Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

321. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Yugoslav Ambassador (Mates) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), Department of State, Washington, December 9, 1957¹

Washington, December 9, 1957

SUBJECT

• US Military Aid to Yugoslavia

The Yugoslav Ambassador called on Mr. Murphy at his own request to discuss the conversation last Friday between Ambassador Riddleberger and Marshal Tito.² He explained that he had come under instructions from his Government to repeat President Tito’s remarks to Mr. Riddleberger on the question of US military aid. Mr. Mates observed that this particular aid had in the past given rise to unfortunate statements, particularly in the US Congress, which did not contribute to good relations and had resulted generally in an “unpleasant atmosphere”. He recalled his meeting with Mr. Murphy on January 8³ when, he said, he had pointed out in connection with the then anticipated resumption of deliveries that it would be desirable if these deliveries could be effected at the rate originally contemplated and without further interruption. After deliveries were resumed in May of 1957, he said, he had pointed out that the stretchout was in his personal view unfortunate. Since that time, his Government has given further consideration to the question, the Ambassador said, and has concluded that the political difficulties caused by military aid now outweigh the value of the military equipment involved.

In order that the termination of military aid may be carried out smoothly and without irritation on either side, Mr. Mates said, President Tito had proposed that US and Yugoslav representatives meet in Belgrade to make necessary specific arrangements.

Mr. Murphy observed that he saw no occasion for irritation, and that he appreciated the motivation for the Yugoslav proposal. He pointed out, however, that we had been surprised at the publicity which the whole question had received, particularly as this appears to have originated in Belgrade. This was difficult to understand, Mr. Murphy said, since it was our understanding that the Yugoslavs had specifically requested that their proposal be kept secret. Mr. Mates replied, however, that he knew nothing about the publicity, that he too had been surprised, and that he had in fact intended to ask Mr. Murphy whether he knew anything about it.

In closing the conversation on this topic Mr. Murphy asked, as he had once earlier in the conversation, whether we were correct in taking the Yugoslav decision to apply to all US military aid program, including end items, spare parts, training, etc. In his reply Mr. Mates made no distinction between end items and spare parts and training. He said it was his understanding that the decision extends to all military aid, all “military hardware” as he put it, that is, the entire military aid program.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.5–MSP/12–957. Confidential. Drafted by R.B. Hill of the Office of Eastern European Affairs. In a memorandum dated December 9, Elbrick suggested that in his scheduled meeting with Mates, Murphy question Mates on whether the termination of the aid program applied to spare parts, whether it involved an abrogation of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, whether the Yugoslav Government would insist on the rapid withdrawal of AMAS, and how the Yugoslav Government would now supply their military needs. (Ibid., 768.5–MSP/12–957)
2. See supra.
3. Telegram 556 to Belgrade, January 9, summarized the Murphy–Mates discussion the previous day. (Department of State, Central Files, 758.5–MSP/12–2456)