307. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 2, 19571
SUBJECT
- US-Yugoslav Relations
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. Avdo Humo, Yugoslav State Secretary for Finance
- Mr. Leo Mates, Yugoslav Ambassador
- Mr. C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary of State
- Mr. James Riddleberger, United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia
- Mr. Henry P. Leverich, EE
The Secretary welcomed the Yugoslav Secretary of State for Finance and the hope was expressed on both sides that the forthcoming economic discussions here would be useful in furthering mutual understanding.2
The Secretary then spoke in substance as follows:
[Page 782]We have been very admiring of Marshal Tito’s courage in establishing the independence of his country. In the past, the United States has made large contributions, in both military and economic spheres, to assist the Yugoslav Government in maintaining its independence, despite the fact that we do not entirely agree with the type of governmental system in Yugoslavia. It is not, however, our official responsibility to interfere in internal matters as long as any given country maintains its independence and conducts itself internationally in an acceptable manner. In view of the rapidity with which news is now spread throughout the world, the public in every nation has become increasingly interested in domestic developments in other countries. These domestic matters have thus become news and are read with interest by the American people. Their reactions are duly reflected in our Congress.
This development is relevant to the economic talks on which we are about to embark. There is growing concern in responsible quarters here and abroad as to whether Yugoslavia’s independence is being maintained to the same degree as heretofore. As Stalin himself once said, in a one-party state the party and the government are separate entities but the government can take no action without party consent. It seems that a greater degree of unity—perhaps subservience on Yugoslavia’s part—between the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist Parties, is taking place which seems to impair the independence of the Yugoslav Government. We have no means of knowing the precise relationship between the two parties, but we have to draw the necessary inferences from certain facts, and the degree to which the Yugoslav Government is consolidating its policies with those of the USSR gives concern with respect to the former’s independence. The most disturbing event is that the only countries to vote against the most recent UN resolution on Hungary comprised the Soviet bloc plus Yugoslavia. This is the first time that Yugoslavia has voted with the Soviet bloc when no other independent country was voting that way. The only Yugoslav departure from the Soviet line is the withholding of recognition from East Germany and there are indications that recognition is now being contemplated by the Yugoslav Government. Such a development would obliterate the last difference between the Yugoslav and Soviet foreign policy lines. It would seem that were Yugoslavia really independent there would be at least one time just under the laws of chance when the Yugoslavs would find the West right and the Soviets wrong.
The Secretary would say that he personally still holds the view that Yugoslavia is maintaining its independence and that the US is justified in attempting to nurture and support this independence. But, he would have to say that he is becoming increasingly isolated in this view not only as far as the executive branch and the Congress [Page 783] of the United States are concerned but also with respect to our allies in their attempts to evaluate the current situation as regards Yugoslavia.
When it comes to the question of economic assistance, we are facing a year when our resources are limited and when we failed by considerable majority to obtain the authority in the economic field which we sought. Hence, our available resources must be rationed between many deserving claimants. He ought frankly to say that in order to carry along our present policies we are going to need more cooperation than we have been getting from the Yugoslavs to validate our position before Congress and the American public and to explain to other countries why they are being cut down in the matter of economic aid. As far as the next year is concerned, we have already been put on notice by powerful figures in the Congress that there will be greater effort than ever before to eliminate aid to Yugoslavia, if things continue as they are going now.
The Secretary wished to make it perfectly clear that nothing he was saying should be interpreted as an effort to coerce Yugoslavia in the formulation of its policies. We want Yugoslavia to be absolutely independent, not only of the USSR but of the US and any other country. But, no other independent state in the world, including the various neutral states, has so completely aligned itself with USSR in the international field as has Yugoslavia. This cannot help but raise doubts in the minds of American people and its representatives in the Congress. This is the problem we face. It is proper to state it frankly at the beginning of these economic talks. We would welcome anything which can be said to reassure us and to enable us to reassure others. We are pretty much lacking evidence to refute those saying that because of closer relations between the Yugoslav and the Soviet Communist parties, which control the governments in both countries, Yugoslav independence is being compromised.
The Secretary indicated that he was addressing his remarks both to the Ambassador and to Mr. Humo since perhaps the latter, as Minister of Finance, was not primarily concerned with essentially political matters.
Mr. Humo responded to the Secretary’s statement along the following lines:
He thanked the Secretary for his exposition of US views and for his statement of the problem as seen here. He was indeed happy to hear of the Secretary’s belief in Yugoslavia’s independence. He wished to reaffirm categorically Yugoslavia’s determination to maintain its independence and to state that this determination will remain unshaken in future.
No one has better insight into the developments in the USSR than the Yugoslavs. They fully realized the evils of the Stalinist [Page 784] system with its emphasis externally on preparation for war and internally on the ruthless repudiation of all freedoms. Hence, it is the Yugoslav belief that everything possible should be done to assist in the evolution now in progress away from this system in the USSR. The Yugoslav Government is convinced that even the modest advances toward the defeat of Stalinism must be fostered since its elimination will influence Soviet foreign and domestic policies and will have favorable repercussions on the international scene. Soviet society is still fraught with contradictions. There are still grave internal difficulties being encountered in achieving stabilization in the sense of evolution away from the bad conditions which used to prevail in the USSR. Mr. Humo trusted that recent developments have justified the Yugoslav view, repeatedly expressed in the last several years, of this evolutionary trend in the Soviet Union. The ouster of Molotov and other Stalinist leaders was an important turning of this page in Soviet history but its impact cannot yet be fully felt. Some time must elapse before its full importance can become manifest.
Considered in the foregoing light, the crux of the matter insofar as the improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR is concerned is, in Mr. Humo’s view, not that Yugoslavia has shifted its position but that the USSR has changed. It cannot be said that the Yugoslav Government or party has become subservient to the Soviets. On the contrary, the Yugoslavs have exerted an important influence toward change in the USSR. Without going into details about the question of the Yugoslav position regarding various international issues, the closer coincidence of Yugoslav-Soviet positions should be examined from the point of view of determining whether this was the result of a change in Yugoslav or Soviet attitudes. Yugoslavia did not change its position on Hungary. Its vote in the United Nations was not on the substance of the resolution but was determined “in the context of contemporary international relations”.
With respect to the Communist Party in Yugoslavia, there can be no foreign influence permitted in the sense of subservience in the development of its actions and policies. This same principle applies to Yugoslav party relations with the parties in the other countries of Eastern Europe, and Yugoslav influence in this respect is helpful to the Communist parties in those countries.
Two episodes demonstrate Yugoslavia’s equanimity in international affairs and the purposeful course which it is pursuing. When Khrushchev was in Prague he declared that Yugoslavia was a satellite of the United States. When Mr. Humo was in Moscow last year he was asked how many US military bases there were in Yugoslavia. These two incidents demonstrate the continued existence of grave internal conflicts in the USSR and show that Yugoslavia is fully aware of these difficulties in the USSR. But the Yugoslav Government believes [Page 785] that the trend in the USSR cannot be turned back to the ugly past and that the future being shaped there will benefit the whole world. The Yugoslav Government has this in mind in building its relations with the USSR.
Regarding US assistance for Yugoslavia, Mr. Humo wished to stress its value and importance in Yugoslavia’s development and recovery and his Government’s recognition of this fact. He understands that it is in US interests to see Yugoslavia economically strong and independent. As has several times been stated, the Yugoslav Government does not intend to alter its friendly relations with the US and the West because of the friendly relations which it maintains with the USSR.
In responding to Mr. Humo, the Secretary said that although it was clearly impossible to settle in this talk all matters alluded to thus far, he would comment on one or two of Mr. Humo’s remarks. The United States shares the Minister’s opinion that there are evolutionary signs in the USSR which may indicate that some of the worst features of what is called Stalinism are being removed. He took note of Mr. Humo’s statement that while there have been important changes in the Soviet leadership there may be some time before their full import becomes clear. He hoped that there would be a change for the better, but this has yet to be seen as far as Soviet international policies are concerned. Not since 1950, when Soviet aggressive attitudes reached their high point in Korea, has there been as aggressive a Soviet foreign policy as now seems to be the case today. Gromyko’s press conference before leaving for the UN was one of the most vicious statements ever made by any Soviet Foreign Minister. The most recent Soviet Note on the Middle East was so rude in its expressions and false accusations that it is questionable whether it was a proper diplomatic note between countries at least at peace with each other. The designs of the Soviet Union in the Middle East were displayed in the massive shipments of armaments in amounts quite beyond the capability for use of the countries in the Middle East for which ostensibly they were destined.
In the case of Germany, the Secretary observed that Khrushchev and Bulganin agreed at the Summit Conference to free elections. Yet the Soviet Government has made no pretense to uphold this commitment and frankly says that no reunification of Germany can take place except under a system enabling the extension of Soviet control to all Germany. The Secretary doubted whether Stalin would have been as brutal in his repression of the heroic Hungarian uprising as his successors were. So, while we do not lament the departure of some of the old Stalinist leaders, we have difficulty in taking hope from the behaviour of those replacing them. We can understand the satisfaction of Marshal Tito and his Government over the denunciation [Page 786] within the Soviet Union of Stalinism which Tito himself had so vehemently denounced in the past. But, the Secretary suggested that the disappearance of one hated and distrusted symbol does not automatically mean satisfaction with its replacement.
The Secretary said that perhaps he had gone beyond the intended scope of this conversation in which he desired merely to explain the genuine difficulties confronting us. He regretted that the Yugoslav Government had thus far been unable to do a little more to facilitate our task when we want to help Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, we hope that we shall be able to do something helpful for Yugoslavia and that Yugoslavia can do something to help us to help Yugoslavia.
Speaking for himself and for Mr. Humo, the Yugoslav Ambassador declared that we are now living through a hazy and fluid period in international affairs, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Consequently he was confident that mutual relations between the US and Yugoslavia could not properly be considered on the basis of a short period of time and trusted that future developments will show the genuineness of Yugoslav independence and Yugoslavia’s desire for peace. Since the US also cherishes these principles, the natural development of US-Yugoslav relations must be mutually beneficial.