Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

306. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, August 9, 1957—noon.

210. Department pouch EE posts and PRU’s. Embtel 200.²

1. While interview with Acting Foreign Secretary yesterday was largely reaffirmation on his part that Yugoslav policy unchanged result Tito–Khrushchev meeting,³ some of his comments may be of interest. He clearly confirmed our earlier impression Yugoslavia wishes improve its relations with Soviets although stoutly maintaining his government’s intention adhere principles of Belgrade and Moscow Declarations.⁴ Yugoslavia did not expect meeting would solve outstanding issues between it and Soviet Government, but Tito returned from Rumania encouraged by “open-minded and receptive attitude” of Khrushchev toward Yugoslav policy.

2. Reiterating that Yugoslav viewpoint was unchanged on major issues, Prica said that following Moscow events⁵Khrushchev was obviously in position to revive his earlier policy of friendship with Yugoslavia which indeed he must develop if his commitments under Belgrade and Moscow Declarations were to have any real meaning. This did not mean Khrushchev was prepared to abandon his thesis that all Communist countries should be in “socialist camp” but his approach was more flexible. Prica stated Tito had made it plain Yugoslavia had no intention joining “socialist camp” as this [was] bloc and Yugoslavia was opposed to blocs. In spite of this firm attitude, Khrushchev had appeared more receptive to Yugoslav ideas and this was reflected by reference in communiqué to “peaceful and progressive forces of whole world and unity of international workers movement”. This in Yugoslavia’s view comprised all socialist parties and in no sense implied joining an alliance. In brief, Prica said, there is wide difference between “international workers movement” and “socialist camp”.

3. Prica revealed there had been considerable argument over substance and form of communiqué, stating Soviets had presented lengthy document which Yugoslav delegation could not accept as it seemed to be at variance in several respects with basic Yugoslav policy, or at least created that impression. Eventually it was decided to issue short communiqué to press which admittedly was vague in its formulation, was signed neither by Tito nor Khrushchev, and while it indicated some progress clearly showed many problems were left unsolved.

4. In response my question whether any particular significance use of word “permanent” re party relations in last paragraph communiqué,⁶Prica firmly rejected any idea of Yugoslav participation revived Cominform.

5. Somewhat to my surprise Prica while admitting Zhukov had been influential in gaining support for Khrushchev during Moscow crisis tended to deprecate his importance and remarked his power may have been overestimated in some quarters. When I asked what he meant, Acting Foreign Secretary advanced explanation along following lines. In Yugoslav view, situation in USSR went far beyond explanation in terms of personalities. Soviet Union was in state of ferment flowing both from de-Stalinization and pressure from below for reforms. No one could be sure today how far de-Stalinization had gone or what final outcome would be but fall of such figures as Molotov and Kaganovich was measure of depth of ferment in USSR. Yugoslav Government had impression this ferment was so widespread and internal pressures so great that Soviet leaders could not stop developments, which he would describe as “positive”, even if they wished. Evidence of this could be found in the “confusion and uncertainty” in satellite leadership which was particularly noticeable in Albania and Bulgaria. In Rumania Yugoslavs discerned some signs of improvement and willingness to recognize necessity for change. Although he would not specify how liberalization of Soviet policies toward satellites would be manifested, his expectation was that developments would occur perhaps sooner than was anticipated in West. He would not go so far as to say that Khrushchev’s policy was entirely correct in Yugoslav Government opinion but he was moving in right direction and justification was slowly emerging for Yugoslav tenacity in sticking to principles of Belgrade Declaration.

6. In reply my query what Yugoslav Government really expected under revived credit arrangements Prica expressed guarded optimism that this time Soviets will grant concrete assistance and not just make paper promises. He would not predict however when some of larger projects would actually be started. He was uncertain whether Yugoslavia would receive wheat from Soviet this year but promised inquire.

7. Re Germany, he pleaded ignorance on whether there had been discussions, and likewise for Near East situation.

8. In conclusion, Prica said he had just read account of Secretary’s press conference of August 6⁷ and he fully agreed with latter’s analysis of Yugoslav position.

Riddleberger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.68/8–957. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and Bonn.
2. In telegram 200 from Belgrade, August 7, Riddleberger provided an analysis of Yugoslavia’s relationship with the Soviet Union. His conclusion reads in part: “that fundamental elements dividing Belgrade and Moscow remain, that both sides for their own reasons desire improve relations to the maximum point possible and maintain public attitudes minimize insoluble differences.” (Ibid., 661.68/8–757)
3. In telegram 188 from Belgrade, August 4, Riddleberger reported that Tito, Khrushchev, and their respective delegations met in Romania on August 1 and 2. Riddleberger also provided a summary of the communiqué issued after the meeting. (Ibid., 661.68/8–457)
4. Regarding the Belgrade Declaration, see footnote 2, Document 251. Regarding the Moscow Declaration, see footnote 5, Document 280.
5. Reference is presumably to the announcement on July 3 in Moscow of the removal of the “anti-party” group of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and others from the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
6. According to Riddleberger’s account in telegram 188, the communiqué called for “maintenance of permanent relations by way of exchange of party delegations, mutual information and publications.”
7. In his press conference on August 6, Secretary Dulles, in response to a question concerning the Soviet-Yugoslav meeting, stated that the United States had no reason to believe that Tito had abandoned his policy of maintaining his independence from the Soviet Union. For the transcript of the press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, August 26, 1957, p. 344.