceptance of situations of fact followed by attempts to final solution. Tito got out of that query, with some help from Foreign Secretary, by somewhat rambling reply to general effect recognition of East Germany was decided on its merits alone and represented “positive” step. Yugoslav decision was based on its own appraisal and recognition of other countries would have to be similarly decided as Yugoslavia did now want to “subordinate its foreign policy to bloc considerations” (whatever that may mean).

5. In seeking further clarification of Yugoslav position vis-à-vis US and USSR, following emerged. When I commented upon increasingly hard line of Soviet policy (Gromyko press conference, note on N.E. to US and declarations at launching of satellite), Tito said he is convinced present Soviet declarations do not represent long-term intentions. He said West should not react so sharply to Soviet declarations and remarked some of our Generals indulged in bellicose speeches as well. We should by now be accustomed to sharp speeches and not become too alarmed. I recalled that circumstances should not be overlooked when aggressive declarations were made, attended as they were by fall of Zhukov. Tito replied he was convinced Zhukov’s fall was not result of foreign policy considerations but was purely internal. I asked him how he interpreted removal of Zhukov to which he replied it was internal matter and therefore he could not properly comment. He would say, however, that West should deal “with whole complex of Soviet policies” and not worry too much about personalities. I said given type of government in USSR this was not so simple as our experience with violated agreements fully demonstrated. Tito did not deny this but said he was still convinced process of liberation in Soviet Union will continue. Russian people expect and await such development and pressure for it will continue, It would be wrong to assume that Soviet foreign policy is purely matter of internal developments and personalities. It represents foreign policy of powerful Socialist country developed as result of many interests.

6. I said we had possibly seen reflection of this in recent party declaration in Moscow⁶ which, however, seemed to repudiate some earlier postulates embodied in Belgrade Declaration of 1955 and Moscow Declaration of 1956⁷ which Tito had signed. Tito said anyone who read recent Party Manifesto in Moscow could readily see why Yugoslav delegation had not signed. Too many conclusions, however, should not be drawn from speculation in Western press. Yugoslavia stuck to positions it had enunciated although it was clear from Party Manifesto that there were differences of principle between it and USSR. Perspectives for Yugoslavia are somber, Tito said, caught as it is between two blocs. He thought basic principles of Yugoslav foreign policy, seeking as it does a relaxation of tension, were right. Failure to make progress on disarmament was discouraging. Had West shown more confidence in Khrushchev earlier things might have been different. He though present international situation was extremely dangerous and hoped West would make renewed efforts to reach agreement with USSR. Yugoslavia would continue to work for solution on basis of its independent judgment and will continue its efforts to have good relations with both blocs. CP Manifesto should not be over-dramatized and it will take time for process in Soviet Union to become manifest.

7. Returning to question of US-Yugoslav relations Tito said he hoped economic relations could continue as before. He recalled hope he expressed last year that eventually he could get away from grants and move toward credit and loan basis. He said Yugoslav Government intends to do everything it can to intensify agricultural production so that it will not perpetually ask for grant aid. He was hopeful that within several years our economic relations would be expanded but on altered basis which would make it easier for both.

8. Comment and recommendations will follow shortly.⁸

Riddleberger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.68/12–657. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. This way apparently an oral message.
3. See Document 307.
4. See Document 263.
5. Apparently a reference to Tito’s letter of August 26, 1956; see footnote 2, Document 284.
6. Reference is to Declaration of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, issued in Moscow on November 16, 1957.
7. Regarding the Belgrade Declaration, see footnote 2, Document 251. Regarding the Moscow Declaration, see footnote 5, Document 280.
8. Telegram 938 from Belgrade, December 8, [3-1/2 pages of source text], was not declassified. (Department of State, Central Files)