Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

305. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 31–57

Washington, June 11, 1957.

YUGOSLAVIA’S POLICIES AND PROSPECTS

The Problem

To review Yugoslavia’s internal situation and external policies, and to estimate probable developments in these respects.

Conclusions

1. The Yugoslav Communist dictatorship remains strong and apparently cohesive. Although there are chronic economic difficulties, widespread anti-Communist sentiments among the populace, and antagonistic attitudes among various nationality groups, these do not now pose a threat to political stability. The regime has successfully resisted Soviet pressures and maintained Yugoslavia’s independence on the international scene. A serious challenge to its control is improbable unless party unity should break down, and this development appears unlikely except possibly in the event of Tito’s death. (Paras. 7, 9–10, 32, 34–37)

2. We believe that Yugoslavia will continue to maintain its independent foreign policy, avoiding alignment in the East-West struggle. While continuing to criticize the inflexible attitudes which it perceives in the two blocs, Yugoslavia will nevertheless continue to recognize the bargaining power it gains from the struggle and would view with anxiety any drastic changes in the power balance. (Para. 44)

3. Barring the improbable event of substantial new Soviet concessions to Yugoslav views on national independence, the Yugoslavs are unlikely for some time to develop relations with the USSR as close as those prevailing in the 1955–56 period. However, they will continue to moderate public expression of differences and will seek opportunities to expand economic and political contacts with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, hoping to exercise some influence toward the emergence of national Communist regimes. (Paras. 46–47)

4. In the face of Moscow’s campaign to impose ideological orthodoxy on the Satellites, the Yugoslavs are giving particular attention to their relations with Poland and Communist China. Tito will continue to cultivate these and any other Bloc states that demonstrate some ability to determine policy without complete Soviet dictation. He will also seek to establish special relations with the neutralist powers and with a wide variety of Socialist parties and organizations in the interest of his personal prestige and in an effort to make Yugoslavia a leader of political forces uncommitted to either Bloc. (Paras. 30, 50, 53)

5. Yugoslavia’s continuing need for outside economic aid and political support will make friendly relations with the West, and particularly the US, an important concern, though cooperation with the Western powers in the military sphere will remain limited. Present levels of US aid enable the Yugoslavs to carry on development programs that they would be loath to abandon. Were US aid to be curtailed, the Yugoslavs would be receptive to greater assistance from Bloc sources, though not at the price of surrendering their independent position. (Paras. 54–56)

6. There is no figure of Tito’s stature to replace him, and a crisis in party leadership could arise after his death, particularly if this coincided with an international crisis or major internal difficulties. However, we believe it likely that there will be a relatively peaceful emergence of a national Communist successor regime which will continue the policy of nonalignment rather than risk a renewal of domination by the Soviet Union. (Paras. 37–43)

[Here follows the “Discussion” section, comprising paragraphs 7–56.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” The report was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on June 11.